

Harold Washington
and the Crisis of
BLACK
POWER
in Chicago

ABDUL ALKALIMAT
DOUG GILLS

Black Power in Chicago
Volume 1

The specific question is: How long will the cathartic ritual of voting satisfy the hunger of Black people for freedom? The general question posed is: How can Black people lead a progressive movement to seize power?

Harold Washington and the Crisis of Black Power in Chicago: Mass Protest

Abdul Alkalimat
Doug Gills

Twenty-First Century Books and Publications

**We dedicate this volume to our children and their future
struggles for peoples power and social transformation.**

Malaika Mei-ling Efe McWorter (b. 1972)

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Twenty-First Century Books and Publications

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Introduction

Data and Method in the Study of the Harold Washington Mayoral Experience

Why another book? We believe that this volume had to be written for several important reasons. First, it is important to identify the forces and factors which contributed to the successful campaign mobilization which made Harold Washington's mayoral election possible. Washington's election was a significant popular accomplishment of global noteworthiness. It is imperative that what happened in Chicago in 1983 – and how it happened – be explained.

Our task is not merely to celebrate a symbol of Black Power, the success of a political struggle in Chicago to elect the first Black mayor. We believe that it is necessary to go beyond community pride and lay bear for critical debate the major political lessons to be drawn from this experience. Only then can the past serve our struggle for the future.

Second, we expect that along with providing explanations and useful insights about how Harold Washington became Chicago's first Black mayor, we will provoke debate over continuing the struggle beyond the Washington reform effort towards a new politics and a new type of democracy. We see this volume as having the objective of contributing to the current dialogue over contemporary urban Black politics. We want to contribute greater insights to the necessity of coalition

building among forces outside the Black community, specifically those forces which converge with compatible demands. We hope this continues a tradition of radical Black activist scholarship.

THE DESIGN

This volume is part of a series of publications on the overall experiences of the Harold Washington campaigns. Specifically, there will be three volumes summing up the role of leadership in the fight for Black power. This first volume explores the strengths and weaknesses, limitations and contradictions within the campaign organizational process. It emphasizes the central role of the united Black political community as the basis for Washington's success. Also, it attempts to demonstrate the critically important role of Latino and white activists in mobilizing the coalition enabling Black led reform forces to capture city hall.

The second volume will be an in depth case study of the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment. This will discuss the relative significance of a nationalist oriented community based middle class leadership in advancing the interests of the Black community through militant electoral protest.

The third volume examines the political thought of Harold Washington. This will include an extensive anthology of his words from speeches as an Illinois state legislator, as a member of Congress, and as Mayor. The Washington legacy will be claimed by many for years to come, and therefore it is necessary to have clarity on what Harold Washington actually stood for, and not merely what others claim for him.

DATA AND METHOD

This study is based on a diverse set of data. The key is the involved observation of the authors in various aspects of the overall campaign experience. Being involved was important because gaining the confidence of the main political actors was essential for obtaining documentary evidence of

campaign activities. One important difference between participant observation and our methodology of the involved observer is that our biases are democratically made known to our subjects, whereas for the other approach one is essentially covert by remaining silent and "apparently" neutral. Furthermore, a corrective against potential bias and "research blindness" was introduced through active debate and discussion of varying political ideas and positions held by the research team and close associates.

Furthermore, after a draft of this analysis was completed it was circulated to a diverse grouping of participants, observers, and academics for review, comment and criticism. Moreover, comments and criticisms were actively solicited through follow-up discussions with individuals, and in public forums with groups. Finally, this process continued with a group of Harold Washington campaign "insiders." Among the persons who were solicited for comment included Hal Baron, Kari Moe, Al Raby, Art Vazquez, and Robert Meir from inside of the Washington administration. Activists who commented were Slim Coleman, Tim Black, Ish Flory, Lu Palmer, Mercedes Mallette, Conrad Worrill, Harold Rogers, Wiley Rogers, Robert Starks, Robert Lucas, Rev Al Sampson, Danny Davis (member of city council), and a few selected academics. On much of this work Ronald Bailey was virtually a third author as he contributed to the early work of designing the research and developing the conceptual framework.

The actual data employed was varied.

Our data can be described by four categories:

1. Direct observation and interviews with key actors;
2. Documentary materials from the campaign
3. Publically available materials, especially the media;
4. Background material, the census and previously published books and articles on Black people and Chicago politics.

The print media was used. This included two white mainstream dailies, a Black daily, three weeklies, three

monthly magazines, and assorted community weeklies and monthlies. We clipped these papers and organized the clips in a chronological order. As a service to the community we selected and circulated three sets of these clips, the 1983 primary race, the general election, and of the general coverage in the radical press. The collection of clips covering the 1983 primary election is a unique documentary account of how a Black protest candidate was victorious based on massive voter registration and turnout by the Black community and its allies.

Equally important as any of this data was the collective discussion at a conference we organized prior to the 1983 primary of activists intellectuals, movement activists, and academics. Our basic orientation and political perspectives were put forward in this conference through active dialogue and debate.

1983 CONFERENCE ON BLACK MAYORS

The conference was held January 28th and 29th, 1983, and sponsored by the University of Illinois and the Illinois Council for Black Studies. See appendix for a list of conference presenters. Over 300 participants came, Black-white-Latino, scholars and activists, students, and many others. The important questions addressed by the conference were: who gets elected as a Black mayor? Why? How? Where? Who benefits? Who gets reelected? And, what difference does all this make in the lives of the majority of people, especially Black people?

We published a call to the conference in a newspaper format and distributed it as an insert in the daily Defender, the major Black newspaper. It stated:

Black people are the most urbanized nationality in the United States, and among the poorest and most powerless. Moreover, cities are turning into Black and Latin communities. The issue of mayoral politics for Black and Latin peoples must not only focus on the concentration of problems facing them, but must also deal with the potential

that exists for solutions to these problems. These solutions are central to the future of the cities and the future of the US as well.

The conference not only addressed the issues of who gets elected and who benefits, but broader issues of tactics and political action. Specifically, this included the role of protest and insurgency, along with electoral activity in the context of the historical development of Black politics in Chicago. The cutting edge of the conference was the limitations of electoral participation in general, and Black mayoral politics in particular.

In the conference call several key factors were identified as systemic impediments to Black mayors (despite any rare noble intentions) that keeps them from being radically innovative, or making revolutionary breakthroughs in solving the problems faced by city residents (unemployment, insufficient income, bad housing, scarce health services, and inadequate education). Among the factors were:

1. the persistence of RACISM in all three forms, individual, institutional, and societal;
2. BUREAUCRACY, those complex webs of relations and regulations which protect custom and convention against innovation; conflicts and competition of intergovernmental relations that reflect structural tensions between branches and levels of government
3. CLASS CONFLICT, different aspects of the social base of a Black mayor limits action to consensus building through trying to balance the opposite vested interests of the working class and the capitalist class;
4. THE ABSENCE OF A VIABLE THEORY OF CHANGE, a comprehensive plan for urban reconstruction, and societal transformation.

Finally at the conclusion of the conference alternative ideological positions were vigorously discussed. In the end, the socially responsible consensus position had been advanced earlier in the pre-conference newspaper:

The increase in the number of Black elected officials is very important, reflecting more than anything else the fierce determination of Black people to fight for all the rights guaranteed all citizens. Some applaud these quantitative gains as key steps toward Black liberation. Other knowledgeable observers, however, have raised serious questions as to what real and lasting gains have been secured through all of this activity. They compare small and hard won symbolic gains with the reality and the inability of elected politicians to achieve substantive changes in the society. A similar observation is made with regard to the problems facing Black mayors in stemming the rising tide of crisis and decay in cities in which they hold office.

Even in the midst of mounting campaigns for Black mayors and fighting for proportional representation for Blacks on city councils, in state legislatures, and even in the US Congress, many people are led to look beyond achieving Black Power and to ask **BLACK POWER FOR WHAT?** ...Other avenues to winning power – and even an understanding of what power is and who controls it for what purpose and how are also critical issues to explore.

Only with a clear understanding of these issues – studying, discussing, clarifying and resolving them – can Black political power in the city be achieved to serve that end that all political power should serve, that of improving the quality of life for the masses of all of the people in the society.

In this book there are four chapters of empirical analysis, two chapters of summation, and a concluding chapter of theoretical critique. The first chapter deals with Chicago history as the context for the Harold Washington 1983 mayoral campaign, especially the role of Richard J. Daley. The

second chapter sets the stage for the election by explaining the origins and posture of the three candidates running in the primary. Chapter 3 is a detailed descriptive analysis of the Washington campaign organization. Chapter 4 sums up the general election. After two chapters of summation, the last chapter draws out and discusses the two main political lessons for the future.

1.

Chicago History and Mayoral Politics

Although mayoral elections are held every four years in most cities, some of these elections are more important than others, or at least a lot of people think so. In 1983, when Harold Washington was elected the first Black mayor in the history of Chicago, people were following this political process all over the world.¹ Chicago is a city accustomed to having its political life discussed throughout the nation and the world. Of course, it has been more generally used as an example of graft, corruption, gangsterism, and political/police violence. However, this time around, the focus of attention was on a positive movement, a movement based on the stated goal of changing the Chicago political scene. It was the movement of a previously powerless or oppressed group—the Black community. The drama of this Chicago story, as a microcosm of the entire U.S., is the historical dynamic of demographic and socioeconomic change, the changing reality of race, nationality, and class. Further, the political struggles waged in Chicago might well be understood as a preliminary stage of bigger developments now unfolding on the national scene.

Thus, it is necessary to have a clear analysis of events in Chicago, and toward that end at least 10 major book-length studies were in preparation within the first few months after the election. In the following pages, we will address four key questions:

1. What historical developments in Chicago led to 1983?
2. How and why did Harold Washington get elected?
3. What difference will it make in Chicago, or to electoral politics generally?
4. What are the lessons of this experience for progressive movements working for basic change?

OVERVIEW OF CHICAGO HISTORY

In its own specific way, Chicago's history follows the general dynamic patterns of capitalism and urban development.² We can distinguish four stages of development in the history of Chicago and identify the relatively characteristic dates for each:³ Indian territory (1770), commercial town (1850), industrial city (1920), and monopoly metropolis (1970).

The terrain around the southwestern shore of Lake Michigan was largely inhabited by Indians of the Potawatomi, Ottawa, and Chipewyan tribes. They were at an early horticultural stage of development, relying on a great deal of hunting and gathering. Thus, a small population required the support of a relatively large area. Although European explorers passed through in the 17th and 18th centuries (e.g., Pere Marquette and Louis Joliet in 1673), the first permanent settlement was established in the 1770s by Jean Baptiste Pointe DuSable, a Black man.⁴ Fort Dearborn was built as an early military outpost for the old Northwest Territory in 1803, burned down by the Indians, and built up again. By 1833, the city was incorporated. As a result of a forced treaty with Indians in 1835, full control of the area was attained by 1837 with a grant of a city charter from the state legislature. During this period, the central dynamic was the imposition of military force, led by the trappers and traders, who subordinated the local indigenous economic activity to the consumer tastes of European and American women back East for furs.

Chicago emerged as a commercial town because of its key location as a regional marketplace, serving the frontier settlers with goods to support their farms in exchange for farm

products. The city grew in population from 4,470 in 1840 to 29,963 in 1850; and from 112,176 in 1860 to 298,977 in 1870. Over 50% of its population in 1860 was foreign-born. This was the period of significant canal building and railroad construction (e.g., the Illinois-Michigan Canal, 1848; Illinois Central Railroad, 1851; and the Rock Island Line in 1854) that opened up Chicago to increased East-West and Mississippi River trade. By 1854, Chicago was the center of the largest corn and wheat market in the United States. Chicago's famous commercial district developed in 1867, when Potter Palmer bought three quarters of a mile of State Street, widened it, built his still-famous hotel, and recruited other businesses to the enterprise that turned State Street into "that great street."

While the early industrial development of Chicago was mainly for local consumption, the Civil War produced conditions for the distribution of Chicago's products throughout the country. Further, the famous Chicago Fire in 1871 was an impetus to economic development. It cleared out over 1,700 wooden buildings of pre-industrial origins. Chicago's rebound from "the fire" was climaxed by its hosting of the World Columbian Exposition only 20 years later in 1893. Great industrial giants began to develop: McCormick built a large farm machinery factory; Armour, Swift, Wilson, and others used the Union Stockyards (1865) to build Chicago into the world's largest center of meat-packing; and Pullman built an industrial community (1884) to produce railroad cars for the nation. Chicago also began to emerge as a great steel-producing center, rising from a zero rank in 1860 to fourth among U.S. cities in steel production by 1880.

The high point of Chicago's industrial development was reached during the World War I years. In 1906 Gary developed as an industrial suburb in which the giants of steel (U.S. Steel, Inland, etc.) flexed their muscles for the world.⁵ By 1914, Chicago ranked second only to New York in manufacturing, especially in men's clothing, meat-packing, and furniture, and in baking, printing, and publishing.

Perhaps more indicative of how this industrial development

changed life in Chicago is to be found in the development of working-class struggle. There was a brutal recognition by the owners of capital of the need to control labor. In 1886, the fight for an eight-hour work day led to the Haymarket Massacre and established May 1 as a *world* working-class holiday. The flip side of the 1893 World Columbian Exposition was the violent repression of Pullman Company strikers by federal troops supplied by President Cleveland. In May of 1937, police and company goons of Republic Steel massacred workers while they marched for the right to organize a union and demonstrated at their South Chicago plant. The working class paid in blood for Chicago's pre-eminence as an industrial center.

Black people have been part of Chicago history since the 18th century, but a Black community only took shape during the period of industrial advancement.⁶ During the 1840s, Chicago was a major "depot" of the Underground Railroad, and soon Black people founded such basic institutions as Quinn Chapel AME Church in 1847 and Olivet Baptist Church in 1850. By 1920, Chicago's Black community had become a Black city itself: it had a hospital (Provident Hospital, 1901); a newspaper (*Defender*, 1905); a bank (Jesse Binga's State Bank, 1908); a thriving business community, and an expanding population (1885: 323; 1870: 3,686; 1890: 14,271; and 1920: 109,458).

The convergence of two processes—the decline of labor-intensive land tenancy in the South, and the peaking of U.S. industrial expansion during the World War I period—produced a "push-pull" dynamic that generated the dramatic immigration of Blacks into Northern industrial cities and their absorption into the industrial work force. It is significant that the proletarianization of Black workers came on the "downside" of the peak of Chicago's industrial development.

The stages of Chicago's history represent cumulative developments that interpenetrate and, together, constitute the structural fabric of city life. Chicago remains a commercial center, but the character of its sales has changed with overall changes in the city. With new transportation and communication developments, it became a mail-order center (e.g., Montgomery

Ward began in 1872). With the automobile and roads, its commercial activity was decentralized from a central business district to a network of suburban shopping centers. (In 1969, 11 suburban shopping centers had sales of \$775 million, while Chicago's downtown had \$906 million.) Further, 20th-century changes in Chicago's industrial development reflected both its growing dominance and its eventual decline. The main aspect of its decline is the loss of jobs at the rate of 20,000 a year since World War II. Factories first relocated from the central city to the suburbs, and then left the region altogether. Symbolic of this loss of jobs was the closing of the Union Stockyards in 1971 and the original McCormick Works of International Harvester in 1961.

Our understanding of Chicago's transformation up to and after World War II is informed by a 1950 study by the Chicago Workers School, *Who Owns Chicago? A Study of the Chicago Groups and the Economy*.⁷ This study focused on the relative standing of Chicago capital after World War II, based on an assumption that this war might have propelled Chicago onto the world scene. They found the following: 1) An intimate connection remains between Chicago capital and Midwest agriculture; 2) Chicago capital does not control basic industry (e.g., steel, oil, auto, heavy machinery; 3) Chicago capital plays a negligible role in the export of capital, particularly to Europe (New York banks handled 93% of the business of the Marshall Plan); and 4) the great Chicago banks have developed a certain degree of independence from the dominant American banking trusts (Morgan and Rockefeller).

By the 1950s, Chicago was undergoing manifest changes.⁸ In 1950, 78% of all employment was in the city, and there were only 56 miles of expressways. By 1972, there were 506 miles of expressways, and by 1980, a majority of jobs were in the suburbs. It is still a center of industry (one third of the GNP of the U.S. is produced within 300 miles of Chicago), but its character has changed to that of a giant metropolis dominated by finance capital.⁹ The five financial exchanges in Chicago now comprise 80% of the world's commodity futures trading.

There are 240 banks and savings and loans institutions in downtown Chicago, and those banks generate more business loans than the banks in any other city. By 1980, Chicago had been pulled firmly into the integrated core of U.S. monopoly capitalism with its imperialist character.¹⁰

This general historical sketch of Chicago is reflected in its population profile (see Table 1). Until 1950, European ethnics dominated the city with the increase of manufacturing. However, the data for 1970 and 1980 reflect the relative dominance of Blacks, a decline in the number of production workers, and a rise in professional workers. This suggests that Chicago was increasing its role as a center of finance capital, including administrative headquarters, higher education, and research and development. Further, these dynamics provide the structural basis for understanding the turbulence of Chicago politics in the 1960s.

Table 1 HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHICAGO POPULATION: NATIONALITY, RACE AND CLASS, 1890-1980

<i>Date</i>	<i>Nationality</i>		<i>Race</i>	<i>Class</i>	
	<i>% Foreign Born</i>	<i>% Foreign Stock¹</i>	<i>% Black</i>	<i>No. Workers in Manufacturing (in thousands)</i>	<i>% Professional</i>
1890	41.0	77.8	1.3	191	2.4
1910	35.9	77.5	2.0	298	5.7
1930	25.4	64.4	6.9	391	6.8
1950	14.5	45.0	14.0	645	8.8
1970	11.1	29.8	34.4	477	12.6
1980	14.5 ²	³	39.8	241	11.4

1. Foreign stock includes people foreign-born and children of foreign-born, so in 1890 41.0% were born outside of the U.S. and 36.8% were their children.

2. This increase in percent of foreign born reflects the new immigrants from imperialist contradictions in Central America, the West Indies, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.

3. Data not available.

The entire history of Chicago politics reflects to some extent the changes just discussed in its economic development. There have been three broad groupings of mayors (for this purpose we are not examining some of the historical transitions and

exceptions to this model).¹¹ (See Table 2.) City Hall seems to have become increasingly stable, dominated by the Democratic Party, and led by native-born politicians. While mayoral leadership was once mainly recruited from business, over time this source of recruitment has increasingly been shared with professionally trained lawyers. Three examples of Chicago mayoral types will make the historical transition clear: 1) William Ogden (1837) was an enterprising land speculator and railroad magnate from New York who established a business and political career. 2) William "Big Bill" Thompson (1915, 1919, 1927), a colorful, corrupt mayor during the high tide of gangster activity in Chicago, illegally became a millionaire. He built a large Black following on his way to becoming the last of the big-time Republican mayors. 3) Richard J. Daley (1955, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1975), trained as a lawyer, dominated the city as chair of the party and mayor for over 20 years.

Table 2 HISTORICAL STAGES OF CHICAGO MAYORAL LEADERSHIP

<i>Types of Chicago Mayors</i>	<i>Avg. No. Years in Office</i>	<i>No. of Mayors</i>	<i>% Mayors Democrats</i>	<i>% Mayors Chicago-Born</i>	<i>Type of Mayor % Years in Office, by Occupation:</i>	
					<i>Business</i>	<i>Lawyer</i>
Commercial Elite (1837-1875)	1.7	23	48	0	86.8 (N = 38)	13.2
Factional Fighters (1876-1930)	4.7	12	50	25	57.1 (N = 56)	42.9
Machine Administrators (1931-1983)	8.7	6	100	67	51.9 (N = 52)	48.1

This development of Chicago mayoral administrations has been summed up by Donald Bradley:

The type of men recruited for the mayoralty changed over the 125 years of Chicago's history. The office was initially (1837-1869) the prerogative of the early promoters and original business elite of the community. Alteration in the economic structure

of the city, the proliferation of public services and official responsibilities, the qualitative and quantitative changes in the population, however, all created a new trend in political recruitment. The rapid change experienced by the city in all of its aspects produced an atmosphere conducive to the cult of the personality that obtained between 1880 and 1930. The 1930s saw the stabilization of the community and the ascendancy of a dominant party machine. Thus, between 1931 and the present, the chief elected office in the city has been held by a group of political entrepreneurs who came up through the ranks of the party organization.

When viewed in the broad perspectives of the changes that have taken place in Chicago, two factors stand out as responsible for the observed trend in political leadership: the desirability of political office for those differentially situated in the community fabric, and the type and distribution of political resources within the community. Related to, but analytically distinct from, the ambition to hold political office is the ability to muster the necessary support.¹²

Black politics fits this model to some extent.¹³ Early Black politicians were strong individualists who built political careers during the first stage and within the second mayoral stage in Chicago. These included the following: John Jones (first Black official elected as county commissioner, 1871-1875); Oscar de Priest (first Black on the City Council, 1916, and the first Black in the U.S. Congress after Reconstruction, 1928-1934); and Ed Wright (first Black ward committeeman, 1920). These political leaders attached themselves to a political faction when it served their ends, and frequently changed sides as political expediency dictated. They were "race men" in that their overriding concern, as individuals, was to work for the good of Black people, or the community.

A second stage in Black politics emerged with the building of the Black submachine. James Q. Wilson identifies its origins:

The Negro machine owes its existence in part to the existence of a city-wide Democratic machine; it is, to use a clumsy phrase, a "submachine" within the larger city machine. Although Negroes have held important political office in Chicago since 1915 (when Oscar de Priest was elected alderman), in Cook County since 1871 (although continuously only since 1938), and in the Illinois

State Legislature since 1876, the rise of the present Negro machine did not begin until 1939. In that year, Dawson, an independent Republican who had served in the City Council, switched parties and, with the active support of Mayor Edward Kelly, entered the Democratic Party as committeeman of the second ward. Real political power in Chicago is vested in the ward committeemen. Although nominally they are elected by the voters of each ward, in fact they are selected by the party leadership. All political matters, including the control of patronage, are decided by the ward committeemen, either individually on matters within each ward, or collectively on matters concerning the party as a whole. Negro political strength is coterminous with the number of Negro ward committeemen, and the existence of a single Negro machine is dependent on the extent to which these Negro ward committeemen can be led as a group by one of their number.¹⁴

Beginning in the 1960s with massive civil rights demonstrations, a third stage of Black politics in Chicago began to emerge— independent politics. Rooted in radical movements, and including activists who would later rise to prominence (e.g., Harold Washington, Gus Savage, Bennett Johnson), this phenomenon began as a movement often discussed as “Protest at the Polls,” which became the first organized thrust for Black political power. At times this motion supported regular Democrats, but by the time of the militant anti-Daley demonstrations in the 1960s, a stream of independents began banging on the door of City Hall.¹⁵ Despite these actions, little substantial benefit accrued to the masses through local changes.

The 1960s were characterized by sustained mass protest and struggle, but without a great degree of lasting change in the lives of the majority of Blacks. Middle-class Blacks did win some benefits. Since mass demonstrations rather than voting had won these gains, the middle class lost interest in voting.¹⁶ (This was the opposite of the pattern in the South, since middle-class Blacks did have hopes of material gain from voting.) Further, the machine did not work for a large voter turnout, so the majority of Blacks were not encouraged to vote en masse. An independent politics had been developing since the 1960s, but it had yet to become organized sufficiently to mobilize and

consolidate the mass vote beyond the boundaries of given wards. The mid-1960s in Chicago witnessed an explosion of mass political participation and various forms of social action. Malcolm X had said that change would come from the "Ballot or the Bullet."¹⁷ During Black riots of the 1960s, Daley gave orders to shoot to kill, while he planned for the Democratic machine to maintain order and political control. Although it seems important to keep the Malcolm-Daley positions clear, the following study is on one additional case of using the ballot.

DALEY AND THE MACHINE

From 1955 until 1976, Chicago was run by Richard J. Daley, the undisputed dominant figure in City Hall and in the Democratic Party.¹⁸ The pattern of Democratic rule in Chicago can be clearly seen in the history of the Democratic mayoral primary since Daley's election in 1955. Daley's political dominance is best indicated by his being unopposed for four of his six elections. He was a formidable opponent who could scream four-letter words on national television, order police to shoot to kill looters during riots, and force prominent civil rights leaders to give him the Black-Power handshake. In fact when he did these things, working-class ethnics loved him even more. As point man for the Irish, Daley administered their disproportionate control of power and jobs despite their declining numbers and percentage of the population. When Daley was first elected, the Irish were 10% of the population, but held one third of the City Council positions. Irish mayors have been in office from 1933 to 1983, except for 1976-1979 (when Daley's floor manager in the City Council, a Croatian, was installed after Daley's sudden death). This domination of City Hall by the Irish has been a source of gripes from the Polish community (although they are the largest white ethnic group in Chicago, they have never had a mayor).

Mike Royko, a well-known Chicago journalist, quotes former State's Attorney Ben Adamowski about Daley's early career while they were young state legislators in Springfield, Illinois:

I remember those walks. Abe Marovitz was always saying, "Some day the three of us will run Chicago, a Pole, an Irishman, and a Jew." Abe was always saying that. But Daley never said anything. I never once heard him say a word about where he wanted to go. Actually, he didn't say much of anything. He rarely said anything on the Senate floor. He was very quiet, humble, and respectful of everyone, and he developed a reputation for being good on revenue matters, but that was about all.

Most of the time he kept to himself, stayed in his hotel room, and worked hard. In Springfield, you could tell real fast which men were there for girls, games, and graft. He wasn't. I'll tell you how he made it. He made it through sheer luck and by attaching himself to one guy after another and then stepping over them. His ward committeeman in those days was Babe Connelly. Babe was always pushing Daley out front. He sent him to Springfield, pushed him for the better jobs.

Then, when Daley got a chance, he squeezed Connelly out.¹⁹

Daley was great if he could use you—his concept of friendship—and was a ruthless enemy to his opponents. For years, his power was damn-near absolute.

Table 3 CHICAGO DEMOCRATIC MAYORAL PRIMARIES, 1955-1979*

Year	% Voter Turnout	Candidates	Votes	
			Totals	% of Total
1955	52.7	Richard Daley	369,562	49.0
		Martin Kennelly	266,946	35.4
		Benjamin Adamowski	113,173	14.0
1959	44.1	Richard Daley	471,674	Unopposed
1963	47.3	Richard Daley	396,473	Unopposed
1967	46.5	Richard Daley	420,200	Unopposed
1971	45.7	Richard Daley	375,291	Unopposed
1975	57.6	Richard Daley	463,623	57.8
		William Singer	234,629	29.3
		Richard Newhouse	63,489	7.9
		Edward Hanrahan	39,701	5.0
1977	47.1	Michael Bilandic	368,409	51.1
		Roman Pucinski	235,790	32.7
		Harold Washington	77,345	10.8
		Edward Hanrahan	23,643	4.0
1979	60.5	Jane Byrne	412,909	51.0
		Michael Bilandic	396,134	49.0

*Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, "Mayoral Election Returns, 1955-1979."

Things began to change in 1975 when Daley was challenged in the primary by an independent (William Singer), a reform-oriented Black (Richard Newhouse), and an out-of-favor machine hack (Edward Hanrahan, the infamous butcher who ordered the murder of Fred Hampton of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense in 1969).¹⁷ However, an even more important change occurred with Daley's death on December 20, 1976. As in all political regimes run by a strong leader, the question of succession was a central issue, and here the seemingly invincible machine revealed its factions, internal tensions, and fundamental weaknesses.

A critical issue in understanding Chicago politics is the way interest groups were co-opted and held together by the machine.²⁰ This was achieved through an exchange of material rewards for delivering the vote based on precinct organizations within the wards. Jobs and economic favors were differentially and disproportionately allocated, based upon voting strength, which in turn was based on which ethnic groups were represented. Irish votes counted more than those of Blacks, and Blacks were given jobs on the lower levels, in the less well-paying agencies. The Black middle class was given honorific positions with status but little control of jobs, because they could not be trusted to hire "right"—meaning, hire mainly loyal Democrats and Blacks who would work for the organization.

The position of president pro tem of the Chicago City Council had been held by three Blacks (Ralph Metcalfe, Claude Holman, and Wilson Frost) up to Daley's death. When Daley died, Frost had the mistaken notion that conventional constitutional precedent would elevate him to the position of acting mayor. Armed Chicago police met him at the mayor's office and rudely turned him away. Power was seized by using the armed force of the state, and Blacks on the City Council were forced to swallow pride of self and community in exchange for a powerful but considerably less meaningful trade-off. Frost became chair of the Council's Finance Committee, while Michael Bilandic, a Croatian who was Daley's Council leader, was made the fourth consecutive mayor from the predominantly Irish 11th ward.

The special election in 1977 attracted some challengers.²¹ Bilandic, a Croatian, beat Roman Pucinski (running for the Polish), Harold Washington (replacing Newhouse as the Black reform candidate), and Edward Hanrahan (the machine renegade). This was the last race to be controlled by the old machine regulars. Blacks were now less reliable, and no charismatic white candidate who could rally the old coalition was in sight.

Bilandic was not an exciting mayor. He presided over factional fights and simply tried to hold things together. Powerful forces were given key posts: Edward Vrdolyak was made president pro tem; Edward Burke became chair of Police, Fire, and Education Committees in City Council; and Ed Kelly maintained Parks with its large patronage "army."

Academic insider Milton Rakove, in his book *Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers*, sums up the end of the Bilandic administration:

In the winter of 1978, one year into Bilandic's mayoralty, there was, however, a minor upheaval of some consequence. Jane Byrne, who was Commissioner of Consumer Sales, Weights and Measures, a small city department, accused Bilandic in the media of "greasing" the city's taxicab companies with regard to a projected fare increase. After a short brouhaha in the press between Byrne and Bilandic, the mayor fired the Commissioner.

Byrne, aggrieved by her sudden dismissal, convinced that the new regime headed by Bilandic constituted "an evil cabal" that had corrupted the political organization and city government built by her mentor, Richard J. Daley, and bent on revenge for the wrongs done to her and Daley, announced that she would run for mayor against Bilandic in the February 1979 primary.

Byrne had some assets as a candidate. She had a sharp intellect, good "gut" political instincts, a long-time familiarity with the political workings of city hall and the ward organization, an ability to communicate effectively at street level with the voters, and a demonstrated knowledge of how to use the media effectively, a talent she had acquired as Commissioner of Consumer Sales. But neither Bilandic nor the machine took her candidacy seriously.

Under normal circumstances Bilandic and the machine would

not have suffered from their political mistake. But the winter of 1978-79 was not normal. The worst snowstorm in the city's history paralyzed the city and aroused the citizenry. The city government's inability to clear the snow away, the breakdown of public transportation and garbage collection, the anti-city hall posture of some key media figures, and Bilandic's handling of the public all combined to encourage a massive anti-machine turnout on primary day. Byrne received all of the normal anti-machine vote in the city plus an outpouring of normally lethargic non-voters who trooped to the polls to register their anger and vent their frustration on the machine's candidate, Mayor Bilandic. Byrne won the primary by 15,000 votes. Six weeks later, with the assistance of the machine she had defeated in the primary, she also won the mayoralty with 82 percent of the vote, a higher percentage than even Daley had received in any of his six mayoral victories.²²

Rakove, as an academic apologist for the machine, paints Byrne as a powerful figure. Byrne ran against the machine and won—then the machine took power after the election. The "evil cabal" became her closest advisers, and the people she feared most were those who had elected her. Further, her protest vote had also elected new young Black Democrats to the City Council—Danny Davis, Niles Sherman, Timothy Evans, and Marian Humes—all with independent postures. She had to deliver, or be challenged as she had done to Bilandic. Byrne blew it. She gave virtually every aspect of the movement fuel for building a protest against the machine. More decisively, she did this when Black and progressive forces were conscious that they had created her with votes and could eliminate her the same way.

ISSUES OF STRUGGLE

First, it is necessary to describe the concrete struggles in the city's poor, Black, and Hispanic communities that built this movement. Then, we will examine how these "economic" struggles were transformed into a "political" movement. Seven issues characterized the anti-Byrne momentum leading up to the mayoral race: health, education, public housing, political representation, business and job opportunity, unemployment and welfare, and private housing development.

Cook County Hospital Struggle

The cost of private health care has tripled in Cook County over the past five years. It is estimated that 600,000 people within the Chicago area cannot afford adequate medical treatment. The infant mortality rate in Chicago (17.9 per 1,000) is one of the highest in the U.S. The infant mortality rate for Blacks is 23.7 per 1,000, one and one-half times the white infant mortality rate.²³ Clearly this factor is associated with the fact that two thirds of all heads of households below the poverty line are Black, and over 80% of these households are headed by women.

The relationship between class and health care is highly correlated. In Chicago, Cook County Hospital is by far the most widely used hospital for Blacks, especially for poor Blacks. Its facilities are outdated and at the time of this struggle the county preferred to close the hospital rather than renovate and upgrade its services. Blacks would then be forced to seek more expensive treatment within the private research hospital facilities in the city or get no treatment at all because of restrictive admissions practices of the private hospitals. Such a move would have resulted in a health catastrophe for Blacks in Chicago.

The struggle to save Cook County Hospital was a result of the fiscal crisis affecting the county. The white middle class and political elites wanted to close Cook County Hospital rather than respond to Black community pressures to expand and upgrade its facilities. The struggle sharpened in the spring and summer of 1981 following the federal and state budget cuts that drastically reduced the quality of life among Chicago's urban poor. Dr. James Haughton, chief administrator of the hospital, became identified as a symbol of Black neglect and the subordination of the Black poor and working class with regard to health care. His dismissal as chief administrator was demanded; part of the controversy stemmed from the fact that the leading opposition to this Black professional came from white progressives.

In response to the crisis, health professionals such as Dr. Quentin Young and Lea Rogers, a longtime health and community activist, provided the leadership of the Coalition to

Table 4 RESURGENCE OF MASS PROTEST DURING MAYORAL ADMINISTRATION OF JANE BYRNE, 1979-1983

Issue	Problem	Affected Population	Protest Leadership	Protest Action (Dates of Greatest Intensity)	Outcome of Protest
Health	Deteriorating health services and facilities. Problem becomes more critical as cuts in health services increase.	Most working-class Blacks, and large segments of general assistance recipients. Over 250,000 inpatients are treated at Cook County Hospital annually.	Coalition to Save Cook County Hospital. Black community leaders and health professionals and health activists.	Spring 1980, mass demonstrations are held. State officials are brought in to hear local community testimony in 1979, 1980.	Hospital is saved temporarily; fight becomes part of the increasing anti-Reagan, anti-Thompson fiscal policy resistance. Young plays major role in Washington's health program.
Education	Black representation on Board of Education. Struggle for democratic control over education.	Over 500,000 students are in public school system, of which 61% are Black, 20% Latino. Chicago district has largest enrollment in country.	Parent Equalizers and CBUC lead mass struggles. SUBS coalition provides popular exposure through newspaper.	1979-1980, mass protests, petition drives are launched. During 1982, CBUC leads opposition to Byrne's appointment of two whites to Board replacing Blacks.	Successful in opposing selection of Ayers as Board President. Palmer becomes a leading advocate and adviser in Washington's campaign. Tillman runs for alderman, placing second in 3rd ward. Palmer runs unsuccessfully for Congress in First District.
Public Housing	Black representation diluted by Byrne on CHA Board. Conditions in public housing worsening.	144,000 people reside in CHA housing developments. Over 90% are Black, 68% of families are headed by women, two thirds are on public assistance.	Chicago Housing Tenants Organization and other tenant/community activists.	Spring-summer 1982, stormy series of protest actions escalate, leading to arrest of many activists.	Swibel is forced to resign as chair. Replaced by Mooney, a Swibel/Byrne protege. Community leaders call for boycott of Chicago Fest. Stamps runs for alderman in 43rd ward. Robinson becomes campaign manager for Washington, is appointed CHA chair after election.

Streeter Campaign: 17th Ward Politics	Byrne attempts to unseat Streeter for opposing her appointment of Janus-Bonow to School Board.	The 17th ward is 97% Black, voting against machine positions and opposed to "Plantation Politics."	CBUC joins forces with other West Side community groups to oppose Byrne, along with other white reformers and liberals.	May-July 1982, with the support of a Black-led citywide coalition, Streeter defeats Byrne's candidate in the primary and runoff.	The Streeter victory is termed a "people's victory," and a defeat for Byrne and the regular party. Serves to further weaken the machine in the Black community.
Black Businesses and Jobs	Underpinning the status issue of Black representation are issues of inequality of job and contract opportunities for Blacks.	Blacks are 40% of population, yet have only 27% of the policy positions and 27% of total jobs. Blacks get less than 20% of city contracts.	A broad coalition both within the Black community and citywide supports the Chicago Fest protest. Key organizations are PUSH, CBUC.	August 1982, a 14-day boycott of Chicago Fest led by Coalition to Stop Chicago Fest and supported by a white-Latino "Committee of 500."	Leads directly into mass voter registration push. The leadership become key supporters of Washington's mayoral bid.
Unemployment, Welfare	The economic crisis and the Reagan-Thompson budget cuts represent a direct attack on the standard of living.	Over 600,000 people in poverty; 200,000 GA recipients. Unemployment is over 12.4%. The overwhelming majority are Blacks.	POWER, spearheaded by community activists across the city. An all-Chicago Summer Congress is held in August 1982.	August-September 1982, exposures of Reagan-Thompson-Byrne links to domestic cuts and diversion of public resources into politicians' coffers.	Leads to mass voter registration drive based upon mobilizing the disenfranchised among Blacks, Latinos, and poor whites.
Private Housing Reform	A large percentage of federal Community Development funds are retained to support machine politicians and patronage, as well as investments in central business district.	City receives over \$110 million in Block Grant funds to support housing rehabilitation, neighborhood development, and revitalization.	Chicago Rehab Network, a coalition of housing development organizations, is joined by other community-based organizations.	August-September 1982, administrative complaints made; protest at Mayor Byrne's office and media campaign launched against repeated "reprogramming" of CD funds to meet other political objectives of Byrne's administration.	Leads to a general and widespread anti-Byrne motion being developed in the neighborhoods. Undermines Byrne's base of support. HUD rules of support. HUD rules must be restored.

Save Cook County Hospital. This coalition led the fight for Cook County Hospital amid disclosures of administrative mismanagement, overbillings of patients and the state, and of health suppliers such as American Hospital Supply Corporation overstocking and overcharging the hospital for its basic inventory. The Cook County struggle was integrated, in part, into the broader struggle developing in opposition to Reaganomics and state budget cuts by Governor James Thompson. This broader motion had a citywide scope, taken up by organizations such as the Illinois Coalition Against Reagan Economics (I-CARE) (dominated by white liberals, social workers, and municipal employees), and the more grassroots POWER (People Organized for Welfare and Economic Reform) headed by Slim Coleman, Nancy Jefferson, Clarence Probst, and Bob Lucas, all community activists.

While Cook County Hospital was not closed, its director James Haughton—the highest paid public official in the U.S.—was dismissed and the hospital turned over to a hospital conglomerate controlled by the wealthy Pritzker family of the Lugen chain.

Public Schools

In Chicago over 500,000 children are enrolled in the public schools, making Chicago the second-largest school district in the United States. Chicago's school system, like those of most large Northern cities, is shackled with a persistent fiscal crisis. Struggles over sources of revenues, pay increases for teachers, quality of education, and control over allocation decisions are related to the budgetary crisis, and the fact that 61% of the students are Black and 82% are Black and Latino.²⁴

Within the context of the fiscal crisis two issues are predominant: representation and the deteriorating quality of education children receive in the public schools. On the latter point, 1982 data indicated that Chicago students' average reading scores were at the 43rd percentile nationally, and those of Black students were at the 19th percentile. The deterioration of educational standards, coupled with keener competition in the job market, has sparked widespread concern in recent years. One of the

most prominent actions had been led by a coalition of parents and community activists called Parent Equalizers, headed by Dorothy Tillman, a longtime South Side activist.

But the most dramatic issue growing out of the conditions of the Chicago schools has been policymaking representation. Blacks, while only a plurality of the city's population (39.8%), are an overwhelming majority of the public schools' enrollment (60% Black students). Blacks have been underrepresented on the School Board: only 27% (3) of the 11 School Board positions were held by Blacks at the time of the 1983 primary. The Byrne administration became the focus of sharp representational struggles. The first of these struggles was over her attempt to appoint, as president of the School Board, Thomas Ayers, one of Chicago's ruling elite, who serves on the boards of Sears, Zenith, First National Bank, Commonwealth Edison, and Chicago United (a group of leading businessmen). A broad unity coalition headed by Lu Palmer of the Chicago Black United Communities (CBUC) opposed Ayers's appointment and blocked it with a massive petition drive, demonstrations, and a court challenge. But the issue of representation obscures the broader issue of who runs the schools. Following the school crisis of 1981-1982, the control over the public school system budget was taken out of the hands of the School Board and placed in a "receiver-ship" of bankers called the Public School Finance Authority, patterned after "Big Mac" in New York.

The second of these struggles was over the selection of a Black Superintendent to replace Joseph Hannon and his temporary replacement Angeline Caruso. Most of the Black leadership supported Manfred Byrd, Deputy Superintendent, for the post. When Ruth Love, a Black woman, was appointed in Byrd's stead, the movement was temporarily dissipated. However, a new upsurge resumed in the spring of 1981 when Byrne replaced two Blacks on the School Board with Rosemary Janus and Betty Bonow—both white—who were leading neighborhood activists opposed to further school desegregation. Again, the CBUC led a citywide, multinational coalition, with significant support among white and Latino community

leaders; this coalition included Tillman, Marian Stamps, Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity), and Slim Coleman on the North Side and Arturo Vazquez in the near West Side Pilsen community. This coalition-building process, featuring broad Black community unity, supported by white and Latino progressives and neighborhood activists, typified the 1983 mayoral campaign and the substantive and representational issues underpinning the mayor's race.

Public Housing

In Chicago, 90% of the 144,000 residents in the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) units are Black; 85% of all CHA households are Black; and 68% of all CHA families are headed by women. Throughout the United States, government efforts to provide decent, affordable housing and to subsidize the occupancy of housing have been under increasing attack since the mid-1970s. Historically, public housing has always been an arena of sharply contested struggles: first to get into it (1940s and 1950s), and then to maintain and transform it (1970s and 1980s). Throughout both periods, tenant-residents have had to do battle with public housing policymakers and administrators over the right to participate in decision-making. As the social character of CHA residents shifted to become mainly those on public subsidy, the fight for tenant management on all levels of CHA activity increasingly took on the character of a fight for Black power.²⁵

Public consciousness around CHA was broadened considerably during the spring of 1981, when Jane Byrne gained national attention by moving into Cabrini-Green, a near North Side housing development. Byrne's move into Cabrini brought with it intensified police/political violence, wholesale evictions, and generalized deterioration of maintenance in other CHA developments to compensate for the short-term improvements that were made in Cabrini-Green. These all occurred at a time of growing conservative sentiment that public support for housing should be curtailed. Public opinion was sharply divided along class lines, overlaid by racial polarity.

During the Byrne administration, the fight to maintain Black

representation within CHA policymaking circles intensified amid disclosures that CHA properties would be converted into private housing (condos and middle-class apartments) by real estate investors like Charles Swibel. Swibel has figured prominently in all disclosures about city housing/business deals. A leading member of the machine's "evil cabal," he chaired the CHA Board until the summer of 1982, when he was forced to resign under massive protest, led by a coalition pulled together by Marian Stamps and the Chicago Housing Tenants Organization. Moreover, Renault Robinson, the most vocal Black on the CHA Board (and later to be named CHA chair under Harold Washington), called for a federal (HUD) investigation of CHA administrative practices. HUD recommended that Swibel resign his position as chair in order for CHA to continue to get its funding. In order to "save face" for the corrupt but influential Swibel, Byrne led a fight in the state Legislature for the CHA chairmanship to become a paid position so that Swibel could refuse the position as a "conflict of interest."

Byrne also played a direct role in an upsurge of CHA tenant protest when she replaced three Blacks on the CHA Board with three whites during the spring of 1982. She enraged the Black community further in the summer of 1982 by replacing Swibel as CHA chair with another white, Andrew Mooney, a protege of Swibel and a product of the ward bosses, who had only been appointed to the CHA the previous spring. The citywide protest targeted Jane Byrne at City Hall and at her 42nd ward home, linking her to both the political cabal and the large corporations. (One of her appointees was a junior executive with Prudential, and the wife of a judge with strong machine ties.) The CHA protest action during the summer escalated with attempts to take over CHA Board meetings and a series of acts of civil disobedience that resulted in the jailing of several protesters, including Lu Palmer.

Ward Politics

The 17th ward, located on the far South Side, has a population which is 97% Black. Its social class composition is 76% blue-collar, with a relatively large concentration of single-family homeowners.

They have voted independent of machine-slanted candidates and opposed machine-backed positions in the City Council they believed to run counter to the interests of the Black community.

In April 1982, in a special ward election, Jane Byrne attempted to unseat 17th ward alderman Allan Streeter, whom Byrne had appointed to fill the ward vacancy the year before.²⁶ In City Council, Streeter had become a popular hero by opposing Byrne on four major issues: the seating of Thomas Ayers as School Board president; the appointments to the School Board of two white segregationists with Northwest and Southwest Side constituencies; the appointment of three whites to the CHA Board and Andrew Mooney's selection as CHA chair; and Byrne's plan for remapping the city ward boundaries. All of these issues represented systematic attempts on the part of the regular Democratic Party leadership to dilute Black political representation and/or voting strength within local government.

The issue that most provoked Byrne's wrath was Streeter's public criticism of her for replacing Leon Davis and Michael Scott—both Daley supporters—on the School Board. Until then, Streeter was little known outside his ward and within the Democratic Party leadership. Supported by a broad coalition of Blacks, white independents, and community activists (CBUC, PUSH, the newly formed POWER, and white progressives like Jody Kreistman and Hal Baron at Associated Colleges of the Midwest), Streeter bested 13 other candidates in the April primary and then won a special runoff election, to retain his City Council seat.

The Streeter election was significant in several respects. First, it laid to rest the notion of machine invincibility *at the level of ward elections*, just as Byrne had demonstrated that City Hall could be wrested away from the ward committee slaters. Second, Streeter's victory represented a major political defeat for Jane Byrne. By supporting Streeter, Black community leadership had retaliated against Byrne's political insults of replacing Black leadership. Finally, it was a significant mass victory for the 17th ward electorate, who registered a major blow against

"plantation politics" by repudiating the Byrne-endorsed candidate and the machine selection process.

This election showed that unity among the Black community leadership was a prerequisite for citywide coalition-building. Streeter, like so many other politicians, grasped the motion of his electorate toward increasing independence from the white/ethnic-dominated leadership of the regular Democratic Party, its paternalist attitude, and outright racist practices.

Black Businesses and Jobs

The Chicago Fest boycott of 1982 was an immediate aftermath of the CHA struggle.²⁷ However, the actual material basis for the boycott was certain economic realities of the Chicago scene. In Chicago, the city budget approximates \$2 billion (\$1.96 billion overall budget for fiscal year 1983). The city has nearly 44,000 employees, only 26.9% of whom are Black. The average employee earns \$24,000, and Blacks earn some \$3,500 less, according to a recent study.²⁸ In addition, the city purchases \$500 million in goods and services with less than 15% contracted with Black firms and individuals. Moreover, the city has nearly \$2 billion in time deposits, with over 80% of these deposits held by the five largest banks, including Continental Bank, First National Bank, etc.; only 7% of these deposits are held in all Black banks combined.

It has been conservatively estimated that 25% of the city employees are patronage workers (and 20% of these are from four wards: 11, 18, 19, and 23) on the near West and Southwest Sides of the city. A recent *Chicago Reporter* study of the contracts negotiated by all Chicago area public construction agencies in 1982 reported that of the \$121 million in construction contracts issued by these agencies, less than 15% were let to Black contractors and subcontractors. Moreover, Black and Latino workers have long claimed discriminatory hiring practices by the city and broken promises by city officials. During the summer of 1982 Black workers and community activists led by Nancy Jefferson, a Black West Side activist, protested discrimination in the construction of Presidential Towers, a near-Loop luxury

highrise, in which Charles Swibel and the Democratic Party chair of Cook County, Ed Vrdolyak, have considerable interests. Finally, Black vendors claimed that the city systematically excluded them from equitable participation in the sponsorship and opportunities generated by the city-sponsored mass festivals and cultural activities. Chicago Fest is the most popular of a series of festivals promoted by the Byrne administration and Festivals, Inc. (The private promoter of these festivals had arranged for lucrative contributions to the campaign funds of leading party officials—Byrne, Vrdolyak, and Ed Kelly, the Park District Superintendent, among them.)

Thus, when Jesse Jackson of PUSH called for a boycott of Chicago Fest, it had a social basis of support not immediately grasped by many of the leading forces in the CHA struggle, who saw it as a media-oriented diversion from the main issues raised by that struggle. However, when community activists like Tim Black, Ish Flory, and Bob Lucas joined the boycott, many of the CHA protesters saw in this motion a further attempt to target Byrne and end City Hall policies that allowed party elites and loyalists to rob the public blind.

The Chicago Fest boycott started as a Black protest headquartered around PUSH and later CBUC, then expanded more broadly to include a coalition of community-based groups and activists among Blacks. The boycott quickly gained support from many segments outside the Black community, including a "Committee of 500" headed by Slim Coleman and Arturo Vazquez. The "Committee of 500" included white and Latino community and labor leaders, as well as liberals and activists involved in various reform struggles. The main point of unity was the need to expose the fact that the "evil cabal" in City Hall had linked the system of patronage to the major firms with which the city did business. Indeed, the City Hall cabal was identical in many cases with these same firms.

Out of the Fest boycott was generated the momentum leading to the mass voter registration drives in September and early October 1982, preceding the statewide November elections and the primary campaign. Politically, the Fest boycott expressed

the basic coalition-building process that underpinned Washington's election victory: the Black community as the main force, with critical support from the most active sectors of the white and Latino grassroots communities.

Unemployment/Welfare

In December 1982 the unemployment rate in Chicago was 13.7%. For Blacks as a whole it was 20.4%, and for Black youth (ages 16-24) the unemployment rate was a staggering 40.1%. In addition, it was estimated that some 900,000 persons in 240,000 households were eligible for food stamps in the Chicago area in June 1981—30% of those persons and 40% of the families were Black. Moreover, the number of people below the poverty level in Chicago has been variously estimated at between 600,000 and 800,000.²⁹

As a result of the Reagan budget cuts in the past two fiscal years, more than 15,000 CETA jobs had been eliminated and cutbacks to public assistance had affected over 800,000 persons and 240,000 households in the Chicago area. A sizable number of jobs lost were held by social welfare employees, who formed the base for the Illinois Coalition Against Reagan Economics (I-CARE). This group was most representative of the leadership of the anti-Reagan coalition in Chicago. In Illinois, Governor Thompson's fiscal austerity program has, as part of its significant social impacts, meant marked reductions in both the eligibility and in the level of assistance for health care, daycare services, education, and public aid. In the Chicago area the people hit hardest have been a large number of general assistance recipients, who now find it more difficult to survive; the prospects for finding self-supporting jobs have become increasingly unrealizable (especially given the transformation of the economy and the fiscal policies of the Reagan and Thompson administrations).

In contrast with I-CARE, the social base of POWER (People Organized for Welfare Economic Reform) was the growing number of skilled and semi-skilled workers swelling the ranks of the poor white, Black, and Latino unemployed, and the

expanding number of welfare-dependent family heads in the Chicago area. POWER was organized in immediate opposition to Governor Thompson's austerity program of the winter and spring of 1982. It was also a grassroots response to the failure of I-CARE to develop a program and build a coalition that reflected the needs and aspirations of the grassroots poor. Moreover, many of the founders of POWER were acutely aware that Jane Byrne was the only large-city mayor who had not publicly criticized Reagan's general domestic policies and their specific urban impacts upon the poor and politically disadvantaged. POWER organizers were persistent in their efforts to link Reagan, Thompson, and Byrne as an unholy alliance, who victimized the poor and unemployed—both the more visible Blacks and Latinos and the less visible poor whites—and whose policies propped up the rich and the super-rich.

During the early summer, POWER made plans, including mass meetings and local ward organizing, developing the unity that fueled the spontaneous upsurge of protest and electoral participation in the summer and fall of 1982 and the winter of 1983, the period immediately preceding the 1983 mayoral campaign. First, POWER leadership built for an All-Chicago Community Congress, whose basic purpose was the development of a political platform that could be used as an organizational and educational tool in the November statewide elections (targeting Thompson), the February 1983 primary (targeting Byrne), and the 1984 presidential elections (targeting Reagan and the Republican Party). Second, POWER's leadership played active and supportive roles in the reform struggles around particular issues, politicizing them to focus on increased electoral participation. Third, POWER elements were involved in the particular tactics of the electoral process underpinning Harold Washington's campaign: monitoring election law enforcement, ward remap struggles, and litigation, along with the Political Action Committee of Illinois (PACI), headed by Sam Patch and Charles Knotts. PACI's main role was to use the courts to defend the interests of the Black community in federal, state, and local redistricting issues. Fourth, POWER spearheaded the citywide

coalition build-up to push the voter registration of anti-Reagan, anti-Thompson, anti-Byrne forces to "protest at the polls" against their policies and government practices.

The role of the *All Chicago City News* (ACCN) must be mentioned. Initiated in the spring of 1981, ACCN became the citywide newspaper of the independent opposition and pro-reform forces. On a biweekly basis, ACCN provided timely political exposure, agitational and mass propaganda, linking particular issues of struggle with the need for local and national political reform and making a populist critique of the capitalist system as a whole. Wherever there was an issue, ACCN reporters were there. ACCN is an excellent source of background material and documentation of the pre-campaign build-up to the Chicago mayoral elections.

Private Housing Reform

In Chicago there are approximately 1,200,000 units of total housing stock. Some 240,000 of these units, mainly multifamily rental property, are in need of moderate to substantial rehabilitation. Each year the city has received over \$120 million in federal funds for urban and community development (CD). In 1982-1983, the city received about \$110 million in CD funds. Only a small fraction of those funds were actually expended for community and housing development in the neighborhoods. In fact, during the four years of the Byrne administration over \$500 million in federal funds were received, and less than 25% of the monies reached the neighborhoods. When administrative costs were included, nearly 80% of these funds were spent to support the development of the city's central business district (the "Loop") and agencies based inside it.³⁰

During the last two years of the Byrne administration, Byrne "reprogrammed" (i.e., diverted for unplanned purposes) over \$36.8 million in funds previously allocated through the CD process for housing and neighborhood redevelopment. These reprogrammed allocations were made to meet other fiscal needs (\$16.8 million to the Board of Education's teacher pension fund, which was indirectly political, and \$10 million into a temporary

youth jobs program during the midst of the primary campaign). During the previous year, she had diverted \$8.8 million in housing program funds for a "clean and green" cleanup campaign and for purchase of expensive snow-removal equipment for the Department of Streets and Sanitation, although that department is supported by the regular city budget.

The opposition to Byrne's reprogramming efforts was spearheaded by the Chicago Rehab Network, a coalition of many of the most politically active of the housing community development organizations throughout Chicago's neighborhoods. The Network provides a forum for the public critique of city housing policy, and has been a leading force for the actual rehabilitation of over 2,600 units of housing in the most economically depressed community areas of the city.

The peak of the reprogramming struggle came during the pre-primary period from August 15 through October 1982. The widespread public exposure around the diversion of CD funds led many opinion-makers to note that Byrne had lost the neighborhood electoral base that had made it possible for her to defeat Bilandic in 1979. Moreover, it would not be difficult to argue that the groups targeted for CD fund cuts by Byrne were active Washington supporters.

In sum, local activists, involved in a series of welfare and substantive issues, targeted City Hall and the mayor's office—particularly Jane Byrne's administration—as the focal point of attack to address the deteriorating conditions faced by Blacks, Latinos, and poor whites in Chicago. Struggles took place within the areas of neighborhood services, housing, health care, employment, welfare distribution, educational opportunity, political representation, and enforcement of affirmative action standards for Blacks, Latinos, and women. These struggles around seemingly isolated and discrete issues were transformed into citywide policy issues as networks were forged, bringing activists together. A developing consensus emerged around: 1) issues (reform programs); 2) the problem (Jane Byrne and the machine); and 3) the solution (a reform candidate). Thus, an important dimension of the pre-campaign build-up to the massive voter registra-

tion drive of fall 1982 was the linkage of organizations and community activists involved in struggles around basically "economic" issues into citywide networks, with their protest demands aimed at City Hall. The voter registration drive was the first phase of the political expression of this united citywide movement—based among Blacks and led by Blacks.

2. The Primary: The People Choose A Candidate

The economic struggle waged in the 1982 mass protests had a direct relationship to the control of City Hall. Mayor Byrne and young Richard Daley, son of the late mayor, had their followings and were expected to declare as candidates for mayor in 1983. The people had no champion to challenge the Democratic Party regulars; however, a movement to find a Black mayor began again (prior efforts were the "Committee for a Black Mayor" formed in 1974 by Harold Washington, Charles Hayes, Larry Bullock, and Lemuel Bentley, and also Washington's bid in the 1977 primary).

Table 5 shows three of the efforts to identify a Black candidate by community draft or by poll of community leaders. It was obvious that only with a high level of Black unity behind a viable candidate would there be a chance of winning. By the summer of 1981 the one person who had the credentials and the developing consensus was Harold Washington. A serious movement to "draft" Washington to run for mayor was the expression of this consensus.

Harold Washington had been a Democratic Party regular, the son of a precinct captain whose position he assumed, but in 1975 he bolted the party machine and evolved as a consolidated independent. He achieved national visibility as the popularly elected replacement for Ralph Metcalfe (after the machine appointee, Bennett Stewart, served out a term), and he was elected national vice president of the liberal Americans

**Table 5 SELECTION OF A BLACK MAYORAL CANDIDATE:
THREE CITYWIDE SURVEYS, 1980-1983**

Survey by the Chicago Reporter Newsletter (August 1980)	Survey by AIM Magazine (Summer 1981)	Community Vote Organized by CBUC (May 1982)
1. Harold Washington	1. Cecil Partee	1. Harold Washington
2. Roland Burris	2. Harold Washington	2. Lu Palmer
3. Richard Newhouse	3. Roland Burris	3. Danny Davis
4. Wilson Frost	4. Jesse Jackson	4. Roland Burris
5. Cecil Partee	5. Richard Newhouse	5. Jesse Jackson
6. Warren Bacon	6. Wilson Frost	6. Lenora Cartwright
7. Clifford Kelley	7. Tom Todd	7. Renault Robinson
8. Earl Neal	8. Clifford Kelley	8. Anna Langford
9. Kenneth Smith	9. Manfred Byrd	9. Manfred Byrd
10. Jesse Jackson/ Clark Burrus	10. Danny Davis	10. Margaret Burroughs

for Democratic Action. Other candidates to run for mayor were less appealing because they: 1) were still party regulars, 2) were not known well enough throughout the city, or 3) had never held public office. Washington was the best-qualified candidate.

Washington had demonstrated his viability as a candidate by winning every election in which he ran except his 1977 bid for mayor, and even then he did better than all previous Black mayoral candidates in Chicago. As a successful Chicago politician, he called for the real lifeline of any serious citywide race—Black voter registration. He announced that the main condition for his running for mayor was that the “draft” movement become a voter registration movement, and that 50,000 voters be added to the rolls.

VOTER REGISTRATION

The Chicago Urban League had issued a report on Washington's problem in September 1981: “Why Chicago Blacks Do Not Register and Vote.” It began with a focus on the 1983 mayoral election:

The Black population is steadily approaching a numerical plurality in the city. In 1983, the mayoralty—and with it control of resource allocation through city administrative departments, boards and commissions—might well hang in the balance. If Black political participation could be increased 5 percent to 10 percent, Blacks might effectively determine the outcome of this crucial election. Within a year after that, control of the City Council and most services of city government also may well be at stake.³¹

Of course, the Chicago Urban League was trying to find out if the 5 to 10% increase was possible. They presented eight reasons why Blacks do not register and vote. Heading the list of reasons were "not interested in any of the candidates" (49.4%) and "fed up with the whole political system" (32.2%). They combined a controversial point of summation with a call for a serious review of political strategy:

Lack of electoral participation appears to be a long-term, deeply-rooted "structural" problem—one for which electoral reform and other superficial stopgap measures can only have very limited and temporary success. . . . Sizeable, sustainable increases in Black registration and voting are unlikely without a rather fundamental effort to make politics and public affairs a much larger part of Black family and community life.³²

An extensive citywide voter registration drive peaked between August and October 5, 1982, setting the stage for the Democratic mayoral primary. While many of the traditional institutionalized organizations (i.e., the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Chicago Urban League, PUSH) had attempted to build a mass Black community registration as far back as 1981, the most significant aspect of the pre-primary voter registration drive was the entrance of new entities into voter registration. For the most part, these new entities represented grassroots community efforts both within and outside of the Black community. First, there was Chicago Black United Communities (CBUC) headed by Lu Palmer, a leading community activist and a Black professional journalist opposed to Jane Byrne and the machine. Second, there was Citizens for Self-Determination, a far South Side organization, headed

by Mercedes Maulette, a noted organizer in electoral politics, and sponsored by Al Sampson, who emerged early as a significant figure in the mobilization of the Black church and the organization of ministers to support Washington's candidacy. A South Side youth social service group, Concerned Young Adults, promoted nonpartisan registrations. Moreover, the Independent Grassroots Youth Organization, dominated by a local street gang, claimed to have registered 5,000 youth. Then there were two campaign-specific coalitions that emerged in anticipation of the Black community fielding a candidate for the 1983 mayoralty. They were Vote Community, founded by Ed Gardner and Tim Black and promoted by Robert Starks and influenced by his associates in the coalition known as the "African Community of Chicago," and the People's Movement for Voter Registration and Education (People's Movement) under the leadership of longtime independents such as Lu Palmer and Tim Black, a former labor organizer; Nate Clay, a Black journalist; and Sam Patch, prominent in PACI. The leadership of all of these groups became the principal actors in forming the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment as the informal arm of Harold Washington's campaign organization. Added to these groups was the significant infusion of money from Black businessmen. Most notable was a cosmetic industry millionaire, Ed Gardner (Soft Sheen), who was the principal financier of the "Come Alive, October 5" media blitz leading into the final voter registration weekend before the November election as well as the encore rendition, "Come Alive, January 25," which closed out the pre-primary election registration.

While these united community efforts represented one of the indispensable preconditions for mobilizing the Black community for a Black mayoral success, what was unique about this voter registration movement was its citywide character. POWER provided the framework for formal and informal coalition-building across lines of race and national origin. POWER also provided the organizational context for community activists and political reformers to coordinate citywide, and to plan organizational tactics (for voter mobilization and education).

By September 1982, the goal of 50,000 new registered voters had been reached, through POWER's use of the tactic of mobile registrations, i.e., taking registration stations to welfare and unemployment offices within the city's South, West, and North Sides. Washington's response was to increase the call to register 100,000 new voters! The leadership of this movement answered him. Under the combined efforts of POWER, PUSH, Vote Community, People's Movement, CBUC, and Citizens for Self-Determination, an all-out campaign was launched to meet this challenge. Churches were targeted, library centers were established, and an extensive absentee ballot thrust was coordinated by PUSH and CBUC. Gardner announced that he would put up \$50,000 to sponsor a media blitz targeting the Black community for the weekend of October 5. Through ACCN, POWER announced that 180,000 registrations needed to be on the books by the final weekend. Over that weekend some 60,000 registrations were made, principally in the Black community and mainly independent of the regular party apparatus.

The increase in Black voter registration placed the total Black registration at 565,000. An additional 76,000 registrations were added between December 1982 and January 25, 1983; 36,000 were Black registrants. This brought the combined total of Black registration to 600,000 out of an estimated 665,000 eligible Black voters. The total primary registration was 1,582,000. These potential voters had to be protected from challenges by the machine-controlled Board of Elections Commissioners. This was done successfully, mainly through strong community monitoring and vigilance.³³

When community representatives approached Washington with 180,000 registrants, his response was, "Yes, they are registered but (1) will they turn out, and (2) will they support the independent candidates in the November 2 state election?" These were no trivial questions, given that in the 1977 primary only 27.5% of all eligible Blacks voted when Washington ran against Bilandic and Pucinski. In 1979 (Bilandic vs. Byrne) only 34% of all registered Blacks cast ballots out of 490,000 Black registered voters.

In Chicago, the November 1982 election was characterized by an anti-Republican vote. While the Black community leadership was lukewarm about the Adlai Stevenson III candidacy for governor,³⁴ the Black turnout against Thompson was overwhelming. This overshadowed the fact that the three independents targeted for support for state Assembly seats (Monica Faith Stewart, Art Turner, and Juan Soliz) lost because of the machine's "Punch 10" campaign for a straight Democratic-ticket vote, which cut into the votes of these independents. The opposition to Thompson demonstrated to the Black leadership, and to Washington supporters in particular, that the Black community would unite to support a viable Black candidate for mayor. Second, George Dunne's victory in the Cook County Board president's race against Bernard Carey was attributed to the Black independent orientation, since Byrne publicly opposed Dunne, a longtime supporter of Mayor Daley.³⁵

On the strength of these developments, the sentiment for a Washington candidacy grew to a fever pitch. Following the successful registration drive and the outcome of the November 2 elections, CBUC and a delegation of Black community leaders presented Washington with his "draft." Washington had only one course of action: to postpone his official announcement to the week following the announcement by Richard M. Daley, son of the late mayor. Daley announced his candidacy on November 4, ensuring that there would be two strong white candidates and a viable Black candidate in the battle to head the municipal government.

The Washington strategy had been predicated on at least two strong white Democratic Party candidates vying for the primary nomination. With Daley safely announcing, Byrne's forces would turn their attention to her formidable rival from the Bridgeport neighborhood, home of the Daley machine. The theory was that Byrne and Daley would split the white vote and neither could afford to attack Washington for fear of alienating the Black vote.

On November 3, columnist Mike Royko noted in the *Sun Times* that the real race was now beginning. He was correct.

Streeter's aldermanic victory, the boycott of Chicago Fest, the strong anti-Byrne sentiment in the neighborhoods, and issues of redistribution policy for sharing wealth and power (housing, jobs, education, CD funding, and the closing of the Jackson Park "El") all indicated that the 1983 Democratic primary would be unique, having major implications for the alignment of mainstream political forces in Chicago.

The three prime candidates who entered the field were going to war for the mayoral seat. Before the 170-day campaign was over, dated from Daley's announcement on November 4 through April 12 (Washington announced on November 10), it would be the most expensive (\$18 million spent), the most corrupt (Byrne's blatant payoffs to street gangs), the most polarized among race/nationality lines (Byrne and Epton share the laurels),

Table 6 CANDIDATES FOR DEMOCRATIC MAYORAL PRIMARY: FEBRUARY 1983

<i>Candidate</i>	Harold Washington	Jane Byrne	Richard Daley
<i>Birthplace</i>	Chicago	Chicago	Chicago
<i>Date of Birth</i>	1922	1935	1942
<i>Race</i>	Black	white	white
<i>Nationality</i>	Afro-American	Irish-American	Irish-American
<i>Gender</i>	male	female	male
<i>Father's Occupation</i>	minister/lawyer	corporate executive	lawyer
<i>Education</i>	Roosevelt University, Northwestern University	Barat College, University of Illinois	Providence College (R.I.), DePaul University
<i>Occupation</i>	lawyer	housewife, civil affairs	lawyer
<i>Political Experience</i>	Father was a precinct captain. Served as apprentice to the Dawson organization, held elected office for 18 years in state Legislature and U.S. Congress	Campaign volunteer, close associate of Mayor Daley, appointed to positions in party and city government, only elected office as mayor of Chicago (1979-1983)	Son of Mayor Daley (terms 1955-1976), committeeman of 11th ward, held elected office for 10 years as state senator and State's Attorney of Cook County

and the most publicized (internationally, nationally, and locally) mayoral race in Chicago's political history.

More people participated in the primary and general election than in any other election in Chicago history, and more white people voted on the losing side than in any two successive elections in the city's history. In the 1983 Democratic primary, the Chicago electorate had three choices: Byrne represented the present, Daley the past, and Washington was identified with their aspirations for the future.

THE INCUMBENT

Byrne's campaign strength was among middle-class and working women, the neighborhoods, and seniors.³⁶ She had not been able to hold her electoral coalition together for very long after her election for several reasons. First, she was saddled by a deepening fiscal crisis that affected her relations with city employees (teachers, police, fire, lower-level department administrators). In order to keep spending in line to satisfy creditors and to protect her base among white homeowners, Byrne was forced to hold down salaries and block further increases in social expenditures, as well as taxes.

Second, in order to govern, she had to accommodate the machine leadership, who demanded a free hand with patronage and the opportunity to make deals that, once exposed, revealed corruption and caused a further loss of credibility, especially among the liberal opinion-makers in the media. Byrne apparently was willing to accept this accommodation so long as she was able to swell her "war chest." She raised some \$10 million for political campaigning by the primary opening. A large proportion of this money came from city workers (a source of resentment to those out of power) and from agents with city contracts.

Third, she reorganized the Office of Neighborhoods to be a legitimating device to promote her image and secure her re-election instead of a vehicle for mass input into changes in community development policy. Moreover, she alienated

community leaders by reducing and then rerouting the flow of money into development programs at the neighborhood level.

Fourth, while leaving her doors open to real estate developers and business contractors, Byrne lost credibility with many of the corporate elite, who viewed her as politically unstable and prone to quick changes of both policy and personnel. Thus, she contributed to an unfavorable business situation by failing to provide a climate for continuity of program, personnel, and policymaking in government leadership.

Fifth, while Byrne consolidated her alliances with the most reactionary and irresponsible wing of the Democratic Party, she alienated herself from the mainstream of the party. On one hand, not having strong connections with the corporate and declining industrial elite, she was forced to build up her coffers by repeatedly "tapping" city patronage workers, in addition to contractors doing business with the city. On the other hand, Byrne encouraged further fragmentation of the Cook County Democratic Party and, instead of uniting the party, she undermined her most organized potential base of support. She did this by: 1) dropping Carter after earlier endorsing him in order to support Kennedy during the 1980 presidential campaign; 2) opposing Daley as State's Attorney in 1980; 3) closely identifying with Reagan and becoming the only mayor of a large city not to oppose his domestic and urban policies; and 4) opposing George Dunne and supporting Bernard Carey, the Republican candidate for Cook County Board president.

Finally, Byrne made a series of tactical blunders that undermined her brittle support among Blacks and Latinos.³⁷

She attempted to play off Blacks against Latinos on the one hand, while exploiting the nationality differences among the various groups within the Latino population in the city, mainly through her appointive powers (i.e., replacing Kenneth Smith, a Black minister who chaired the School Board, with a Cuban, Raul Vialobos).

In a series of appointments that undermined Black and Latino representation on other boards, commissions, and within departments, Byrne replaced representatives from these blocs with

whites (i.e., CHA, Board of Education, CTA, Police Department, Department of Housing).

Byrne played the role of a "sacrificing public official," appearing to learn firsthand what the people faced. Byrne is from the 42nd ward, which encompasses what Chicagoans call the Gold Coast and the slums—she is from the Gold Coast, and the Cabrini-Green housing development (known for the TV show "Good Times") is in the slum. Amid tremendous publicity, Byrne "moved in" to Cabrini. While she was there, personally protected by police in all adjacent apartments (both sides, above, and below) and by hundreds of others in the area, crime was reduced. But as she soon left, it was worse than ever—elevators would go out for weeks in 21-story buildings where senior citizens and the sick would be under a sinister form of de facto "house arrest." The gangs retaliated against families who were able to avoid the mass evictions of so-called "anti-social" elements. In the end, many of the people who initially praised Byrne for her actions in Cabrini were later neutralized by reports that services were being withdrawn from other CHA developments to support Byrne's temporary publicity stunt.

She earned the enmity of Blacks by leading the battle to dilute Black representation and voter strength on substantive issues. At the same time, she continued the tradition of hand-picking candidates for elective offices with predominantly Black constituencies. The Black community resented the appointment of Bennett Stewart for the First Congressional District seat when Metcalfe died. It was further aroused when she pitted Eugene Barnes against Washington, who two years before ran as an independent and became the first Black congressman to be elected from a central city district independent of the machine. Byrne's all-out campaign to dislodge Allan Streeter incensed the Black community. With his successful election some observers proclaimed the end of an era: "No more plantation politics" from City Hall. The "last straw" occurred in the West Side 29th ward aldermanic primary, when Byrne attempted to send Iola McGowan (a Byrne appointee who had been ruled not a resident of that ward by a district court) against

Black independent Danny Davis. The Black community viewed this challenge with a mixture of righteous indignation and sarcastic amusement at the fiasco. Despite the fact that the 29th ward boundaries had been recently redrawn to maximize the possibilities that Davis, an ardent Washington supporter, would lose, McGowan lost big—another blow against the “machine invincibility” myth.

DALEY “THE SON”

When Richard M. Daley³⁸ left the state Senate in 1980 to run for Cook County State’s Attorney, it became clear to all that he was gearing up for a mayoral bid—perhaps as early as 1983—by testing his drawing power in a citywide election. His campaign announcement for mayor therefore came as no surprise. However, it brought panic to Byrne’s camp and smiles of hope to Washington supporters. Daley had a number of credits that enhanced his viability as a candidate:

He had his father’s name and his mother’s blessings. “Sis” Daley is the machine matriarch who has carefully guarded the Daley legacy to be bestowed upon her sons. He also appeared to have enough support within the party to make winning against Byrne a realistic prospect. The 11th ward had control over as much as 20% of all the known patronage jobs in the city. In fact, the four contiguous Southwest Side wards (wards 11, 18, 19, and 23) control 8,000 of the patronage-held jobs in the city government. Political elites throughout the city owed their careers to Richard J. Daley, including George Dunne, John Stroger, William Lipinski, William Bowen, Thomas Hynes, Burt Natusus, Frank Stembeck, and others, as well as most veteran Black politicians in the city. Within the Black community, there was thought to be a significant political base among the old generation of business and professional people who remembered Richard J. Daley, “the Father,” and saw “the Son” as one who would have influence among their constituencies. Daley was also expected to pick up substantial support among the “Lake Front liberals,” city union workers, and many employees who

were perceived as having nowhere to go but to support Daley, given Byrne's practices as chief administrator and as a politician.

Daley also had weaknesses, but some of these weaknesses tended not to be significant during the campaign. First, public speaking was not his main forte. Although he lacked charisma, the four-month campaign laid to rest the rumor that he couldn't talk. Second, Daley resided in Bridgeport, one of the most segregated communities in the near Southwest Side. During the summer of 1982, the Rev. Cecil Turner, a Byrne supporter, attempted to embarrass Daley by exposing him as a supporter of racism. Turner attempted to exploit a street gang attack on a Black man by holding a mass demonstration through Bridgeport to dramatize the situation and hurt Daley's mayoral chances. The event drew little support among Black leadership, who saw that Byrne would benefit and a Black mayoral success would be weakened if Daley's viability as a candidate vis-à-vis Byrne was reduced. Third, as the lines of the campaign battle unfolded, Daley was put into the position of having to compete with Jane Byrne for mainly white votes. He did not want to embarrass his liberal supporters or alienate his potential Black support by attacking Harold Washington. Thus, unable to dictate the campaign issues, Daley was forced to make a relentless attack on Byrne's mayoral record before white audiences. He had to attack her without attacking the Democratic Party. At the same time, he could not dislodge Black support from Washington, nor was he able to gain more than an even split with Byrne. Daley's campaign faltered during the final weeks leading into the election and dissipated during the period in which Washington peaked.

Pragmatically, Daley's vision of Chicago was government reform and "business as usual," but with a new twist. If on the surface most of his reform positions were shared with Washington, it is because they both are liberal Democrats. On the other hand, the line of demarcation between the two candidates was the question of patronage. Washington moved from a soft position on patronage to a hard position against it, enabling Washington to disassociate himself from Daley's platform. Daley

was locked into a white ethnic base, primarily among white trade-union workers and city employees on the Southwest Side and part of the North Side of the city.³⁹

Endorsed by the *Sun Times* and *Tribune* newspapers as State's Attorney for Cook County, Daley had taken strong administrative initiatives on issues relating to women, and had promoted women to positions of responsibility. This gained him endorsements of leading liberal feminists, such as Dawn Clark Netsch, a state representative to the Assembly, who became his campaign manager. However, he did not gain much support among women's organizations.

During the period they were both in the Illinois General Assembly, Daley's record tracked side by side with Washington's vote on most issues, i.e., the fight against the consumer sales tax, mental health and nursing home reforms, Equal Rights Amendment, pre-natal health care, expense of daycare centers, equal pay for equal work, medical and mental care for rape victims, and child abuse-child support legislation. His strong stand against street violence (vs. "organized" crime) had earned him the enmity of the Black and Latino street gangs, some of whom eventually became paid, active supporters of Byrne. After failing to get money from the Washington campaign, the El Rukns cut a deal with the machine leadership that netted them as much as \$70,000 for "polling" assistance.⁴⁰ The outcome of the primary election indicated a rejection of both the gangs and Richard J. Daley by the Black electorate.

3.

The Harold Washington Primary Campaign

Harold Washington⁴¹ was born into the regular Democratic Party. His father Roy was one of the first precinct captains of the old Dawson organization, having previously worked for Oscar de Priest. A Baptist minister and lawyer, his father never held public office. Washington attended public schools, graduating from DuSable High School in 1940. He spent four years at Roosevelt University and was elected president of the student body his senior year.

Among his peers at Roosevelt were: Gus Savage, later a U.S. congressman, Second District; Bennett Johnson, later a leader of "Protest at the Polls," and the late Lemuel Bentley. After earning his law degree at Northwestern University in 1952, Washington worked with the Illinois Industrial Commission (1960-64) and was Assistant State's Attorney in Chicago from 1954 to 1958. It was not until 1964 that Washington won his first elective position as a member of the Illinois General Assembly for the 26th District.

In the Assembly from 1965 to 1976 and as state senator from 1976 to 1980, Washington served on numerous committees and commissions. He drafted liberal legislation in the areas of consumer credit, witness protection, small business and minority set-asides (affirmative action programs), fair employment practices, and the Human Rights Act of 1979; he was also the prime sponsor of the Illinois Martin Luther King, Jr., Holiday Act of 1973. From 1965 to 1975 he voted generally with the Cook

County Democratic Caucus in the Assembly. After 1976, and while in the state Senate, he consistently voted his conscience and that of his constituency, which often put him into opposition to the Cook County machine.

Washington earned consistently high ratings by the liberal Independent Voters of Illinois-Independent Precinct Organization, as well as being rated one of the 10 best legislators by *Chicago Magazine*. Until his bid for the 1983 Democratic primary nomination he was repeatedly endorsed by the *Sun Times* and *Chicago Tribune* as well as the Black-owned *Chicago Defender*. During his mayoral candidacy, *Crain's Chicago Business* ran features favorable to his candidacy, although its editors did not endorse any of the three candidates during the primary.⁴²

While in Congress for less than two terms, he distinguished himself as an active and generally progressive member of the Congressional Black Caucus and on the floor of the House as a sponsor or co-sponsor of progressive legislative initiatives. He led successful fights for the Voting Rights Act extension and against the Reagan-proposed MX Missile program. Moreover, he voted consistently against the Reagan budget cuts and for extension of welfare benefits. He introduced legislation in support of a nationwide emergency jobs bill during the winter of 1982. Finally, he worked with the Congressional Black Caucus to propose budgetary alternatives to Reagan's fiscal plans. On international issues, he opposed pro-South African initiatives, supported the Nuclear Freeze, opposed U.S. foreign intervention in Central America, and supported cuts in defense spending by the U.S. government.

So in Harold Washington Black people had drafted a standard-bearer with the credentials and progressive orientation to be "their" candidate for mayor. Community leaders from all sections of Black Chicago were forced to keep step with this new electoral upsurge or be cast aside.

WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN STRATEGY: AN OVERVIEW

Harold Washington emerged victorious in the Democratic primary, riding the crest of an unprecedented mobilization of

the city's Black community, which includes nearly 1.2 million people, or 40% of the total Chicago population. Underpinning this campaign victory and augmenting the tremendous Black community mobilization was the significant coalition built among Latinos, white liberals from middle-class backgrounds, and poor whites from working-class origins.

In a special newspaper call for a 1983 conference on "Black People and Mayoral Politics," five key factors from research studies were cited as having the highest salience for explaining the electoral success of Black mayors. These factors are: 1) mobilization of the Black community, 2) building broad support, 3) campaign organization, 4) candidate viability, and 5) the city's need for crisis management: We can use these factors to focus on a summation of the primary campaign.⁴³

Mobilization

The most important factor explaining the election of Black mayors (at the macro-level of analysis) is the percentage of Black people in the population of the political jurisdiction. The larger the proportion of the Black population, the greater the chances for election—especially since absolute population increase is typically accompanied by a greater quantity of resources (money, skills, talent pools) needed by Black candidates. This population of Blacks must be mobilized and they must cast their votes for the successful Black candidate.

In the case of Chicago, the most significant factors in Harold Washington's victory were the increases in voter registration, voter turnout, and bloc voting of the Black electorate. We examined the patterns of the electorate in the 18 most homogeneous wards in Chicago: 11 are 90% or more Black (wards 2, 3, 6, 8, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 28, 34) and 7 are 90% or more white (wards 13, 23, 26, 38, 41, 45, 50). In the 11 Black wards, net new voter registrations increased by 78,919 between the 1979 and 1983 mayoral primaries. By contrast, in the 7 white wards there was an average increase of only 600 net new voters. The registration drive in these 18 most homogeneous Black wards showed an average increase in registrations of over 4000 per ward! Thus

the addition of 180,000 new voters to the rolls was a key tactic that led to Washington's success.⁴⁴

In the same 11 Black wards, the average voter turnout was 73.7%, compared to 79.1% in the 7 white wards. Although the turnout rate among whites was higher, this was offset by a big increase in the number of Black voters between 1979 and 1983. The Black voter turnout in 1983 increased by 21.5 percentage points from the 1979 level of 52.2%. In the 7 white wards, the percentage increase over 1979 was only 13.9%, up from 65.2% that year. In 1983 the election was defined by the role of the new Black electorate, made up of many voters who had previously been alienated from electoral participation.

The overwhelming support Black voters gave to Washington is significant in other respects—especially given the high viability of Byrne and Daley, Washington's drawing strength was outstanding. In the 11 Black wards, Washington won 77.7% of the 276,678 Democratic votes cast. By contrast, in the 7 white wards Washington won less than 1% of the Democratic ballots cast, 2,131 of 227,327, showing the racist character of the primary election.⁴⁵ Table 7 presents a profile of the primary results highlighting the racial/national origin-characteristics of the turnout.

Table 7 RESULTS OF DEMOCRATIC MAYORAL PRIMARY, FEBRUARY 1983

	<i>Washington</i>	<i>Byrne</i>	<i>Daley</i>
Total Vote	36%	34%	30%
Wards Carried	40%	42%	18%
Vote from Black Wards	79%	15%	6%
Vote from Latino Wards	25%	45%	30%
Vote from Lake Front Wards (Middle-Class, White, Liberals)	8%	46%	45%
Vote from White Wards	2%	47%	51%
Estimated Total White Vote	8%	45%	44%
Estimated Total Black Vote	80%	12%	8%

Racial bloc voting was the principal characteristic of the primary returns. The white community split 88% of its vote between two white candidates, Byrne and Daley, while Washington got less than 8% of their votes. Over all in the primary election, more than 1,200,000 people turned out. Over 500,000 Blacks voted—or some 77.7% of an estimated 600,000 Black voters. It is estimated that Washington received over 80% of the Black vote; at the ward level, the higher the percentage of Black voters, the higher the percentage vote Washington received in that ward.⁴⁶ While the correlation of the percentage of Black voters with the Washington vote was significant, as many as 165,000 registered Blacks in the 18 predominantly Black wards either did not vote at all or supported a losing candidate. Consolidating these potential Washington voters would become a prime objective during the general election, since voting behavior became even more polarized around racial/national lines than in the primary election.

Table 8 shows the relative political mobilization of racial/nationality groups in Chicago's electorate. Significantly, the voting capacity of the Black electorate nearly doubled, from 34.5% in 1979 to 64.2% in the 1983 primary, while during that time, white voters only increased their voting capacity by 14.0%. This would lead to the conclusion that the Black electorate, while numerically smaller relative to the white electorate, exercised a higher vote capacity and was more highly mobilized than the white electorate—a prime factor in accounting for the Washington primary success.

Table 8 POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF RACIAL/NATIONALITY GROUPS: REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT AS PERCENTAGE OF VOTING AGE POPULATION, 1979-1983

<i>Elections</i>	<i>% Registration</i>			<i>% Turnout</i>		
	<i>Black</i>	<i>Latino</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>Black</i>	<i>Latino</i>	<i>White</i>
Primary 1979	69.4	31.5	77.4	34.5	18.3	50.6
General 1982	86.7	35.1	78.3	55.8	20.9	54.0
Primary 1983	87.2	36.1	82.2	64.2	23.9	64.6
General 1983	89.1	37.0	83.2	73.0	24.3	67.2

Voter turnout is a function of two other elements: material resources, such as money and facilities, and the recruitment of talent and skill. During the primary, Washington had to depend upon resources raised in the Black community. Of the \$1.3 million raised during the primary, over 90% was raised in the Black community (locally and among national Black elites).⁴⁷ The Black middle class provided the main support for mobilizing skill and talent for the Washington campaign during the primary. However, his campaign also drew heavily upon the specialized skills of white professionals, especially at campaign headquarters. Moreover, the high percentage of campaign personnel from professional backgrounds in policymaking and executive positions throughout the organization is shown in Table 9.

Broad Support

As the Black Mayoral Conference newspaper stated:

The successful Black candidates have been supported by key sectors of the White community, especially leading capitalists who contribute legitimacy, money, advice, skills, and other resources. Positive coverage of the Black candidate's campaign by major media follows if the corporate leadership give the nod. The votes of a significant number of Whites and Latinos are also critical.⁴⁸

Washington did not receive the kind of broad support said to be necessary to win the primary. For example, both major newspapers, the *Chicago Tribune* and *Sun Times*, endorsed Daley, while the TV Channel 2 (CBS) editorial board endorsed Byrne. Washington received the endorsement of the *Chicago Defender* and many smaller weeklies. Byrne and Daley won endorsements from the leading capitalists, enabling them to amass large sums of money—over \$14 million between them. Washington's support from the corporate sector was so weak that it led Edwin "Bill" Berry, a longtime civil rights leader who chaired Washington's campaign steering committee, to publicly criticize the white business elite and lament that he had worked so closely with them! The most positive corporate response was in *Crim's Chicago Business*, which suggested that Washington's strengths were being underestimated, although the paper decided not to endorse any candidate.⁴⁹ Labor in the city split three ways. Most of the leadership, especially those in the Chicago Federation of

Table 9 SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICIALS IN HAROLD WASHINGTON MAYORAL CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION: THE PRIMARY

	Policymaking Bodies		Campaign Staff		
	Formal	Informal	December 1, 1982	January 14, 1983	
	Steering Committee (N = 42)	Black Community Task Force (N = 38)	Headquarters Staff (N = 16)	Headquarters Staff (N = 28)	Field Staff (N = 20)
Social Characteristics					
Race/Nationality					
Black	71%	100%	56%	61%	45%
Latino	17%	-	6%	4%	15%
White	12%	-	38%	36%	40%
Occupations					
Professional	57%	45%	56%	69%	25%
Business	10%	-	6%	10%	-
Political	14%	18%	19%	10%	20%
Community/Labor	19%	37%	19%	10%	55%

Labor, with some controversy, supported Byrne. AFSCME (American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees), representing the city workers, endorsed Washington, and the industrial unions' rank and file generally split between Daley and Washington. The United Food and Commercial Workers Union, headed by international vice president Charles Hayes, endorsed Washington. The most vocal women's group in Illinois, the National Organization of Women (NOW), voted to support Byrne, though not without dissension in its ranks. A strong network organized by Black women led the support for Washington in this sector. Community organizations generally supported Washington, particularly in areas of the city where their constituencies were predominantly Black or predominantly Black and Latino. A smaller percentage supported Daley and still fewer publicly endorsed Byrne.⁵⁰

Overwhelmingly, the Black churches supported Washington, many openly and publicly. On the other hand, many churches had constituencies that supported Byrne (because of jobs) or Daley (because of past loyalties). A group of Black ministers called together to endorse Daley were not significant opinion-makers and were picketed by community activists. Byrne's efforts among the Black churches were dismal. The Catholic vote split, with a small percentage going to Washington and Daley and Byrne getting shares. The Jewish vote was split between Daley and Washington.⁵¹

Washington's support among whites and Latinos was critical to his plurality of 32,573 votes. Over all, Washington received about 8% of the white ballots cast, but in some wards his share was higher. In the 48th ward, with a 16% Black population, he won 21% of the vote. In three other wards Washington won 5% of the vote, although the Black population was less than 1%. Taken together, the Washington vote in these wards totaled 8,520, nearly 25% of his margin of victory. In six wards ranging from 46.3 to 75.6% Latino (and only 8% Black), Washington won 13.4% of the vote. These 12,775 votes contributed 40% of his margin of victory. Thus, while the Washington support base was not as broad as many would have hoped, it was

broader than his campaign expected, and it sealed the primary victory.⁵²

Organization

The general assessment of many observers is that the *movement* for Harold Washington led to his victory, and was followed by *organization*. This was perhaps to be expected, given his late decision to enter and meager financial resources. What surprised many was the failure by key black leaders and others, who for months had been discussing the viability of a Black candidate to put more of the campaign "nuts and bolts" into place. As a result, the campaign organization developed in several stages, which defined its effectiveness at critical points. We have identified four such stages:⁵³

Stage 1: Campaign Build-up.

Chicago's Black community was fired up by a series of racial incidents involving Mayor Byrne. Further, many of these incidents also involved other sectors of the community, broadening the dissatisfaction. Simultaneously, this built the basis for Black unity against City Hall, and Black-white-Latino unity against City Hall. The poor led the voter registration drive (especially public housing residents and welfare recipients), and were later joined by the Black middle class. Harold Washington was drafted in the neighborhoods and the churches, and not in conference rooms in Chicago's financial district. This period ended with Daley's announcement on November 4, 1982.

Stage 2: Campaign Crisis.

After Washington reviewed the overwhelming voter registration drive and turnout in the gubernatorial race (November 2), he declared himself a candidate. However, the Washington campaign organization was slowed down by personnel, structural, and financial problems. All of this occurred while the media relegated the Washington campaign to second-level status. At this stage, which lasted through November and December, the Washington campaign remained in the neighborhoods.

Stage 3: Campaign Viability.

The main feature of the third stage was the media. The main events were the debates held in late January 1983. Byrne had millions of dollars, Daley had name recognition, and Washington had Black solidarity. But they stood with an equal chance during four public debates aired on television. Washington emerged as a strong contender after he "won" all of the debates. Further, he rebuilt his campaign leadership around "establishment," middle-class veterans (especially Bill Berry and Warren Bacon) and recruited middle-class professionals into the campaign administration. Last, Washington developed a reform program in line with the interests of the city's poor and the Black middle class, as well as some "business interests." He emerged as a candidate whom various conflicting interests "could live with." This stage began in early January and ended in early February.

Stage 4: Campaign Mobilization.

After the increased viability of Stage 3, Washington quickly got the support of national Black leadership. The best proof of this is the massive rally of 15,000 held on February 6—the largest for any candidate throughout the campaign. Further, most Black leadership in Chicago supported Washington, with machine-based Blacks splitting between Byrne and Daley. This period experienced a wave of support at the grassroots level—its symbol being the "blue button." Over one million were minted and hundreds of thousands were proudly, even defiantly, worn by his supporters. The Black masses exploded on election day, overcoming the widespread and visible disorganization of the day.

Viability

The fact that Harold Washington was eminently the most "qualified" candidate became obvious to many people: the son of a machine precinct captain and an activist in the machine since his youth, a member of the state Legislature for 16 years, and a member of the United States Congress since 1981. Clearly he was viewed as the most viable Black candidate by a broad cross section of the Black community.

In addition to these credentials, Washington had three major traits that enhanced his viability. First, he had a gift for combining polysyllabic words with a sharp wit and culturally symbolic references that appealed to the predominantly Black audiences wherever he spoke. Second, he had a tremendous oratorical presence and appearance of command of the subject that captivated white audiences as well as Blacks. Third, Washington's apparent frugality and indifference to contemporary fashion matched his ability to engage in straight, no-nonsense dialogue with the "masses" and the "elites," qualities deeply appreciated within Afro-American culture.

Leading into the four January debates, the Washington campaign appeared to be stalled. The corporate sector had taken a "hands-off" posture. The national Black elites were not excited about his chances, and the media had relegated his campaign to second-level coverage. Washington needed a breakthrough in terms of his image, and while he had addressed the major issues, he needed a way to project his message broadly. With no money for TV ads, he needed the debates as his major avenue to the white voter, as well as for free advertisement.

Washington had not been drafted by LaSalle Street (Chicago's version of New York's Wall Street), or slated by the machine as its candidate. As suggested by Table 5, he had been drafted by Black people; then his candidacy was affirmed by community activists and most political reformers across the city. In this sense, Washington had a mandate as far as the Black community was concerned. A year earlier, several polls confirmed his popularity among Blacks. CBUC conducted a two-phase poll (called a "plebiscite"). In both the mailing poll and the community straw poll, Harold Washington placed first. Yet in spite of his high accreditation within the Black electorate and among community activists, he was hardly known outside the Black community, who knew "Harold" very well. (See Table 6.)

By January 10, when Washington opened his downtown offices on Dearborn Street overlooking the Daley Plaza and City Hall, negotiations for the debates had been broken off. However, that same day, Richard Daley, who had been lukewarm

toward the debates, received the results of two polls, which indicated that his leading position in the race had dissipated and that Byrne was forging ahead. Daley now saw that the debates might be just the thing to get Jane Byrne to hang herself and restore his lead in the polls. So Daley pushed for the debates, Byrne accepted, and Washington got what he wanted.

Washington benefited more than the other candidates from the debates. He received important visibility and enhanced his viability as a candidate among the local electorate outside the South Side wards and among the national political elites. He also established himself as a gladiator in command of the issues, with a credible program of reform and with a "presence" that inspired people's trust that "he would do what he said." In other words, he was convincing. Finally, Washington's debate performances pumped new life into his supporters and staff executives, pushing many of them to higher levels of effort while invoking a missionary zeal among campaign volunteers.

Need for Crisis Management

In our view, "The ruling elites no longer find it possible to continue to rule in the same way... and larger numbers of citizens are no longer willing to tolerate the existing patterns of politics as usual." The election of Black mayors has often signaled a critical juncture in local politics. The ruling elites become divided, the people more intolerant, and they battle in public view around substantive issues. The same developments bring both the elites and the people to the same realization: Fiscal crisis caused by the increasing loss of public resources, the reduction in federal assistance, and a decline in the industrial tax base, all result in the loss of jobs and income, greater poverty and need, decline in public services, heavier residential property taxes, increased attacks on the basic standard of living and quality of life, and increasing social unrest.

All of these elements were operative, unleashed by the social contradictions expressed in the issues underpinning the 1983 mayoral primary. For the masses, Harold Washington's candidacy became the symbolic expression of their aspirations to repudiate "business and politics as usual."⁵⁴

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN

The Washington campaign was organized on several distinct levels and in several forms. First, there was the formal campaign organization, which was headed at various stages by three different campaign managers. The first center of the formal organization was space rented in the South Side offices of the Afro-American Patrolmen's League headed by Renault Robinson, a longtime confidant and friend of Washington with strong ties to the nationalists and South Side community activists. He had been a leading voice for public housing activists as a member of the CHA Board.⁵⁵

On December 12, Washington replaced Robinson with Al Raby, a longtime Chicago civil rights activist who founded the Coordinating Council for Community Organizations (CCCO) as the first citywide civil rights coalition in Chicago during the 1960s.⁵⁶ Raby has since served in state government under Governor Dan Walker and as head of the Peace Corps in Ghana under President Jimmy Carter. Raby's social base was among Black institutional leadership and among liberals on the city's North and South Side Lake Fronts and in Hyde Park. Robinson's replacement by Raby reflected the politics being played out on the campaign steering committee for control over the ideology and program production of the campaign between nationalists and community activists, on the one hand, and the business/professional sector and white liberals on the other. It also reflected the real fact that a move for Black empowerment could not be won on a narrow nationalist base.

Raby's tenure was marked by a shift of campaign offices to a downtown location, close to the heart of media and other institutional supports. During January and February, the most significant developments for the Raby-led campaign staff were the planning and coordinating of a staff with expanded functions, preparation for the debates, and preparation of a field organization that would ensure a high mobilization and turnout. To do these things, Raby and his advisers moved to bring in the talent necessary to win the election.

The second level of organization was outside the formal campaign structure: the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment.⁵⁷ The Task Force had been developed the weekend prior to Washington's announcement. Its conveners were leaders from some 50 community organizations, ministers, politicians, and professionals. These included: PUSH, CBUC, the Black United Front of Chicago, the Chicago chapter of the National Black Independent Political Party (and other groups identified with the African Community of Chicago), Vote Community, People's Movement for Voter Registration, Peoples College, and several West Side and far South Side organizations. Among the individuals involved were: Robert Lucas (KOCO), Nancy Jefferson (MCC), Joe Gardner (PUSH), Nate Clay (People's Movement), Sam Patch (PACI), Ish Flory (CPUSA), Lu Palmer (CBUC), John Porter and Al Sampson (Black Methodist Ministers Alliance), Mercedes Maulette (Citizens for Self-Determination); many aldermanic hopefuls, including Danny Davis, Cliff Kelly, Dorothy Tillman, Marion Stamps, Josey Childs, Al Streeter, Anna Langford, Perry Hutchinson, and Ed Smith; professionals such as Don Linder, Conrad Worrill, Anderson Thompson, Harold Pates (members of the African Community of Chicago); and political activists Lou Jones and Elgar Jeffers. The Task Force was supported by some community-sensitive legalists, such as Yvonne King and Charles Knotts. Among the youth involved in the Task Force were Leo Webster (CBUC), Doreen Charles (PUSH), and Paul Oliver (Concerned Young Adults).

The mass base of the Task Force was relatively broad—much broader than the functional leadership, which was dominated by a group of institutional militants with limited experience in community organizing and virtually no sense of electoral politics. Their narrow perspective regarding the relationship between immediate and strategic tasks of the Washington campaign relative to the needs of the Black liberation movement and the aspirations of the popular masses set severe limitations upon the capacity of this united-front organization to advance the struggle for political reform (symbolized by

Washington's campaign) in a manner consistent with the broader goals of the movement. Realization of those goals would require a fundamental transformation of the social relations of wealth and power.

Meetings of the Task Force were most often characterized by: petty feuds among the leadership masquerading as principled opposition; the subordination of mass demands for substantive social change to matters of tactical and organizational details, instead of struggling for a program of action that would engage the community in serious political consciousness-raising and fertile debate; and the suppression of debate on central political questions concerning the relationship between the Washington campaign and electoral politics on one hand, and the struggle for Black liberation on the other hand. The issue of tactics in relationship to goals continued to surface within the Task Force but was never struggled through. Thus, the dominant practice of the Task Force for Black Empowerment was reduced to serving as an extension of the Washington campaign instead of advancing the spontaneous struggles of the masses toward political goals beyond the limitations of the Washington campaign and electoral politics.

So while the Task Force played a major role in mobilizing and politicizing the Black electorate in support of the Washington campaign, the Task Force provided little enduring leadership for the campaign. It further liquidated its capacity to provide socially responsible leadership and direction by failing to be self-critical and to sum up the political lessons that the broader community could use in subsequent struggles once the mayoral election, as an event, was over.

The Task Force was conceived and structured as a parallel organization to the formal Washington campaign. It functioned essentially as a vehicle for outreach to the Black community and as a means to articulate positions and take actions that Washington might find expedient to disassociate from his formal campaign. Of the founding 50 organizations, 25 usually had representatives at its regular meetings. Although the Task Force had been called together by a diverse cross section of

community organization leaders and activists, and its meetings were usually attended by 60 to 80 people—many of them working-class and community-oriented—the functional leadership of the Task Force was dominated by professionals. Out of 38 persons identified as the core leadership of this coalition, 45% were lawyers, teachers, ministers, or institutional administrators. About 37% had community or labor backgrounds, and nearly one fifth were politicians seeking to gain elective office or to retain a seat on the City Council. While some small business people and vendors were associated with the Task Force during the primary, they were not significant in its leadership; however, they did become more prominent during the general election period and the period after Washington was elected.

The ideological and political orientation of the Task Force leadership was predominantly nationalist in perspective and reformist in character, which also accounts for its transitory impact. While the Task Force made its most significant contribution during the primary, as we shall see later, given the ideological orientation of its leadership, it could not play as significant a role during the general election—a period that required a citywide campaign and a program to attract more white, Latino, and liberal reform voters. The leadership of the Task Force had too narrow a political framework to guarantee a success of Washington's campaign, since it was not based solely on support for the demand for "Black Power."

The idea of a parallel organization that could support a citywide Black mayoral candidacy originated with the 1967 Stokes campaign in Cleveland. Such a model provided two elements essential to a Black mayoral success: 1) maximization of democratic input and grassroots participation in the campaign; and 2) a direct, immediate source of "muscle" for the campaign on the streets and a mobilization arm to provide the formal campaign with essential resources—money, talent, skilled personnel, and advanced ideas.

The Task Force provided very few funds to the campaign. In fact, it received support from the central campaign. It recruited few talented personnel who held positions of responsibility

at any level within the formal campaign organization. The Task Force *was* able to provide a "strike force" and a street force to use against the opposition. For example, when the Task Force surfaced publicly in January 1983, it threatened to—and did—picket those Black churches that provided a forum to Daley and Byrne within the Black community. It also picketed a group of 75 "old guard" Black ministers who announced their intended support for Richard Daley. The media exposure accompanying the event was effective enough to cause the Black ministers to short-circuit the planned endorsement luncheon at the Hyde Park Hilton. In conjunction with a group of former civil rights activists, led by Bob Lucas, a noted community organizer, the Task Force also demonstrated against Jane Byrne's opening up a South Side campaign office on the corner of 47th and Martin Luther King Drive, the historic site where the Chicago civil rights movement was born. Finally, when the El Rukn street gang, "hired" by the regular Democratic Party to support Jane Byrne, threatened and intimidated Washington supporters in the South Side communities of Douglas (near South Side) and Woodlawn (far South Side below Hyde Park), the Task Force was mobilized under the leadership of Nate Clay to confront the El Rukns and to reassure residents that political violence by the machine would not be tolerated in the Black community.

FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN: THE STEERING COMMITTEE AND CAMPAIGN STAFF

In late November 1982, Harold Washington announced an 18-member campaign steering committee to provide oversight to the campaign and make policy recommendations to Washington (as chief executive of the steering committee). The steering committee was also responsible to coordinate the efforts of various citizens' and sector committees for Washington, including the umbrella, 300-member Citizens' Committee to Elect Harold Washington for Mayor of Chicago. Of course, with a formal Citizens' Committee this large, the actual operative

body was the steering committee. The Citizens' Committee was headed by Bill Berry and Warren Bacon, the ranking Black executive of Inland Steel⁵⁸.

The steering committee was chaired by Bill Berry. Berry, the former director of the Chicago Urban League, is now a leading executive with Johnson Products Company and a "principal" in Chicago United, the main coalition of elite Black/white corporate executives and corporate board officers in the city. The steering committee began with 18 members and during the latter stages of the primary was expanded to include an additional 10 people, as well as the co-chairs of the various citizens' committees. The steering committee remained predominantly Black throughout the campaign—71% of its members were Black, 17% Latino, and 12% white. The occupational background of steering committee members was predominantly professional (lawyers, ministers, and administrators constituted 57% of the committee), followed by community and labor leaders (19%), political activists and politicians (14%), and business people (10%). So the social character of the steering committee differed markedly from that of the Task Force (see Table 9). Nearly two thirds of the steering committee were professionals and business elites, while the Task Force had a smaller representation from the professionals (45%) and a significantly higher proportion of community and labor types among its leading members (37%).

During December and early January, the senior campaign staff was composed of 16 people; it was expanded to 28 after January 15, reflecting both the increased viability (qualitative) and increased resources (quantitative) of the Washington campaign. The senior staff remained predominantly Black (56 to 61%), with whites constituting a smaller proportion (36 to 38%). While Latinos constituted a much smaller proportion of the campaign headquarters staff, they were more significantly represented in the field organization (15%) as well as on the steering committee (17%).

In contrast to the other levels of campaign organization, the field staff most represented the racial/national origin and

class composition of the electorate and the movement that fueled Washington's candidacy. For example, Table 9 shows that the composition of the field staff closely approximated the percentage of Blacks, whites, and Latinos in the general population, with Blacks slightly overrepresented and whites slightly underrepresented. Moreover, 75% of the field executive staff positions were filled by persons whose principal occupations and orientations were toward community/labor groups and political struggles for change.

A quick overview of Washington's campaign organization confirms the pattern of open democratic involvement and influence at the bottom (reflected in the composition of the Task Force and the field staff) and the policymaking and executive positions at the top dominated by professional and business people. This pattern becomes even more apparent in the campaign organization during the general election period, when there was a significant shift in the character of the campaign.⁵⁹

Notwithstanding this pattern, throughout all levels of the Washington campaign, Blacks not only constituted the social bases of the primary mobilization, but also were the leading force within the campaign. Nevertheless, the contributions of whites and Latinos were significant, and the roles they performed in certain skilled, technical positions perhaps may have been indispensable.

The Washington campaign organization had several "centers" of activity and locations at various stages of its development. Initially located in the far South Side headquarters of the Afro-American Patrolmen's League, the campaign headquarters moved downtown under Al Raby's leadership. The major influences in the early campaign's direction were decidedly those forces within the community and neighborhoods. During the mid-stage of the primary (the period marked by the debates and Washington's increasing viability) the influence of community activists was wrested away, as a media-oriented approach gained ascendancy. However, by February 6, the date of the big rally, the pendulum had swung back toward community forces under nationalist-conscious leadership, mainly from the Task Force

for Black Political Empowerment. Thus, at each stage of the campaign, different class forces—but mainly different strata within the middle-class leadership—contested for control over the ideological orientation, strategy, and program content of the Washington candidacy.

While some degree of decision-making went on outside the formal apparatus (as indicated in campaign documents, interviews, etc.), it is difficult to demonstrate who these informal advisers were. Most inside observers agree, however, that Washington resisted attempts to be "kept" by the various factions within the diverse, multifaceted coalition that converged as his support base. It seems that he listened to many actors during the course of the campaign and allowed democratic input from many political blocs. This would account for the essentially eclectic, liberal/populist character of his campaign program, whose platform planks evolved over the course of the campaign.

Not only was there a dynamic quality to the source of influence on campaign decision-making, there was also a dynamic character to the locus of campaign activity. Besides the central headquarters, at least two other "centers" of campaign activity are important to mention. First, the PUSH headquarters, near Hyde Park on the South Side, served as a major center of campaign activity, information, and mobilization for campaign tasks (voter registration, fund raisers, and small community rallies). More often than not, the Saturday morning PUSH meetings were filled to capacity (2,000 people). Second, the Charles A. Hayes Labor and Community Education Center (also known as the "Packing House") served as the main training center for campaign workers across the city, especially for the 19 predominantly Black wards on the South and West Sides. The Hayes Center, also on the near South Side, is more central to the working class than is the PUSH location. Following the PUSH meeting, 200-300 campaign workers each week would await the "pep talk" speeches and weekly summations of Harold Washington, which pumped up workers for the next, usually monumental, task to be carried out by a field organization of

people with limited experience even at voting, and virtually none at running a field operation for a citywide campaign. The Center also served as a daily distribution center for campaign literature: buttons, posters, stickers, shirts, and other paraphernalia. At the latter stages of the primary, a literal vendors' market was created, with peddlers hustling over 140 different "Harold Washington" buttons. These vendors made the Hayes Center a major stop on their rounds to other campaign sites.

Another major stop on the Harold Washington campaign trail was the Tuesday night meeting of the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment. The Task Force claimed a work force of 2,500 volunteers in the 19 wards that it was responsible to coordinate. The most sustained period of Task Force activity came during the mobilization stage of the campaign. During this period, Task Force workers provided muscle and escorts on Washington's daily transit and CHA housing stops; during two mass "literature blitz" weekends, nearly one million pieces of literature were distributed throughout the Black community. As part of the Task Force's routine, a "squad" of workers combed the community, looking for "green" (Byrne) and "red and white" (Daley) posters, which they "replaced" with Washington signs and posters, which in turn were often removed by the opposition's workers.

Finally, CBUC headquarters on 37th Street was a major source for political education on Wednesday nights, before and during the campaign. Lu Palmer and Jorga Palmer gave leadership to two auxiliary support units: the "1000 Black Men" and the CBUC "Women's Auxiliary for Harold Washington." These two units provided much of the unofficial tactical and logistical support for the formal campaign organization (postering, distribution, telephone solicitation, typing, and mass mailings). If Renault Robinson and Al Raby were *the* campaign managers, Jorga Palmer was *the* unofficial campaign monitor and publicist for the Black community. Lu Palmer had been the leading proponent of a Black mayoral bid over the past three years. He coined the expression, "We shall see in '83."

Because of the excitement and electricity generated by the

Washington campaign and the movement it represented, many organizations, including CBUC and Operation PUSH, benefited from the campaign by increased membership, revenue, and publicity. The Washington campaign reinvigorated these organizations and injected new viability into them.

Following the last debate on January 31, the attention of every camp turned to field organization. Both Byrne and Daley had citywide organizations composed of veteran field personnel. Washington had access to only a few professional or seasoned organizers, most of whom were familiar only with the terrain inside the confines of the First Congressional District, his extended home base.

An earlier attempt by Raby to test the field organization had failed miserably, because of poor planning, lack of motivation, incorrect rationalization, etc. Raby had called for a January 15 rally at the downtown Daley Plaza, stating that its purpose was to convince the national Black political leadership that Harold Washington was a serious candidate. Despite objections from community organizers, Raby had stood firm on his proposal to go ahead with the January 15 rally. He had expected 10,000 people to attend, but only 2,500 came in the cold and rain in response to a six-day notice. Now February 6 had all of the surface indications that people would not fully support the first in a series of Washington rallies at the near West Side Pavilion at the University of Illinois-Chicago Circle Campus. It was cold, and 6 to 9 inches of snow lay on the ground in some parts of the city. Yet people came out in droves from all parts of the city, in numbers officially estimated at 15,000 seated (with many others standing inside). What accounted for the turnout?

Washington's success in the debates had raised the level of interest in his candidacy to a fever intensity. Many people were also incensed that Byrne had unleashed the gangs on the Black community, targeting Washington supporters. They supported the rally as a manifesto of their intentions to "protest at the polls." But the most important factor was that everyone in the city of Chicago knew about the rally. It was advertised

on radio, discussed on talk shows, and talked about by DJ's between records. More than one million handbills were distributed in the eight days leading up to the rally, including a major distribution the day before the rally. The Women's Network, the Task Force, the campaign headquarters, and PUSH must have called everyone on their mailing list twice!

THE OUTCOME

On February 23 at 2:00 a.m., Harold Washington accepted the resounding mandate by 79% of the voting electorate in the Black community: the Democratic Party nomination for mayor. At the McCormick Inn, a throng of 30,000 to 35,000 people anxiously awaited for him to say: "It's our turn!" The Washington campaign had opened with "Harold" promising to take his campaign into every community, into every ward, and to every sector of the Black community. In response to this intensive-extensive and open campaign process, the vast majority of Black voters overlooked the mistakes, errors, blunders, and high level of disorganization of the campaign. The Black community made it a heinous crime to be unregistered, a shame not to wear a blue button—and its leadership heaped scorn on all those who sided with the opposition.

Working people held hands with the unemployed and the impoverished across racial lines. The church support was reminiscent of the energy of the 1960s, a period when the politically "dead" rose up. And there were many Lazarus-like winos and street people in the campaign who put on ties, picked up notebooks, pens, and pencils—not merely to vote, but to advocate that others do so also. Women's groups united under the Women's Network in Support of Harold Washington, where middle-class highbrows joined hands with welfare recipients. Youth joined together with senior citizens who had passed on the baton of active struggle to those younger. The elderly, many of whom had been trapped in their highrises for years in fear, walked in defiance (of the gangs) to "punch 9" and await the unfolding of their wildest dreams—a Black mayor in their lifetimes.

Finally, it was all-class unity in the Black community that made it possible to strike another blow at racism and the systematic exclusion of Blacks from power that had characterized Chicago politics for so many decades. While for many, Harold Washington's victory was the fulfillment of a dream, for others it marked only the beginning of another phase of the march in which too few knew how utterly treacherous it would be.

For the Washington victory there were three magical tactical weapons: the January debates, the blue button, and the mass rally on February 6. These innovations electrified the mass electorate and consolidated the Washington support base. They were expressions of a mass movement for political reform combining elements of political protest with cultural affinities rooted in a Black tradition conditioned by the historical oppression of Blacks. Taken together, this electrified mass movement enabled the Washington campaign to compensate for its shortcomings in formal organization.

4.

Racism vs. Democracy in the General Election

In the aftermath of the primary, the Black community was filled with new excitement and new possibility; in general, the people's victory gave every Black person and a few whites in Chicago a positive "high." Precedents for this included Joe Louis's knock-out punches and the speeches of Martin Luther King. Spontaneously, mass celebration spilled out into the streets throughout the Black community, while thousands of people crammed into the campaign headquarters hotel. In this context, new political contradictions were emerging, relating to the three recipients of the victory: the man, the community, the party. Would the primary lead to greater unity (either the maintenance of unity in the Black community or a rapprochement to unite, on a multiracial/multinational basis, the regular Democratic organization)? Or would racism dominate the general election regardless of party or the tradition of Democratic voting?

Every Democratic politician changed posture immediately. Once again, Black people were in a position to serve the Democratic Party. White politicians particularly had been making some serious errors and were concerned that they might have alienated Black support. Blacks who supported Daley and Byrne were super-quick to get on Harold Washington's bandwagon.

A major question in the media and on the street was the role of Jesse Jackson and Operation PUSH. Two things were clear: 1) PUSH put way more than its share of effort into supporting Washington for mayor, gave exposure to virtually all

Black and progressive candidates on its radio broadcasts every Saturday morning, and made its facility available for meetings, workshops, and staging areas; and 2) Jesse Jackson was viewed as opting for media "star" status as his main leadership style, and therefore could be used by the press to dominate the campaign imagery precisely at the time when the campaign faced the danger of racism and had to be pitched to a broad multiracial constituency. A decision apparently was made by Washington and Jackson. PUSH would continue to give its informal support to the campaign, and Jackson would avoid being manipulated by the press into creating an image problem.⁶⁰

Harold Washington's primary victory was a people's victory. It generated a community-wide "high" with effects upon subsequent mass organization, particularly upon the Task Force. The crescendo effect of a significant social protest is often followed by a downturn in the level of effort and organizational discipline. The loss of focus within the Task Force came precisely at the point when another upsurge in activity was required, since the general election was seven weeks away. Some people "stayed home" or went "on vacation" for a couple of weeks. This loss of orientation and momentum in the Task Force occurred at the same time the campaign organization was being forced to adjust to the new conditions of success. An expanded citywide movement was needed, which required that political resources be rediverted and concentrated outside the Black community, indicated by the increased outreach efforts to Latino and white voters. There was also a new emphasis on "top-down" coalition development that contrasted sharply with the "bottom-up" thrust of the primary and the pre-campaign build-up: 1) The steering committee was expanded to include more Black elites, whites, and Latinos in formal and functional campaign roles; and 2) a "blue ribbon" Transition Team was formed, composed heavily of business and professional elites, the majority of whom were white.

These readjustments in campaign orientation and activity led to a loss of status and a role-shift for the Task Force: there were new needs for the general election. It was no longer

necessary to use militant tactics to defend Black unity. The pervasive racism generated by Epton's campaign and the racist reaction of the machine's defeated leadership were sufficient to ensure unity in the Black community. Washington took on all the traits of a gladiator who could do no wrong in the Black community. When white Chicago Democrats decided to vote Republican, Chicago was put on war alert!

However, the Task Force leadership resisted preparing a plan to stay in front of the spontaneous mass energy unleashed by the primary victory. Hence, the Task Force's role became limited to campaign literature distribution and advance street work for Harold Washington, and it raised no new demands or program. In short, between the primary and the general election periods, the Task Force lost its capacity to innovate tactically. (Or, to quote Al Sampson, a leading member of the Task Force, "We haven't busted any new grapes since the primary.")

Thus, the primary victory and the transition in strategy by campaign leadership in the face of an expanding movement significantly altered the social character of the leading bodies of the campaign organization. The Task Force had provided a militant character to the campaign that was no longer required. The role redefinition of the Task Force was reflected in its decline and fall in status relative to other bodies and activities in the campaign organizations; included in this was the expanded use of television media and radio advertising.

CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DEEPENS

The Democratic Party was immediately confronted with a deepened organizational crisis with national ramifications for the 1984 presidential elections. It involved the ability of the party to mobilize and consolidate the growing electoral bloc of Black people as the party elites attempted to wrest control of the national government from the Reagan-led Republican and conservative Democratic alliance.

Responses of local party leaders varied a great deal from

the objective needs of the national party organization. Within the former group, the main contrast was between the behaviors of local Black leaders, who rapidly closed ranks behind Washington's mayoral bid, and white Democratic Party leaders, whose actions ranged from full endorsement and public support (e.g., Richard Daley, George Dunne) to outright repudiation of Washington's bid (e.g., Roman Pucinski, Vito Marzullo). At the national level, the call was for national party leaders and Black elites to endorse Washington immediately, while the local white Democratic Party elites hedged, being unable to reject the Democratic Party or to accept the Black Democratic nominee. But at the same time, the local elites lacked a full alternative. Given this, their only other option was to denounce the Democratic Party and to support the Republican Party candidate, Bernard Epton. It is significant that the regular Democratic Party did not endorse Washington until March 24, a full month after the February 22 primary elections. By then, every major Democratic Party presidential hopeful had endorsed him. Allan Cranston endorsed Washington during the primary; Walter Mondale and John Glenn endorsed him immediately after it. Edward Kennedy, after endorsing Washington, came to Chicago in March in order to tell Jane Byrne personally that her "write-in" candidacy would get no broad party support. The national Black political elite, who consolidated behind Washington late in the primary, now redoubled their efforts to improve the position of Blacks within the party by leveraging individual party support for Washington's campaign as a precondition for the deliverance of the national Black vote in the 1984 elections.

National Party: The Southern Strategy

The national Democratic Party, sensing an upsurge in electoral participation among Blacks and working people throughout the country, resulting from the widespread resistance to Reagan's domestic budget cuts, saw in the Washington victory the first step to Reagan's defeat in 1984—a rebuilding or reconstitution of the Democratic coalition. Therefore, recognizing the importance of Black voter strength, Democratic Party leaders, candidates,

and officeholders put Chicago on their calendars and made it known that they would support Washington in "any way he desired." This comment was echoed by Cranston, Mondale, and Glenn, the early presidential front-runners. The venerable Claude Pepper (D-Florida), a leader of the senior citizens' lobby in Congress, was brought in to target the white ethnic vote among the aged. Bert Lance of the Georgia State Democratic Party endorsed Harold Washington amidst a great deal of publicity and led a delegation of Southern state party chairs to Chicago. Democratic fundraisers were held by Black and white party elites across the country, notably in New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles.

The week after the primary, Washington, Byrne, and Washington's political adversary, Police Superintendent Richard Brzeczek, attempted to show party unity by leading a delegation to Washington to push the case that the 1984 Democratic convention should be held in Chicago instead of in San Francisco. While the appeal failed to land the lucrative convention, it was a significant attempt to rise above local party divisions. Everyone in Chicago would have benefited from the national attention and the money spent by Democratic convention-goers. Clearly, this event would appeal to local business owners of hotels, restaurants, taxi companies, and downtown commercial outlets.

Brzeczek, an avid Byrne supporter, had earned Washington's ire, in part, because he had mismanaged the police department, and contributed to racial polarization within the police ranks by adhering to unfair promotion policies, and by underreporting of police-crime statistics, especially crimes committed against women, Blacks, and Latinos. He further enraged Washington supporters by appearing on Byrne's TV campaign commercials, politicizing the Police Department even more. During the huge February 6 rally, Washington announced to the predominantly Black crowd that the "first thing I will do when I assume office will be to . . . fire Brzeczek!" Later Brzeczek sarcastically replied, "No he won't, I'll resign first," which he did in April following Washington's unanticipated and

unwelcomed primary and general election victories.⁶¹ Were the convention to be held in Chicago, it was obvious that such differences could explode in the party's face.

The Congressional Black Caucus represents the formalized political center of the Black elite in the U.S.⁶² Since 1980, Washington had been one of its newest but most vocal and progressive members in Congress. But only during the later stages of the primary, beginning with the debates, did the Black Caucus begin to view the Washington bid for mayor as a serious one. It was at this time that Caucus members such as John Conyers, Ron Dellums, Shirley Chisholm, and Harold Ford, leaned on the national Democratic Party to support Washington, if the Democrats were to have any hope of winning in 1984. They were particularly incensed, but not surprised, by Kennedy's endorsement of Byrne in the primary. However, they reserved their sharpest criticism for presidential hopeful Walter Mondale, who endorsed Richard Daley—in a miscalculated underassessment of the level of local Black unity operative in the Washington campaign and an overassessment of Daley's support in the regular Democratic Party.

John Conyers (D-Michigan) spent nearly three weeks in Chicago and brought in his leading organizers to head up the Election Day apparatus for Washington during both the primary and the general election. Other members of the Caucus raised money for his candidacy. While over 85% of his \$1.3 million in primary funds were raised locally, over 25% of the \$3 million raised for Washington during the general election period came from national sources, with Black Caucus individuals serving as conduits for a large percentage of these monies. This in part substantiates the observation that the Washington campaign was "nationalized" and taken on as an agenda item of the national black political elite.⁶³

The success of the Washington campaign has stimulated interest in local elections across the country. The international and national media attention generated by the Chicago mayoral election has had a major, perhaps enduring, impact upon the level of Black political participation and the nature of local electoral

coalitions. This certainly was the case in Philadelphia, where Wilson Goode withstood the challenge of Frank Rizzo, the arch-villain of the Philadelphia Black movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. It has also contributed positively to local elections in Boston and Baltimore, where strong Black electoral challenges were waged. It is too early to foretell the full ramifications of the Washington campaign success for the alignment of race, nationality, and class forces. Part of this will depend on the benchmarks and limitations of Washington's reform government administration in its practice, as well as the practice of progressive and radicalized sectors of the Chicago movement. The latter have assumed the responsibility for identifying the course of march and advancing the struggle, qualitatively, past the limits of reform.

The Democratic Party leadership understood that the key to a presidential success in 1984, depended upon the mobilization of the Black vote in Northern cities and in the Southern states. While other sectors of the national electorate, such as the working class and national minorities, are critically important components of a new Democratic coalition, Blacks hold the key. Reagan's 1980 victory can be attributed to the under-mobilization of Blacks in the South and the Northeastern cities.

A Chicago election success by Washington on the basis of a multi-racial/multinational coalition could be used as a springboard and a political model for mobilization of disaffected Blacks across the United States. Hence, the significance of Jesse Jackson's presidential bid. The critical questions for Black people are these: What will be the qualitative uniqueness of a new Democratic coalition that can transform national politics and the social status and conditions of Blacks in return for their support? In other words, whose class interests will be served by Black support of the Democratic Party, and will those interests push the political process beyond the traditional limits of reform that have dominated the platform and programs of Democratic candidates and Presidents in the past?

In Chicago, a similar question could be raised. Washington had won the primary without the support of the regular

Democratic Party organization. It appeared that he would have to win the general election without broad party support. Should he lose, the Democratic Party would have blown an excellent opportunity to consolidate on a new basis. Should he win without the party support, there would be no basis for a rapprochement. From this standpoint, the national democratic leadership had everything to gain and nothing to lose by supporting Washington. In supporting him, they had an opportunity to rebuild on the basis of an upsurge in mass participation among Blacks and other disaffected segments of the electorate in an all-out effort to defeat Reagan. The Black Caucus understood this and it became easy for them to influence white Democratic leaders of the national party to put Chicago on their itinerary. So a succession of Democratic politicians and hopeful candidates were willingly paraded through Chicago to "prime the pump." They had to convince white Democrats to do what Blacks had done for 50 years: to be a decisive force of support rather than the main base of support for Democratic candidates. The main obstacle was the incipient racism that was a cornerstone of Chicago's machine politics, but that had been ignored by Democrats and historically lamented by Blacks, who foresaw no other political alternative. In the aftermath of his general election victory, Washington spent considerable time on the national Democratic circuit drumming up support for Democratic candidates.

Local Party Organization: Crisis of Leadership

At the local level, individual Black leaders who had split support between the machine candidate, Byrne, and her main political rival, Daley, now immediately came out publicly for Washington. Black Byrne supporters—Cecil Partee, City Treasurer; Iola McGowan, a party central committee member and West Side opponent of Danny Davis in the 29th Ward; state Representative Larry Bullock; and aldermanic influentials Wilson Frost, Tyrone Kenner, Bill Henry— all loyal machine politicians, immediately threw their support to Washington within one week of the primary election. It took no intricate

analysis for them to see that the Black vote in their wards and districts was an anti-machine rebellion. On the other hand, party leaders representing the most politically operative white ethnic constituencies were unable to achieve unity on the issue of whom to support. As a consequence, they sent confusing signals to a cross-pressured white electorate who historically had been loyal to the Democratic Party, but loyal to the ethnic-based machine as well. Now, in the absence of a united party leadership, these white voters were momentarily immobilized. Perhaps for this reason, an expected white backlash, manifested in increased post-primary voter registration of ethnic white voters, did not occur. For example: post-primary voter registration averaged about 2,000 per Black ward, but averaged less than 500 in the ethnic white wards.⁶⁴ Had the party leadership provided an alternative prior to the closing of the post-primary registration period, there might have been an attempt at a mass mobilization of the white ethnic vote. As things stood, the Washington victory paralyzed the machine, throwing its conservative leadership into political crisis.

One major illustration of the crisis within the local Democratic Party was Jane Byrne's attempt to mount a write-in campaign outside the framework of the regular Democratic Party process. In considering this futile effort, several factors must be highlighted. First, the norm of reciprocity that normally applies in electoral politics is a hallmark of machine politics. Jane Byrne, in amassing an unprecedented \$10 million war-chest, had locked herself into a number of promises in return for these contributions. Moreover, Byrne had not contemplated losing and had not calculated the ramifications that transition report disclosures might have for her long-term career ambitions.

Further, rumors had persisted since the first week in March that Byrne would try an independent bid to retain her City Hall post. Initially, it was widely held that she would negotiate with the Republicans to displace Epton as the GOP standard-bearer and "great white hope." Epton wanted no part of this deal. On March 16, Byrne announced a "write-in" candidacy bid amidst mixed reactions of shock (on the part of national

Democrats), anger (on the part of Black leadership), and alarm (on the part of the Epton camp and Republicans who could not see how Epton would benefit by her entry). Byrne calculated that Washington did not have a "green light" from the local party bosses and that, therefore, her candidacy would fill this vacuum. Byrne correctly anticipated a racist upsurge within the white ethnic wards in Chicago's Northwest and Southwest Sides and believed that she could ride the crest of a racial tidal wave to victory.

Finally, a large percentage of the white electorate had experienced a high degree of "cognitive dissonance" relative to Washington's candidacy, amidst charges of his failure to file income taxes, pay his personal bills, and meet professional obligations to his legal clients. At the same time, a large portion of the white electorate was cross-pressured between supporting the Democratic candidate or bolting the party to vote for race. Some pondered the possibility of staying home altogether.⁶⁵ In the absence of a clear signal from the party leadership to unite behind an alternative to Washington, Byrne perceived that she could be the "last hope" short of a Black Democrat or a Republican as mayor.

However, Byrne miscalculated how pragmatic considerations on the part of the ruling elite and the national Democratic Party leadership would operate to limit her base of support. The business sector did not rally to her support with money to finance a write-in attempt. Business interests undoubtedly calculated that the political costs of supporting Byrne in a racist appeal would far overshadow any benefits that might accrue as a result of a Byrne victory. *Crain's Chicago Business* weekly had already stated that in their post-primary assessment, a Washington government might not be so bad after all.⁶⁶ Most observers talked repeatedly about the tactical difficulties of launching a serious write-in candidacy, which would require a massive infusion of money for educating the electorate (how to correctly spell Byrne's name and where to write it on the ballot, etc.). The Byrne candidacy fizzled when every one of her major primary supporters deserted her. It was extinguished

altogether when Ted Kennedy came to Chicago and told the family protegee that she would get no national support and that any attempt to run would be politically suicidal for her. National Democrats had sent her pointed messages: "Back Washington."⁶⁷ Thus, one hour after the Kennedy visit on March 24, Byrne held a press conference to withdraw from the race. This was also the signal for the regular Democratic Party to endorse Washington publicly, although some party leaders found themselves too busy to attend the slating session. Still others released their ward organizations to "vote their consciences." Eight aldermen and committeemen eventually either came out publicly for Epton or allowed their precinct apparatus to be used by "Democrats for Epton."

Byrne reneged on her postelection promise to support Washington as the party nominee and to facilitate a full transition by opening up her government to Washington (and Epton) transition officials. However, Richard Daley, the other principal primary candidate, made his position clear that despite the disaffection of many local Democrats, "I'll stick with Washington."⁶⁸ Daley had little to gain by bolting the party, and, were he to run for other citywide office or to retain his State's Attorney's Office position, he would certainly need the support of Chicago's Black voters to win. Given the position of the national Democrats on supporting Washington, Daley would need the support of the national party should he run for a future congressional seat against a strong local rival.

With Jane Byrne running a dead-end write-in campaign, the local machine leadership divided, and the Republican Epton running a campaign with lukewarm electoral appeal and little substantive content, many observers felt that, even in this racially charged environment, Washington's chances for victory were most favorable. For one thing, Black voter interest had been sustained at a fever pitch.

When Byrne withdrew, the Epton camp was enthusiastic, since this enhanced the possibility of a serious election bid by Epton. In other words, the viability of Epton's campaign bid was established on the basis of racism becoming the dominant

aspect of his candidacy, which accounted for the subsequent groundswell of support he received from white voters at the polls.

The local Democratic Party organization had not given Byrne's write-in a seal of approval. The day following her withdrawal, the Democratic central committee endorsed Washington. With 40% of its members absent, an unprecedented voice vote (instead of a roll call) was called by chairman Ed Vrdolyak, who had supported Byrne during the primary. While Vrdolyak had formally endorsed Washington, he, like many committeemen, did little to support his candidacy. This act drove a wedge between the Black Democratic committee members and aldermen and white politicians from the ethnic wards. Meanwhile, the party became further polarized, as staunch conservatives like Roman Pucinski and Joseph Nardulli joined with 25th ward alderman Vito Marzullo (the first ward boss to back Epton openly) to bolt the party position on endorsing Washington.

Following Marzullo's lead, longtime alderman Anthony Laurino (34th ward) and Park District Superintendent Ed Kelly (also the 47th ward committeeman) became early supporters of Epton. Seventh ward committee member John Geocarlis had the dubious distinction of not only endorsing Epton in a racist bid against Washington, but also letting it be known that he supported Frank Rizzo over Wilson Goode in the Philadelphia primary.

Some local politicians, such as 38th ward committeeman and alderman Thomas Cullerton, remained "neutral" as did Richard Mell in the 33rd. They took the posture that their constituencies—and the wing of the party under their leadership—should vote their own consciences. The most despicable roles were played by party chairman Ed Vrdolyak (10th ward), Ed Burke (14th), Frank Stembert (22nd), and others who feigned public support for Washington, but in every other way worked directly to support Epton's candidacy.

Vrdolyak must be singled out as the center of the racist reaction to the Washington campaign.⁶⁹ On the last weekend before the primary, he made the clearest statement of the central campaign issue: racial power. Arguing before Northwest Side

party workers, Vrdolyak stated that the party should close ranks behind Byrne and abandon Daley, since a vote for Daley was a vote for Washington. "After all, it's a race thing," he said. Vrdolyak then bolted the post-primary unity breakfast attended by every central local party figure to show unity for Washington being the party's nominee for mayor. During the general election, Vrdolyak went to Gary, Indiana, to speak before a Democratic Party organization meeting, where he levied an implicit criticism against Washington about how racially charged the general election had become. "Fast Eddie," as Vrdolyak is called, failed to attend the major Democratic Party fundraiser for Harold Washington, a \$200-a-plate affair attended by 2,500 people, sending his brother instead. Finally, Vrdolyak procrastinated in pushing for early party unity around Washington's nomination: he convened the party central committee only after national Democratic Party leadership made it clear that Byrne's write-in bid was to cease and that local party leadership should close ranks behind Harold Washington. This gesture of support came a full month into the seven-week-long general election period. It goes without saying that Vrdolyak is the leader of the current block of "29" aldermen in opposition to Washington's reform-in-government program. This group has been called part of the "Cabal-ocrats"—Republicans masquerading as "Democrats" within the party.⁷⁰

THE EPTON CAMPAIGN

In Chicago, the electorate is not merely predominantly Democratic. Republicans are virtually non-existent. Normally, a Republican candidate for mayor must be "accosted at gun point" and forced to run.

Bernard Epton, the Republican mayoral candidate, won the Republican nomination with a little over 11,000 votes. However, as indicated in Table 10, Epton's proportion of the Washington vote was 93%, a percentage four and one-half times higher than that polled by Wallace Johnson (20% of the Democratic vote) against Jane Byrne in 1979. The fact that Washington had

outpolled Epton in the primary by over 400,000 votes in an overwhelmingly Democratic city makes his campaign one of the clearest cases of racism. Vulgar, barbaric, and violent is the story of how a Jewish Republican turns into the white racist's darling candidate in opposition to a Black reform candidate with a prior history of party loyalty and service—Washington had even supported Richard J. Daley in 1975 against Richard Newhouse, the Black candidate.

Table 10 RATIO OF REPUBLICAN VOTE TO DEMOCRATIC VOTE

<i>Daley (6 elections)</i>	.51* (.36)
<i>Bllandic</i>	.28
<i>Byrne</i>	.20
<i>Washington-Epton</i>	.93

*Daley was contested in 1955 by Robert Merriam and in 1963 by Ben Adamowski (when Republicans got 80% of the Democratic vote). In his other four elections he beat the Republicans 4 to 1.

Bernard Epton had served in the state Legislature for 14 years. During his early years in the House, he had enjoyed the repeated endorsement of the liberal Independent Voters of Illinois, which had a stronghold in the Hyde Park district that he represented. Epton had teamed with Washington to sponsor a number of progressive bills. A prodigious investor, he parlayed his knowledge of insurance law to become the authority in the Legislature on insurance legislation and regulatory statutes—and was rewarded handsomely by the large monopolized insurance industry in the state. To this extent, the frugality of Washington is sharply contrasted by the style of the multimillionaire Epton.

Soon after Washington's primary victory, Epton, little known outside his liberal Hyde Park constituency before the primary election, made several statements that set much of the tone for the general election campaign to follow. First, Epton was quoted in the press as stating that Washington's Democratic primary opponents "had been too soft on Harold," a person whom he had known for two decades, mainly through their roles in the state Assembly. They had co-sponsored legislation

during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This remark was a signal that Epton planned to exploit Washington's tax, professional, legal, and personal business difficulties, which his primary opponents had not raised directly.

Second, Epton called upon Washington to take a public pledge that the two would not inject racism into the election campaign. In a February 27 *New York Times* interview, Washington replied to Epton's challenge by making the following statement:

I've known Mr. Epton for 20 years. He knows my stand on racism. I talk about it softly not abrasively. And I resent his subtle injection of racism even as he says he rejects it. He doesn't have to contact me. He should just shut up about it.⁷¹

Washington responded even more angrily when he heard Epton had hired the firm of Bailey, Deardourff, and that the Republicans had sent in a crack team of investigators known for "digging up dirt" on the Democratic opposition.⁷² Soon afterward, racist street literature began to appear, having originated among the city's Police Department personnel. One particular leaflet featured a new Chicago police emblem labeled: "Chicongo Po-lease" and suggested that Washington would quickly hire Black comedian Richard Pryor as the Police Superintendent were he elected. In the days and weeks that followed, the racist literature became more widespread and outrageous. There were the "Honkies for Bernie" buttons, intended to counter the outstanding electrical charge generated by the blue button, worn proudly by hundreds of thousands of Chicago Blacks and Washington supporters. Finally, there was the famous "watermelon" button, which mysteriously appeared and had the effect of enraging the Black community while shaming white liberals who vacillated in giving Washington their unconditional support as the bona fide reform candidate in the race.

Finally, Epton launched his first series of TV and radio ads under the theme: "Vote Bernard Epton Before It's Too Late." Blacks were infuriated and white liberals thought the slogan too clear in its deliberate appeal to the white ethnic vote. In a statement that sent a message to Epton supporters within and outside the Democratic Party, Washington lashed out at

the racists and opportunists who would exploit racial fears among the electorate and divert the substance behind his campaign and the movement that propelled it toward political reform:

Those who would slyly, shamelessly and irresponsibly inject racism into Chicago politics and into this campaign are playing with fire. This racism business is dangerous. Racism is a dangerous thing and those who should know better should inform those who don't that they should stop it.

The central issue in the general election was racism, racism that obstructed the democratic right of a people who are the largest plurality within the city to translate their numerical dominance into electoral power by capturing City Hall. For 50 years the Irish had controlled Chicago's City Hall. By the beginning of the 1970s the Poles had thought it would be "their turn."⁷³ However, the marked but gradual decline in overall white ethnic voting strength relative to Blacks and Latinos, the new nationalities, forged by legacies of common struggles against oppression and political subordination, would not allow the Polish aspiration to be played out in Chicago.

On one side of the struggle was an antagonist who represented an attempt to turn back, or at least to suspend, the clock of social time, preserving the decadence of the Chicago machine. On the other side was an alignment of race, nationality, and class forces who supported the fullest aspiration of an oppressed people to have their democratic rights realized, at least symbolically, through the transfer of the political power of governance as expressed in the selection, then the formal election, of "one of their own" as mayor. This event brought to a conclusion an act denied them in 1976, when Daley died and Wilson Frost, then mayor pro tem, was locked out of the mayor's office and Blacks thereby were blocked from achieving a semblance of real political power.

Blacks were now the basis of a major convergence of racial/national, and class forces into a movement that targeted for extinction a system of rule and dispensation of favors and rewards based upon the differential voting strength and political power of ethnic groups in Chicago. Over the years since its inception,

the machine had not merely become obsolete—its problems were now making it difficult for the ruling elite to rule. The machine had more and more begun to run into contradiction with the realization of the democratic aspirations by Blacks and Latinos (who constitute a large portion of the working people, the poor, and powerless). The machine had become bankrupt as a system for selection of policymakers and for allocation of social resources. We saw this unfold most dramatically with the upsurge in protest issues under the Byrne administration. The deepening fiscal crisis of the city, intensified by federal retrenchment in urban and social expenditures, further aggravated the existing political situation. The contradictions inherent within the fiscal crisis set in motion widespread and seemingly isolated political conflicts, which collectively called into question the old system of privilege and power based upon patronage and "plantation politics." Thus, the systemic dislocations experienced in Chicago would have profound consequences on the city's politics and politicians. For in their attempts to preserve their privilege, the "old guard" had to call upon primitive, barbaric tactics of racial hate-mongering, which feeds upon ignorance and fear and arouses the most backward sentiments and passions among the white electorate.

On the one hand, Epton was an instrument whom the "old guard" would hoist to champion their cause. On the other hand, Epton's ambitions to rule made him more than willing to be their pawn. He was a conscious political actor, who had amassed the material resources and influence to come closer to realizing his "great venture" than any other Republican in more than 50 years. He tried to do this at the expense of the aspirations of Black people in Chicago and all working people, the unemployed, and dependent sectors who became the broad social base of the movement to elect Harold Washington mayor.

By mid-March, and certainly by the eve of the Washington/Epton debate (March 21) and thereafter, Epton attempted, with notable success, to make Harold Washington, the person and the candidate, the central issue of the campaign.

After it was clear that Byrne's write-in campaign had failed to capture the white voter upsurge that had been anticipated, Epton moved to fill this void. By then he had received considerable encouragement from machine politicians who had bolted the party. Epton, a politically obscure and unknown Jewish liberal, had become the "white hope."

Table 11 EPTON: THE ALTERNATIVE

	<i>The Reform Democrat</i>	<i>The Maverick Republican</i>
<i>Candidate</i>	Harold Washington	Bernard Epton
<i>Birthplace</i>	Chicago	Chicago
<i>Year of Birth</i>	1922	1922
<i>Race</i>	Black	white
<i>Ethnicity</i>	Afro-American	Jewish
<i>Gender</i>	male	male
<i>Father's Occupation</i>	minister/lawyer	business lawyer
<i>Education</i>	Roosevelt University, Northwestern University	University of Chicago
<i>Occupation</i>	lawyer	lawyer, investor
<i>Profession</i>	politician	politician
<i>Political Experience</i>	Father was a precinct captain. Served as apprentice under Dawson; protege of Metcalfe; held elective office for 18 years in state Legislature and in Congress; ran for mayor in 1977.	Longtime loyal liberal Republican with Hyde Park political and social connections. Served in state Legislature for 17 years; no prior city-wide campaigns.

Just as Washington had been selected as the "Black hope," the question until this time had been: who would best represent the "white hope"? Since Byrne's burn-out, many white people had become interested in the Republican candidate. Washington's past legal and personal difficulties (failure to file income taxes; spending 40 days in jail; being suspended from the Bar for three years; failure to pay gas, electric, and water bills; being "co-owner" of a slum building on the South Side), made it easy for some people to justify their support for the

Republican candidate who happened to be white—even if the negative disclosures about Epton's background were not essentially different, qualitatively.⁷⁴ As noted in Table 11, there was not very much in terms of political background that separated Epton and Washington. Most Black people were not really disheartened by the disclosures about Harold Washington. There was a generalized mass view: one cannot be within the machine for over 30 years of one's adult life and not be infected by it to some extent.

Epton tried to use his relentless attack on Washington both to consolidate whites, ethnics, and liberals around his candidacy (Table 12) and to discredit Washington in the eyes of the Black electoral base. He failed; despite the daily press coverage, he was unable to fragment the overwhelming political solidarity that emerged in the Black community. He achieved little but the creation of conditions for a deeper and broader exposure of his own social and professional background and that of his "classmates."

Programmatic Issues in the General Elections

During the primary period, racial bloc voting had been the main characteristic of the voter turnout,⁷⁵ but was not the defining characteristic of the political leadership of the contending camps. However, in the general election period of the campaign, racism became the all-pervasive characteristic and the central issue for the electorate and the political leaders alike. Racism overshadowed all other issues projected in the media, as suggested by the list of headlines presented in Table 13. Racism minimized the salience of other social issues of governance and public policy.

In contrast to Washington—who attempted to run a citywide campaign during the general election and campaigned in all 50 wards—Epton never went into the Black community and, except for a few instances, did not attempt to attract the Latino vote. In fact, the few Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Cubans who were initially interested in Epton became less attracted to his campaign when he admitted that he had no specific program for Hispanics.

Table 12 GENERAL CAMPAIGN CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES

Epton's Campaign Charges		Washington's Charges and Countercharges	
Date	Charge	Date	Charge
2-14	Washington didn't file income taxes for several years. Washington didn't pay local taxes.	2-26	Epton is injecting race into the campaign.
3-11	Epton is a victim of racism: Blacks for Washington.	3-1 to 3-20	Epton is a Reagan puppet.
	Washington took money from his law clients without representing them.	3-1	Epton is physically ill.
3-21	Washington did not file income taxes for 19 years.	3-1	Epton is using racism to promote his candidacy.
3-21	Washington lied in court that he had no lawsuits against him during his law suspension or probation.	3-20 to 3-30	Epton is under psychiatric treatment and is being treated during the campaign.
3-21	Washington was "disbarred" (rather than suspended) from practicing law.	3-15 to 3-30	Epton voted against the ERA and is generally anti-woman.
3-21	Washington illegally received unemployment compensation while working.	3-15	Epton had an anti-labor record in the Assembly, voting for "right to work" laws.
4-8	Washington is a slum landlord on Chicago's South Side.	3-27	Washington erred but Blacks learned forgiveness long ago.
4-9	Washington was arrested on a morals charge involving a child.	3-20	Epton was a tool of large insurance interests in the Legislature.
4-13	The Chicago media have attempted to ruin Epton and distort his campaign.	4-8	Epton is spreading lies and conducting a smear campaign.
		4-8	Epton spent state money to travel to conferences to pursue personal business.
		4-9	Epton is resorting to every conceivable trick to save a campaign and keep the machine in power.

Note: The major sources for all the charges, countercharges, repudiations, and concessions of prior misdoings are matters of public record (Chicago *Sun Times*, *Tribune*, *Defender* newspapers). Epton widely circulated a paper called "The Case Against Harold Washington." In addition, Epton published a 600-page compilation to document his charges. Washington supporters countered with a "record" search on Epton, which was selectively released to the press and supporters. Finally, the ads and publicly distributed campaign literature of both camps are sources of information.

**Table 13 A SAMPLE OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE
RACIST PROPAGANDA HIGHLIGHTING EPTON'S BID
FOR THE MAYORALTY IN CHICAGO***

The Charges/Assertions

"Epton Sees Himself as Victim of Racism," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-11-83

"Epton Fans Racism: Washington," *Sun Times*, 2-26-83

"It's Our Turn": Jackson, Washington (2-23-83 post-primary celebration)

"Racial Propaganda Continues to Spread," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-7-83

"Epton Uses Racism, Foe Charges," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-11-83

"Another Racial Schism Is Showing," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-83

"Racial Charges Fly as Epton Presses Attack," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-11-83

"Label of 'Racist' Overused, Abused," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-11-83

"A One-Issue Mayoral Race," *Chicago Tribune* "Perspective," 3-27-83

"The Black and White Facts of Racism," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-27-83

"In the End It's Quality that Counts," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-27-83

The Appeal

"Are UNI Students Racist?" *NI Press*, 3-8-83

"Race Baiting Gave Byrne the Hook" *Chicago Tribune*, 3-29-83

"Ignore the Racist Scare Tactics," *Chicago Metro Weekender*, 3-29-83

"Must Racism Taint Campaign?" *Sun Times*, 3-8-83

"Cardinal Bernardin Rips Jeering Whites," *Chicago Defender*, 3-29-83

"Two Bank on Racial Hot Spots," *Sun Times*, 3-15-83

"Ethnic Coalition Must Avert 'Race War,'" *Sun Times* editorial, 3-15-83

"Epton Hits Talk of Racial Tensions," *Chicago Tribune*, 3-17-83

"The Constituency of Fear," *Chicago Tribune* editorial, 3-27-83

"Chicago's 'Racial' Race," *Rockford Star*, 3-31-83

"Religious Council Plea: Epton Stop Racist Ads," *Sun Times*, 4-2-83

"Ugly Campaign Buttons Surface," *Chicago Defender*, 4-11-83

*Authors' note: This table captures part of the character of the general election period of the 1983 mayoral campaign, both the charges and assertions, as well as the liberal appeals to avoid the racial polarization. Mass racism was fanned by reactionaries and opportunists in their search for power and privilege, and in pursuit of greed.

But the charge that Epton had no program that addressed the political and substantive issues is only partially founded. The Epton campaign generated six major policy papers and a series of press statements addressing specific areas of government affairs. What is true, however, is that he failed to make the issues addressed in his policy papers *the* major issues in the campaign. He also failed to distinguish his position clearly from his more reformist and socially conscious adversary.

Initially both candidates attempted to make matters of governance and public policy major campaign issues. Washington retained this posture throughout the campaign; Epton, however, dropped any pretense of addressing broad public issues after Byrne initiated her write-in candidacy and that became the dominant news item. The local media were now giving scant attention to Epton's campaign. By the night of his debate with Washington, and thereafter, Epton made little use of his campaign issue papers, subordinating them to his relentless attack on Washington, while his supporters encouraged the mobilization of the white ethnic vote against the Black Democratic candidate.

To Washington's credit, his campaign adhered to its promise to take the priority issues into all 50 wards (the theme, "A Mayor for All Chicago").⁷⁶ He continued to center his campaign around the issues of jobs and economic development (substantive), opposition to the machine and patronage (reform of distributive policy), and opening up the process of government decision-making to neighborhood-level (reform of allocative policy). Despite internal struggle within the campaign, Washington published 10,000 copies of a compilation entitled "The Washington Papers: A Commitment to Chicago, A Commitment to You." "The Washington Papers" addressed the concerns of constituencies in 11 substantive issue areas (see Table 14). However, as a campaign organizing tool, the content of the 52-page booklet received little exposure, overshadowed at the introductory press conference by John Glenn's endorsement of Washington's candidacy. Washington did make other attempts to consolidate his constituency around central campaign issues. In addition to a number of "street sheets" and

Table 14 ISSUES OF THE WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN

<i>"The Washington Papers": Constituent Arenas</i>	<i>Washington 12-Point Program: Unity Themes</i>
1. Jobs for Chicagoans	1. Open government
2. Health	2. More jobs for Chicago
3. Crime and community safety	3. Sound fiscal policy
4. Housing	4. Neighborhood involvement in revitalization
5. Neighborhoods	5. Better, more affordable housing
6. Education	6. Excellence in education
7. Women's issues	7. Secure communities
8. Seniors' issues	8. Affordable, quality health care
9. Art and culture	9. Improved race relations
10. Energy	10. Fairness and equity in governance
11. Fiscal policy	11. Strong leadership to new partnerships (between government and the people on one hand and the private sector on the other)
	12. Women's rights and opportunities in government

12 issue papers, Washington distributed some 250,000 copies of a fold-over 12-point platform entitled "A United Chicago, On the Move Again for All of Its People." These points became the over-arching themes that united the campaign speeches and issue papers and provided coherence to "The Washington Papers."

Jobs

Washington stated repeatedly that the number-one substantive issue in Chicago was: "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs." With over 12% of the city's work force unemployed and Black unemployment over 20%, Washington hammered this theme to good advantage. The issue was: how could he deliver? Washington saw in his election as mayor a signal to the Republican-corporate coalition behind Reagan that supply-side economics had failed and that people needed a government that would put them back

to work. He reached out to the forces behind POWER, the coalition of unemployed workers and welfare recipients that had been so instrumental in the voter registration mobilizations. A refutation of Epton was a step toward the defeat of Reagan in 1984.

Health

The issue of quality, affordable health care was a priority in the Washington program, not only because of the high level of need among Chicago's Blacks, Latinos, and working poor, but also because of the active role of the health coalition in the campaign. Many of the health activists in Washington's campaign had also been involved with POWER, I-CARE, and the earlier Coalition to Save Cook County Hospital. The Health Coalition for Washington held a number of fundraising benefits, distributed literature, and sponsored a day-long health conference in early February 1983.

Crime and Community Safety

Washington's constituency contained many contradictory interests (Black police officers in the Afro-American Patrolmen's League, CHA protesters, seniors, small businessmen, anti-gang forces, etc.). Washington attacked the leadership of the Police Department as the main source of the problem. At the February 6 rally, mass approval for the dismissal of Superintendent Brzezczek indicated that this fragile point of unity was on target. Moreover, Black independent security firms were among those who had complained the loudest about the unfair manner in which the city contracted for special security (Chicago Fest, CHA Housing, etc).

Housing and Neighborhoods.

The housing constituents in the city are among the most organized and politically institutionalized groups in the city. While private housing (rehabilitation) interests at the neighborhood level are more organized, the public and tenant housing interests are equally vocal. Both elements were brought into the campaign in opposition to Byrne's policies and the collapse of federal housing programs. Both groups also realized

that something significant had to be done about the increasing political demands for immediate relief and involvement in shaping housing policy by these actors. Washington offered CHA residents, rehabilitation housing groups, and all recipients of federal Community Development Block Grant funds the promise of a greater flow of dollars into their programs, unencumbered by the machine-patronage system and "downtown developer interests"—Swibel and Vrdolyak. It was also the neighborhood/housing constituency that had made the most sustained and comprehensive criticism of Byrne's fiscal and budgetary policies.

Education

Like the area of crime and public safety, the public education arena is very diffuse. However, the single most common denominator among the diverse education interests is their agreement that the quality of education received by children in Chicago is dismal. While Washington promised noninterventionist policy into School Board affairs, he did offer his moral leadership to advocate for the resources essential to promote excellence in education in the public schools and in the city college system. Under Jane Byrne, a School Finance Authority made up of the leading banking interests in the city was superimposed upon the School Board structure, with the authority to approve or reject the school system's budgetary plan and fiscal policy. Its members were committed to the ideology that the schools, whose students were mainly children from working-class and poor families, should be "run like a business." A reasonable translation: expenditures made to ensure educational quality and improved skills development should be subordinated to the banks' interest in having loans made by the banks to the schools repaid on time. Opposition to the banks' exercise of direct control over education policy came from three separate but interrelated sources: 1) Parent Equalizers, headed by Dorothy Tillman, a parent protest organization of grassroots residents and community activists; 2) Substitutes United for Better Schools (SUBS), working mainly through a monthly news organ *Substance* aimed at temporary and full-time teachers

and educational reform activists; and 3) Citizens Panel on Public School Finances, a citywide watchdog agency composed of middle-class professionals and institutional elites with access to media, through which they criticized public schools management.

*Women's Issues*⁷⁷

It might be recalled that Illinois NOW leadership endorsed Jane Byrne. While Byrne appealed to the independent, career-oriented feminists in the city, Daley and Washington attempted to tap the "abused women" and "women-as-workers" segment of the women's movement. Moreover, more than any other candidate, Washington took his campaign into the unemployment centers and CHA developments, where a disproportionate number of women were concentrated. Equally as important, many of the health issues that were undertones of the 1983 mayoral campaign were raised by women. Women constituted the organizational base of many of the coalitions around the issues of health, housing, education, crime, and community safety. Their special demands were focused within the umbrella organization, Women's Network for Harold Washington and in CBUC's Women's Auxiliary.

Senior Issues

Washington made several efforts to capture the seniors' vote in Chicago. In the primary, one of his initial issue papers targeted the conditions of the aged in Chicago's electorate. During the general election, he arranged for Claude Pepper (D-Florida), the leading seniors' spokesman in Congress, to tour Chicago neighborhoods on his behalf. Also, the Seniors for Harold Washington held a major press and public conference that focused on the mobilization of seniors against hunger, homelessness, and fear of violence.

Art and Culture

Jane Byrne had built a sizable constituency of influential "new culture" types on the basis of her "festivals." The social base for this constituency were the middle-class singles on the near North Side and the growing number of downtown

residents who were attracted to Summerfest, Winterfest, Loopalive, Springfest, and the more notorious Chicago Fest. The problem with all these "fests" was their political errancy: the cutting edge was that Black artists were excluded from decision-making, denied equal access to special audiences, and given limited opportunities to make money. One of the more significant informal coalitions that contributed to the mobilization for Washington was the "Artists for Harold Washington," joined by small culture vendors and producers of cultural artifacts.

Energy

Since 1979, the basic cost of electricity and gas had increased by 89% in Chicago (Commonwealth Edison and Peoples Gas are the leading monopoly corporate utilities). Under Byrne, a city revenue-generating surcharge was affixed to the usage of energy. The city had no incentive to fight for lower rates before the Illinois State Commerce Commission. Com Ed continued to build generator plants and pass on the cost to consumers. Com Ed also bought hundreds of millions of dollars worth of coal, which consumers paid for, but which it never intends to use. The issue of affordable energy was one of the less ambiguous issues of the community/consumer economics: a broad constituency could be united against the interests of a few monopoly utilities and capitalist investors. Under the leadership of the Center for Neighborhood Technology, an Affordable Energy Commission was established, to fight for a cap on the energy surcharge and reinvestment of utility profits in neighborhood housing and residential energy conservation. Washington essentially endorsed these reforms. Most observers see the main obstacle to the implementation of these reforms as being in part the reactionary resistance and sabotage of the "old guard" who remain entrenched within the party, the City Council, and the bureaucracy on one hand, and the state of Chicago's fiscal economy on the other.

Fiscal Policy

The cornerstone of Washington's reform program is the elimination of patronage from Chicago government, along with

sound fiscal policy. Despite his aggressive attacks on patronage, and his avowal of open government and redivision of decision-making, based upon the community-labor alliance as the cutting edge of his electoral coalition—all of which would type-cast Washington as a political progressive—Washington's fiscal policies are conservative (i.e., rigid fiscal controls, balanced budget, attention to bond ratings, positive relations with lending institutions). At the center of urban governance is the approach taken by the head of government to crisis management. In the Washington program, we see potential makings of an austerity program that, under a white mayor, Blacks might find untenable. But under a reform candidate like Harold Washington, an austerity program has the best chance of maintaining popular credibility—to win in 1987, Washington needs to remain credible and to extend his electoral coalition.

ELECTION DAY VOTER TURNOUT

Nearly 1.3 million people, 82% of the eligible electorate, voted for the Democratic and Republican candidates on April 12. Washington received 50.06% (668,176) of the votes while Epton received 46.4% (619,926) of all ballots cast.⁷⁸ The mobilization of the electorate along essentially racial and national lines (white ethnics included) made this one of the closest local elections in the history of machine politics in Chicago. Washington carried 23 wards, two more than he carried in the primary election. Epton carried 27 wards on the strength of the white ethnic backlash and a massive bolt of the 50-year tradition of Democratic hegemony at the polls.

Epton carried 86% of the vote in predominantly white wards, compared with 12% for Washington. Washington garnered 98% of the vote in predominantly Black wards, while Epton received less than 2% of the vote in these same wards.

In the traditionally liberal white Lake Front wards usually carried by Democratic candidates, Epton carried 72% of the vote, outpolling Washington (24%) nearly 3 to 1. When we consider that the Lake Front wards are more racially

heterogeneous, and given the pattern of Black and Latino voting (9 to 1 and 3 to 1 respectively for Washington over Epton), it is not difficult to argue that Washington received a far lower percentage of the actual white vote than the percentage shown in Table 15.

**Table 15 RESULTS OF MAYORAL GENERAL ELECTION,
APRIL 1983**

	<i>Washington</i>	<i>Epton</i>
Total vote	668,176	619,926
Percentage of total	50.06%	46.4%
Wards carried	46%	54%
Vote in Black wards	98%	2%
Vote in Latino wards	74%	25%
Vote in white wards	12%	86%
Vote in Lake Front wards	24%	72%

If the Latino vote (discussed below) is held constant, our data indicate that the general election was even more racially polarized than the vote in the primary. In the primary returns, the leading white candidates received an estimated 88% of the total white vote and 21% of the total Black vote. However, in the general election returns, the big difference is that Epton captured 85% of the total white vote but a virtually insignificant percentage of the Black vote (2%, given errors).

When Washington's electoral support is analyzed, the near-total Black support he received distorts the actual composition of his support base. Washington received 77% of his winning total from Black voters, 17% from Latinos, and 6% from white voters. By contrast, Epton received less than 2% of his support from Blacks, 3% from Latinos, and 95% from whites. This indicates that Epton's electoral coalition was more racially homogeneous than Washington's, although the latter had a main base of support (Blacks) that was more intensely supportive of his election than was Epton's main base of support.

This analysis would support the view that while racial polarization was extremely high in the general election—even

more polarized than the primary election—racial polarization does not explain all the variance between the two elections. If racial bloc voting was the defining characteristic of the electorate in the primary, then voting along nationality lines was a characteristic feature of the general election vote. The single most important aspect of the nationality vote was the dramatic shift in support among Latinos for Harold Washington.⁷⁹

Although Washington received 74% of the vote in wards numerically dominated by Latinos, the Latino vote varied markedly along subnationality lines. Puerto Ricans and Mexicans gave Washington a range of support from 79% to 68%, respectively, while the more conservative but smaller Cuban electorate gave Washington only 52% of their total voter turnout. Despite these differences, Latinos overall came close to voting as a bloc for Washington. One other point is significant with regards to the Latino vote. In November 1982 there were only 79,000 registered Latinos, and Latino-dominated wards tend to be less racially homogeneous than ethnic-white wards and the highly homogeneous Black wards on the South and West Sides of the city. Therefore, it is important to look more closely at the demographic distribution of the population comprising Latino wards. Table 16 focuses upon the five wards that have the highest percentage of Latino population. The percentage vote for Harold Washington is highly correlated with both the overall Latino percentage of the population and the combined plurality of Blacks and Latinos in the ward.

Table 16 THE HISPANIC VOTE IN THE 1983 CHICAGO MAYORAL ELECTION, BY WARD

Ward	Hispanic Voting-Age Population	% Hispanic of Total Voting-Age Population	% Hispanic and Black of Total Voting-Age Population	Primary Vote for Washington	General Vote for Washington	% Increase in Vote for Washington
22	25,676	69%	77%	1,780	4,674	163%
25	22,638	59%	75%	2,620	5,925	126%
26	20,032	50%	54%	1,488	7,449	401%
31	19,495	51%	59%	2,709	9,857	264%
City Total	252,077	12%	47%	424,107	668,176	58%

However, in each case, and for Latinos overall, the outstanding features of the Latino impact on the 1983 mayoral election are: 1) the almost 20% increase in Latino registrations (17,000) by March 15, bringing overall registrations close to 100,000; 2) the increase in Latino turnout as a percentage of registered voters; and 3) the dramatic increase in the percent vote received by Washington in the general election relative to the vote he captured in the primary election. For example, 69% of the registered Latinos went to the polls for the general election—a Chicago record. In the primary, Washington received an estimated 25% of the combined Hispanic vote (Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Cuban). However, in the general election, the exciting story is that in each ward, Washington received an increase in support of at least 126% over his performance in the primary. The most dramatic increase came in the 26th ward, where Chicanos and Mexicanos gave Washington an overwhelming 401% increase in support with 7,449 votes, compared to 1,488 votes he received in the primary. In the 31st ward, Washington received 2,709 votes during the primary, but 9,857 votes in the general election—a 264% increase in support. Over all, Washington received 17% of his support from Latinos as compared to 6% from whites and 77% from Blacks.

What explains this dramatic Latino turnabout? A study of campaign documents, including campaign schedules, internal memos, and budget reports shows that Washington made a major shift in his outreach to attract the Latino vote. In addition, the campaign made extensive efforts to bring Latinos into positions of visibility and responsibility within all levels of the campaign. Moreover, Washington targeted his campaign program to address the needs and aspirations of the Latino population, who express the same objective needs for jobs, housing, food, and protection from police misconduct and brutalization as do most Blacks and the majority of working people as a whole. Washington's major campaign literature was presented in Spanish. Also, the Washington campaign underwrote a major newspaper project, *El Independiente*, a "secret weapon" targeting the Spanish-speaking communities of Chicago. At least three issues were printed. In a racially polarized electorate, where

the electoral capacity of Blacks slightly offset the number of whites who turned out as a percent of those registered, the dramatic turnabout in the Latino vote is the key aspect of the general election voter mobilization, which provided Washington's campaign with its margin of victory.

The interpenetration of race and nationality in the general election mobilization is also shown by the data in Table 15. While Washington received 74% of the vote in predominantly Latino wards, he received only 12% of the vote in white ethnic wards heavily populated by Irish, Poles, and Italians. However, most revealing is the low level of support given to Washington in the normally liberal and progressive Lake Front wards. There Washington received less than 25% of the vote compared with Republican Epton's 72%. It must be further noted that earlier attempts to analyze the Jewish vote—often thought to be progressive, at least by Chicago standards—have indicated that Jewish voters gave Epton (who was Jewish) 65% of their votes, while Washington received only 34.5% of the Jewish vote.

5. Governance

If there was a moment of apprehensive reflection by all political forces after Harold Washington won the primary, the post-election response—past the emotional ecstasy and psychological depression of the winners and losers—was more akin to the sober anticipation of war. Washington was a veteran of the machine; he knew them and their ways. Also, he knew the depths of ethnocentrism and racism mediated by machine favors that kept Blacks on the bottom. Washington had declared war on patronage, and he knew quite well this reform was a structural attack on the material basis of the machine party bosses—Vrdolyak, Burke, Marzullo, et al. The only other alternative was to make a deal, but while Washington is a Chicago politician, having made deals all the time, now he held the trump cards. Wilson Frost was prevented from becoming *acting* mayor in 1976; Washington *took* the office in 1983. This was not a time for deals with machine party bosses; it was a time for taking over City Hall and preparing to run the city.

Washington's major "peace" move was toward the political actors in the primary and general election. One ritual that reflects the institutional capacity of the U.S. political system to mediate conflict is the usual show of unity after an election by all candidates. Washington called a luncheon for this purpose. Byrne and Daley showed up, but Epton sent his brother, and Vrdolyak gave a lame excuse. The response seems perfectly rational: two Daley proteges united behind the party, at least while

regrouping forces, to keep on good terms with the national party in a pre-presidential election period. Epton maintained his role as racism's standard-bearer and he failed to show up, although it seemed obvious that he would be forgotten as quickly as he had become a racist cause célèbre. Vrdolyak figured that as party chair he could rally white support behind his oppositional leadership in the City Council, and that Washington could be forced to come to him.

But Washington repudiated the old way, and publicly announced that the machine was on its way out. Patronage was to be cut, and City Hall records would be made open to the public. Perhaps no greater example of Washington's style makes this point better than the mayoral inauguration. He chose to have it in the open space at Navy Pier to accommodate thousands, whereas in the past it was held in the City Council chambers and witnessed by hundreds. All relevant city officials were in attendance. Byrne was seated next to the podium, and all newly elected City Council members were present. Washington pulled no punches, using his speech to restate his militant approach to reforming City Hall:

My election was the result of the greatest grassroots effort in the history of the city of Chicago. [It] was made possible by thousands and thousands of people who demanded that the burdens of mismanagement, unfairness and inequality be lifted so that the city could be saved. . . . In our ethnic and racial diversity, we are all brothers and sisters in a quest for greatness. Our creativity and energy are unequaled by any city anywhere in the world. We will not rest until the renewal of our city is done.⁸⁰

While he openly attacked the past practices of the machine, he held out an olive branch of peace to the business community. This was not only or even mainly to Black businesses, which had supported Washington since the primary. The main target was the white corporate structure, the bosses of LaSalle Street. *Crain's Chicago Business* had earlier given Washington a mildly positive review.⁸¹ Washington was keen on keeping this favorable image intact and building even more support.

The search for a rapprochement between business and Black politics is indicated by the social composition of Washington's Transition Team, a leadership group designed to sum up the state of the government and suggest a plan of action to implement the broad policies of the mayor's campaign platform. There was a proportional mix of Blacks and Latinos compared to whites on the overall Transition Team. This maintained a balanced approach, suggesting that the racist hysteria about a Black takeover was based on fear/guilt, not descriptive facts about who was making policy in Harold Washington's campaign.

The Transition Team was actually composed of two different committees, each of which reported directly to Washington: the Transition Oversight Committee, focused on administration of city departments, policy, and personnel practices; and the Financial Advisory Coordinating Task Force (FACT Force), focused almost exclusively on fiscal matters. The social characteristics of these two committees diverged, with fiscal matters virtually in the hands of a white elite group. The data in Table 9 present a contrast in sharp terms. The overall campaign steering committee was 71% Black; 33% were based in political, community, and labor occupations; 57% were professionals. Only 10% were from the business community. However, Table 17 shows that the FACT Force was 70% white, and virtually all were professionals or in business. There was no direct mass representation from politics, community, or labor. On the other hand, since until now every comparable transition committee had been virtually all white, it might be said that the FACT Force being 30% Black was a significant quantitative, if not qualitative change. Interestingly enough, the Blacks on the committee are comparable in that they are professionals who work in the Loop, and Black bankers from the South Side.

Of course, the main reason for a Black power vote is the existence of a "white power structure." This means that the corporate control of the economy is managed by and serves the interest of a predominantly white ruling class. There are few Blacks on corporate boards and in top administrative slots,

**Table 17 SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICIALS
ON TRANSITION TEAM PREPARING FOR NEW MAYORAL
ADMINISTRATION OF HAROLD WASHINGTON.**

Social Characteristics	Overall Transition Team (N = 82)	Transition Oversight Committee (N = 55)	Financial Advisory Coordinating Task Force (N = 27)
Race/Nationality			
Black	39.7%	41.8%	29.6%
Latino	7.5%	10.9%	-
White	54.8%	47.3%	70.4%
Occupations			
Professional	45.2%	41.8%	51.9%
Business	45.2%	43.6%	48.1%
Political	6.0%	9.1%	-
Community/Labor	3.6%	5.5%	-

and in no way do available data demonstrate the existence of a Black power bloc in corporate America. Also, a white power structure controls the government. This reflects disproportionate white control of political parties, elected and appointed offices, and government employment. Further, while Blacks are extremely overrepresented at the lowest job levels in government, the reverse—underrepresentation—is pervasive at the higher levels. White power at the top, and “equal opportunity” at the bottom.

Table 18 reports the relative proportional representation of Blacks in Chicago politics and government. If we generally assume that a figure below the Black percentage of the overall population shows an underrepresentation, we are pointing to white privilege and power. In every case, Blacks are underrepresented, and this has been more or less stable for the last decade and more. However, it is important to point out that the most equality is in City Council representation, which reflects the growing strength of the Black voter in numbers and effectiveness. Control of ward party organization lags behind, as does city employment.

**Table 18 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (% BLACK)
IN CHICAGO CITY POLITICS: PARTY, COUNCIL,
BUREAUCRACY**

	<i>Overall Population</i>	<i>City Council (N = 50)</i>	<i>Ward Committeemen (N = 100)</i>	<i>City Employment</i>
1970	34.4%	28.0%	15.0%	23.1%
1980	39.8%	32.0%	27.0%	26.4%

The struggle to govern has pitted the Black power vote against the white power structure. This is not Black power against the white corporate leadership, although one might well argue that it is at the heart of the struggle. The current fight is against white power control of the government and the Democratic Party. The fight has not been to radically change the system in a fundamental way—although many want to see such a qualitative transformation of the Black liberation movement—but to adjust the system for Blacks to get a proportionate share.⁸² During the 1960s, an expanding economy made possible the reforms that opened the society to Blacks; therefore, Blacks got a higher percentage of new money, new jobs, etc. However, for a decade this country has been in crisis, with a contracting economy, and there is no new money. Blacks are fighting white power at a time when it is impossible even for all whites who had been beneficiaries of white power to be sustained. Blacks and whites appear to be in a zero-sum game in which for one to win the other must lose a corresponding amount. So the emergence of a movement for Black political power evokes fear in whites and a political response: the white power backlash.

Harold Washington faced this backlash in full form after he announced his Black power platform during his inaugural speech. The tense drama of the Chicago Black-white power struggle was on. Vrdolyak organized a majority block (29) of City Council members while Washington had the support of the rest (21).

Table 19 presents the relevant background data on the respective political constituencies of both blocs. The significant difference

is racial—the Washington 21 are based in Black areas and the Vrdolyak 29 are in white areas. The apparent difference in higher education derives from the fact that the most educated wards in the city are also the white liberal areas with aldermen who unite with Washington wards; the percentage of their population with at least four years of college is higher than the predominantly “blue-collar” wards represented by the Vrdolyak 29.

Further, the difference on the mayoral vote is clear: the Vrdolyak 29 bloc is characterized by voters who bolted the Democratic Party and crossed over to vote for the Republican Epton. The racial hostility in the campaign was stronger than a 50-year solid political tradition.

**Table 19 THE SOCIAL BASE OF WHITE POWER
VS. BLACK POWER IN THE CHICAGO CITY COUNCIL:
A COMPARISON OF FACTIONS**

	<i>Washington 21</i>	<i>Vrdolyak 29</i>
<i>Population of Wards</i>		
Black	71.7%	10.8%
White	21.9%	68.8%
Hispanic	3.9%	16.9%
Blue-collar	55.7%	53.1%
Four years college	9.5%	7.3%
<i>Mayoral Vote</i>		
Washington	86.1%	25.9%
Epton	13.6%	73.7%

6. Summary

Our analysis of the Harold Washington mayoral victory in Chicago has been informed by the following historical developments. One basis for the election of Washington was the relative and absolute increase in the Black population of Chicago over the past 150 years, especially the past 50 years. The Black population increased from 109,000 in 1920 to over 1.2 million by 1982. Further, the relative growth of the Black population (Table 1) took place in the context of the overall development of the economic base of Chicago (Indian territory, commercial town, industrial city, and monopoly metropolis), and the resultant transformation of local politics. The last 50 years have been dominated by the Democratic Party machine. The development of Black politics and politicians fits into the overall pattern of Chicago mayoral types (Tables 2 and 3).

During the 1930s Blacks were differentially absorbed into the Democratic machine just as they had previously been absorbed into the Chicago industrial economy, *at the bottom*. Racism operated in the party to hold back Blacks from being incorporated equitably with anything approaching democratic representation. By the 1960s, and corresponding to the broader civil rights movement in the U.S., an independent Black political movement began to emerge and increasingly assert itself, pressing for welfare, status, and symbolic goals, usually within the framework of the Democratic Party. While systemic contradictions, manifested in various forms of the "urban crisis" (economic,

fiscal, political, and social), continued to intensify into the 1980s, the system was able to contain political movements for change within the bounds of "acceptable" political behavior. Hence, the ruling elites have been able to manage the urban crisis, and to define the limited, reformist character of the movement for Black empowerment. The Washington campaign symbolized the mass response to growing systemic inequities within a limited electoral reformist framework.

The regime of Richard J. Daley (1955-1976) was based upon a Democratic coalition of white ethnics, State Street merchants, government employees, and Blacks. It had the outward appearance of stability, but was tenuous and transitory at best. For Daley presided over a city undergoing significant economic, demographic, and social transformation. These factors combined with a U.S. economy in contraction and federal domestic expenditure retrenchment to unleash political conflicts within his coalition, leading to fragmentation along racial and national lines after Daley's death.

His successors, Bilandic and Byrne, were unable to preserve the coalition or to unite the Democratic Party on a new basis. The disintegration of the machine into various warring factions (i.e., Daley the son, Pucinski, Vrdolyak-Byrne, and Black and white independents) grew increasingly sharp in City Council. Mayor-Council battles raged over the allocation and distribution of public resources. The fiscal crisis worsened as the political elites found it increasingly difficult to match declining revenues with expanding legitimate mass demands for public goods and services, and at the same time protect the old tradition of dispersing privilege, rewards, and jobs.

The pre-campaign period was marked by an increase of community-based protests around several concrete issues (private housing, jobs, health, education) and status-representational issues (appointments of officials to the School Board, Chicago Housing Authority Board, and other boards and City Council selection). Under the Byrne administration, welfare and status goals were pursued by various segments of the Black community, joined by popular elements among Latinos and whites.

These neighborhood forces targeted Jane Byrne as the symbol of both the machine and the conservative alignment of social and political forces (Reaganomics and Thompson welfare cuts) at the federal, state, and local levels. Policies had become increasingly racist in character. Thus, in order for there to be any new redistribution of resources for Blacks, the machine had to be dismantled. "Black power," Black electoral empowerment, became a tactic for reform, dictating the transformation of the economic goals of struggle among the masses into a political struggle for a Black mayor, a symbol of Black power in City Hall.

The selection of Harold Washington as the candidate of Blacks for mayor was unique in the respect that neither big business nor the machine wanted him to run. Harold Washington was a "reluctant" candidate who had been "drafted" by the Black community. Significant numbers of activist whites and Latinos were convinced to support Washington.

The most important development paving the way for his subsequent campaign was the transformation of spontaneous mass protest around specific issues into a political movement, the most extensive mass electoral mobilization in the history of Chicago politics. That mobilization was based upon the registration of nearly 240,000 voters, more than 160,000 of whom were Blacks, many previously alienated from electoral participation. This mobilization was sustained in a record turnout of the Black electorate in the February primary and the April general election. In 1979 only 34% of the approximately 490,000 eligible Black voters went to the polls. Only 72% of the Black voting age population was registered. In 1983, over 650,000 or nearly 90% of the potential Black electorate was registered. Harold Washington received about 80% of the Black vote in the primary and 98% in the general election (Tables 7, 15).

As overwhelming as the Black vote for Washington was in the primary election, racial bloc voting was most characteristic of the white electorate. Byrne and Daley, two viable white candidates, split 88% of the white vote, while Washington received some 80% of the Black vote. The Washington primary victory had been made possible by virtually total unity among Black

community leadership, and the mass involvement of the electorate. The blue button was worn by hundreds of thousands of Washington supporters and became an important symbol, displayed in defiance of the machine.

There is common agreement that campaign organization was of secondary significance to the movement behind the campaign itself. The Washington campaign proceeded in stages. During the primary, it had two major elements: an informal organization under the leadership of the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment, and an extensive formal structure (Table 9).

The Task Force, composed essentially of activists from community organizations and labor, political, and some professional leaders, made major contributions to several tactical aspects of mobilizing the Black electorate and neutralizing opposition to the Washington campaign within the community. However, it contributed few resources to the formal structure of the campaign, or to the mass issue-based movement behind it. The formal organization of the Washington campaign, its steering committee, heads of citizens' groups and campaign staff were drawn mainly from middle-class Black professionals, with whites playing key roles in certain areas.

The campaign organization and leadership developed over time through stages: pre-campaign build-up, crisis, viability, and mobilization of the electorate. During the first two stages the campaign reflected a more broad-based input from the community. The viability stage was marked by the debates in late January that made it possible for Washington to capture the public eye, to take his program to the white electorate, and to acquire resources from among the national political elite. The fourth stage emphasized maximum turnout of the Black electorate on Election Day.

The general election more than ever was marked by racial bloc voting and the intensification of Black community unity. The development of a Black-white-Latino coalition was decisive because it led to a dramatic turnabout of the Latino electorate's support for Harold Washington. Washington increased his

support among Latinos from under 25% during the primary to more than 74%. Latino support in the general election enabled Washington to snatch victory from the jaws of a racist backlash among the white electorate, who bolted a solid tradition of overwhelming support for Democratic primary nominees. Black empowerment and reform of the Democratic Party were the major political issues in the primary; the notion that a Black reform mayor would lead to a radical change in the distribution of goods and services along ethnic and racial lines fed a racist reaction that made racism the main feature of the general election (Table 13). Bernard Epton received 95% of his 620,000 votes from among white voters. Washington, while receiving 98% of the Black vote, only received 77% of his electoral support from Black voters. The outcome of the general election reflects the character of the Washington coalition and the relative success of the general election campaign strategy: to consolidate the Black base of support and expand the base among Latinos and whites (Tables 7, 15, 16).

To accomplish the general election strategy, Washington de-emphasized the role of the Task Force, upon which he had relied heavily during the primary period. A more significant feature of the general election was the role played by the national Democratic Party. Chicago witnessed presidential hopefuls and leading party officials invade the city in a steady procession to appeal for party unity and Democratic solidarity behind Washington's candidacy as the first step toward a Democratic defeat of Reagan in the 1984 presidential election. Also, Washington and other Black elected officials were able to gain support for his candidacy in Chicago in return for future help in mobilizing the Black electorate for Democratic candidates in the 1984 general elections. Locally, in extending an "olive branch" to corporate elites and white businesses, Washington moved aggressively (causing some consternation among Blacks) to bring more whites into his transition apparatus.

While the Washington Transition Team was on the whole well-balanced between whites, Blacks, and Latinos, there was a marked difference in the comparative composition of his

primary campaign organization and the Transition Team as a whole (Tables 9, 17). There was a tendency toward middle-class professionals and business and corporate executives on the latter. Within the Transition Team there was a marked difference in the composition of its two major committees. The Financial Advisory Coordinating Task Force, which focused upon fiscal and budgetary matters, was smaller (27 members) and overwhelmingly white (70%), while the Transition Oversight Committee, which focused on government personnel and programs, was larger (55 members) and reflected a proportional representation of whites (47%), with Blacks and Latinos constituting a plurality (52%; see Table 17). Thus, while Washington was fighting against the intensely racist campaign of his Republican opponent, he was also preparing for governance. He assembled a Transition Team that in class if not racial terms was more characteristic of those in previous administrations than of the movement that fueled his victory (Tables 7, 15). Washington dispelled any notions that a "Black takeover" was imminent by appointing a nominal majority of whites to the Transition Team. And while more Blacks were appointed to a Transition Team than at any time in the city's history, the most significant aspect of the policymaking structure of the early Washington governance collective is its overwhelmingly high percentage of members drawn from business and professions.

The first 12 months of the Washington administration were akin to war. In typical fashion, Rudy Luzano, a Hispanic labor leader and staunch supporter of Washington, was murdered after the general election. In the previous two elections since Daley's death, the reconciliation of the Democratic Party had been marked by the negotiation of deals between Black and white party leaders that essentially blocked Blacks from attaining a greater semblance of power and privilege within the regular Democratic Party. Since party bosses had not supported Washington, and in many instances white ward bosses had actively opposed his election, many had supported Epton by withholding full support for Washington. Analysis of the period

of governance focused upon several aspects of the tactical organization of Washington's forces. First, Washington called for a unity breakfast after his primary and general election victories, which many principals from the losing camps did not attend. Second, at the inaugural, Washington broke with the precedent of a City Council chamber ceremony that could only be attended by 300-400 and held an open ceremony at Navy Pier attended by several thousand. During Washington's inaugural speech he reasserted his stand upon the principles of unity that had propelled him to victory: reform government, elimination of machine patronage, and open government. Washington openly attacked the past practices of the machine while at the same time he promised fiscal restraint, stability in government, and sound business practices. Thus, an olive branch was extended to the corporate business community that had given him minimal support in his primary and general election bids.

The further working out of the economic (class) contradictions central to issues of urban governance has been overshadowed by the persistence, even intensification, of a virulent strain of racist reaction. A major theme in the early Washington administration was the confrontation of Black power marshaled in opposition to the existence and increasingly reactive character of the Chicago "white power structure." Historically, the material basis for a Black-power/white-power structure confrontation has been the underrepresentation of Blacks in Chicago politics and in government (Table 18). The immediate basis for the operation of Black power against the white power structure has been the result of Washington's struggle to govern. At the heart of the current City Council struggle between the Vrdolyak 29 and the Washington 21 is the continuation of the struggle of Black power vs. white corporate America. This scenario tells us as much about the limitations of reformist electoral Black power strategy as it reveals its inability to provide a fundamental redistribution of social resources. In Table 19, we pointed out that the essential differences between the Vrdolyak 29 and the Washington 21 had to do with the ethnic and demographic

composition of their constituents. All of the 29 are white aldermen and tend to be ward committeemen; the Washington 21 either are Black or are white independents with liberal or predominantly Black constituencies. Beyond these distinctions, past all the hype surrounding the struggle to institute reforms that target the machine, there are few substantive bases for unity. Thus, on many class-based issues we can expect fragmentation within both camps.

We have attempted to base this analysis on the objective development of historical forces that led to the campaign, and the social character of the campaign itself. Indeed, it will be discussed as a permanent event in Black political history, and the history of Chicago. We believe this campaign should be studied to understand at least three major points: First, Black adults demonstrated that under specific conditions they will defy all expectations and mobilize at unprecedented levels. These conditions are unity of Black leadership, public attacks from white racism, and a legitimate form of mobilization such as voting. Second, Black movements to solve problems in society can be the basis for a multinational united front under certain conditions. These conditions are unity of a community-based multinational leadership, a build-up of community-based struggles around concrete economic and symbolic issues, and political ideology that is inclusive—not exclusive—of diverse communities and social groups. Third, when (reactionary) white power is confronted successfully by (progressive) Black power—especially if it is allied with a “rainbow coalition” in working-class and poor communities—the struggle will be of worldwide importance.

The promise of Harold Washington—what people are hoping for—may well exceed the realm of political reform. But when people dream so-called impossible dreams of a society free from class exploitation, racial oppression, and male supremacy, sometimes they search for new ways to make them come true. We have done this analysis to aid in this search.

The Washington campaign shows the vitality and viability of the Black liberation movement, specifically in an instance of struggle in the electoral arena. The election of Harold

Washington, a reformed machine politician, was the result of a crusade in the Black community. A network of militant organizations, developing from the late 1970s and early 1980s, led the spontaneous mass movement. The fundamental conditions for this electoral victory included successful mobilization of masses of people, a broad consensus of political focus, and a united leadership.

7. Conclusions: Contradictions and Black Leadership

The great victory of Harold Washington was based on the unity and strength of mass electoral protest at the polls, and on the dynamic personality of a dominant leadership figure. Harold was able to command the discipline and loyalty of a significant majority of community leaders and the voting public. However, the very basis of this victory set limitations on its duration.

Each election has its own logic. Therefore, especially where there is a record mobilization and mass voter unity, each time is a new experience, advances cannot be assumed to carry over from one election to the next. Specifically, although Washington had predicted he would have a long tenure as major, he died less than a year after his first reelection. The great victory was relatively short lived. As a result, the Harold Washington reform movement has been challenged to go beyond a one time record protest vote in 1983, and to go beyond their charismatic leader.

Our task is to analyze the 1983 electoral experience to learn its most important lessons. The next major development of mass protest, whether at the polls or in the streets, will contain many of the same actors and historically based spontaneous

mass actions. It is only by learning the lessons of past history that we can create a new future. Political activists can intervene into a process of struggle and make progressive contributions only by being knowledgeable of the strengths and weaknesses of a movement, of a community.

In general there has been a contradiction between the political motion of the masses of Black people and its middle class leadership. Historically the middle class has led the struggle for democratic rights, to be included within the legitimate institutional spheres of life in the USA. While the middle class has fought for this historical goal of inclusion it has always had to manage two seemingly opposite ideological orientations, integration and nationalism. An integrationist orientation is for the purpose of fighting for inclusion and when successful to rationalize "belonging." A nationalist posture is used to maintain the loyalty of the ghetto based masses, who will not necessarily benefit from or even experience integration, but whose support is essential nevertheless for the legitimacy of Black middle class leadership.

This tendency for a dual orientation should not be mistaken for the more consistent ideological cadre. These are small fractions of the middle class who arm their class-mates with an ideological catechism, but do not give them day to day or even strategic political leadership. This is as true for nationalism as for integrationism. The essential opportunist character of middle class political leadership is that it walks on both sides of the street for its own interests whenever it has to: today it uses nationalism to rally Black support, tomorrow it commits itself to integrationism in order to ease tensions with whites. This ideological dualism is rooted deeply within the very nature of Black middle class leadership as it leads the fight for inclusion, especially in the political arena.

In this way, Black people have a long history of fighting to get inside of the political system, to gain access to "legitimate political resources." After the Civil War, three constitutional amendments established for Blacks their freedom, citizenship,

and right to vote. In the next 100 years, the struggle for voting rights was against *de jure* obstacles in the South (e.g., grandfather clause, poll taxes, literacy tests, etc.). While a breakthrough in Black officeholding occurred during Reconstruction, Black elected officials have developed in significant numbers mainly in the post-World War II period. In this period, Black elected representation has been directly related to enforcement of voting rights and the presence of unifying electoral movements, at least at the local level.

The main basis for Black protest has had to be *outside* of the formal political system, with political resources from the Black community. The primary base has traditionally been in the Black church, the dominant Black social institution. However, Black colleges, media, social and fraternal organizations, and independent Black businesses have all been significant, especially as power brokers for Black middle class interests. To some extent organized industrial workers have been represented by trade union leaders. Each social institution has a stable leadership composed of high status elites, and some sector of the overall Black community as its mass base. These elites frequently negotiate the interests of the entire Black community as the main players of the local and national Black leadership.

There is another aspect of Black protest "outside" of the political system which is rooted in the dual traditions of militant Black nationalism and socialist radicalism. There exist a number of small loosely-related organizations who maintain a highly ideological style of political activity. Because of the intense development of cadre in this type of protest politics, these groups have the potential to provide leadership for relatively large groups of people such as what occurs in the mass mobilization phase of a protest movement involving working class and poor people. Furthermore, these groups often have a "vanguard" quality which enables them to start movement activity before it becomes popular, to "risk" legitimacy by ignoring the existing norms of the political

order. On balance these groups have made great positive contributions to progress.

We have been entering a new stage of Black leadership in which for the first time in history there is a solid and relatively permanent Black leadership within the political system on all levels. This leadership is based on several 20th century developments: Black people are now primarily urban; the civil rights movement has been successful in changing the society from the de jure segregation of all Black people to the de facto segregation of poor and working class Black people; the Black middle class is no longer based on independent segregated social institutions and market within the Black community, but is now based on government employment and management of a transnational based economy of franchise agreements; and the Black community is polarizing between the haves and the have nots.

In general the shift in leadership is suggested by the fact that the Congressional Black Caucus has replaced the civil rights leadership as the main Black leadership on the national level, while the Black mayors and other elected officials are dominant on the local level. *So, middle class Black leadership has been outside, but has now moved inside of the formal institutions of the USA government.* This leadership pressures the masses to move from extra legal (even illegal) protest to protest within institutionally legitimate forms of political action. This all stems from the Black middle class who have gained material benefits from this inclusion, because in essence it has been inclusion within a privileged position of the U.S. class system. The opposition of the Black middle class is a "loyal opposition," while the masses of people have always been a "disloyal opposition." Here we have it all over again, the "house slave" and the "field slave" syndrome of dual leadership (e.g., Phyllis Wheatley vs Harriet Tubman, Uncle Tom vs Nat Turner).

This, then leads us to two of the main political lessons of the Harold Washington electoral protest victory:

1. The tendency of the Black middle class is toward dual leadership, in which mass protest leadership is subordinated to the mainstream leadership of political insiders and institutional elites;
2. The struggle for state power, especially when based on a militant protest electoral campaign, is coopted and limited to the extent it subordinates itself to the procedures set by the bureaucratic organization of the government.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A DUAL LEADERSHIP

The dual leadership of the Washington Campaign developed in the historical context of Black Chicago. On the one hand the Black community grew and developed a diverse set of institutional resources within segregated geographical limits, and on the other, a "vote Black" pattern of electoral activity emerged that resulted in a form of proportional representation as far as Black city council representation is concerned.

Out of this segregated social world developed a Black middle class in control of increasing resources (e.g., education and skills, income, businesses, access to facilities and personal, organizations and associations etc.). In 1950, there were 10,065 Blacks in Chicago with at least a college education, and by 1980, this number had increased to over 47,000. Those resources were used to lead and support Black protest by the civil rights movement. But Blacks did not make great gains in positions of power. The Chicago Urban League did a study of Blacks in top decision-making positions in 1967 and 1977. The overall pattern is found in Table 20.

It is obvious from Table 20, that Blacks are overwhelmingly under represented in both the public (government) and private sectors, but greater representation and improvement has taken place in the public sector. The public sector is much more sensitive and responsive to the demands of the Black

protest movement since it needs the potential political resources of that movement, votes. Voter participation is needed to maintain the legitimacy of a "democratic" government. The pattern seems to be that small electoral districts with large Black populations tend to be represented well. This is born out by the "Black Power Batting Average" for City Council representation.

Table 20 BLACKS IN DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS IN CHICAGO: 1965 and 1977

<i>Date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Public Domain Positions</i>	<i>Private Domain Positions</i>
1965	Total	1223	9900
	Black	75	226
	% Black	6.1%	2.3%
1977	Total	1619	12013
	Black	204	364
	% Black	12.6%	3.0%

Source: Roger Fox et. al., Blacks in Policymaking Positions in Chicago, Chicago: Chicago Urban League, 1980.

The Black Power Batting Average is computed by dividing the percentage Black of the City Council by the percentage Black of the voting age population. Eisinger calls this a "Black representation ratio" and Karnig and Welch call it a "Black council equity ratio." Table 21 presents the Black Power Batting Average for Chicago, 1923-1983. The increase in the number of Black representatives in City Council is a major indication of the developing political capacity of the Black community. Given the racial character of many public policies in the City of Chicago, it would be expected that Black council members would form voting blocs, particularly with regard to issues of interest to the Black electorate.

The table graphically portrays the pattern of post World War I Black political representation. There are three definite periods: (a) **Symbolic representation** (1923-47) represents


seven terms of office when two Blacks were on the Council. These two Blacks were symbolically the representatives of all Blacks in the City. The declining Black Power Batting Average reflects increases in Black population while council membership stayed the same. (b) **Machine representation** (1947-67) represents five terms of office but an incremental increase on representation from 3 to 6 Black members of the Council. These politicians were loyalists in the Daley machine. (c) **Proportionate representation** (1967-83) characterized by an increase to 16 Black members of the council. Black Council Representatives are divided into machine regulars and independents. Currently, there are 19 predominantly Black wards in Chicago. Two of the wards have white alderpersons who are machine loyalist while one is an independent.

DUAL LEADERSHIP

Our model conceptualizes dual leadership in the campaign to elect Washington as a development process contributing to three campaign turning points: the announcement of candidacy December 6, 1982, the primary February 22, 1983, and the general election April 12, 1983. The significance of these three political events concerns victory in different contexts: individual, party, electorate. Overall, Black people moved faster and farther than racist opposition -- hard work resulted in a Black victory. Black electoral superiority was developed by 1982, and it expressed itself in the Washington mayoral votes in 1983. This upsurge in Black voting was an expression of Black protest, and served as the basis of a broad based multi national campaign.

Figure 1 below depicts the process of dual leadership as it directly relates to the three key political events of the 1983 mayoral election. Central to the process is the relative *convergence* of leadership, uniting in such a way as to maximize the mobilization of Black community resources. This unity occurred first around identification of the key political issues and second, the selection of a candidate -

Table 22 INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS: DUAL LEADERSHIP IN THE CAMPAIGN TO ELECT HAROLD WASHINGTON




Harold Washington. Then this convergence of leadership culminated in the victories of the primary and general election in Chicago. Other aspects of the table are the relative *divergence* of "insider-outsider" leadership based upon differences in real or perceived interests of various leaders and their constituencies. When the Black community was under racist attack, there was greater and more sustained unity.

Also indicated in the model, are the specific organizational forms that the insider-outsider leadership dialectic manifested within the Washington campaign. The Steering Committee and Transition Team organizations are the formal structures of the campaign and the Task Force organization and its networks into the community represent the informal aspects that tie the movement to the formal political objectives.

The critical juncture occurred with the establishment of a formal *and* an informal campaign apparatus – the organization of campaign leadership on an insider/outside basis. The outsiders were necessary to give the campaign a strike force of activists willing to use militant tactics if necessary. Within the Black community, the "outsider" leadership group came together as the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment (Task Force). Its major role was to defend the unity of the Black community in support of Washington's candidacy.

Many of the individuals and organizations that united in the Task Force had been working together for a long time. The largest group of loosely coordinated organizations and individuals is called "The African Community of Chicago" (ACC). It is based on a Black nationalist/Pan Africanist ideological orientation. They annually sponsor Kwanzaa (a Black alternative to Christmas) which draws over 1,000 people, and African Liberation Day in late May, which annually draws over 250 people. This represents the institutionalization of Black culture (rituals of resistance) initiated in the 1960s. Typical groups include: Sule Watoto (a Black independent school), Institute of Positive Education, Universal Negro Improvement Association (Chicago Chapter), and the Association of Afrikan Historians, etc.

Table 21 YEARS OF CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS



Several key ACC leaders work together in an inner city Black Studies Program of Northeastern Illinois University (e.g., Conrad Worrill, Anderson Thompson, and Robert Starks). Worrill is head of the National Black United Front, and spokesperson for the ACC. Starks, while holding no public office in Black nationalist organizations, serves as a liaison between mainstream groups and the ACC.

A second network or organization and individuals was composed of reform-oriented community groups and service agencies. These include the Kenwood-Oakland Community Organization (KOCO), Midwest Community Council (MCC), Citizens for Self Determination, Westside Coalition for Unity and Action; Bobby Wright Mental Health Center, Minority Economic Development Corporation, and Coalition for Black Trade Unionists. In contrast to the city-wide and ideological ACC, most of these groups are based in local neighborhoods. Organization of Leadership in Campaign and pragmatically fight for economic and welfare reforms on a step-by-step, incremental basis. The ACC maintains a small group of highly committed ideological adherents, while the reformers deal with material incentives based on the day-to-day needs of their constituency. These reformers are united into working class based, city-wide coalitions that cut across nationality and race. Bob Lucas (KOCO) and Nancy Jefferson (MCC) share leadership roles in several coalitions like the Chicago (housing) Rehab Network, and protest coalitions like People Organized for Welfare and Economic Reform (POWER). These coalitions link Black and white "outside" leadership, especially whites like Slim Coleman (of the Uptown Coalition serving the interests of mainly inner city poor whites). A third block of community forces evolved around Lu Palmer the head of CBUC.

The rest of the identifiable blocs were Black ministers, entrepreneurs, politicians, other city-wide organizations, and Marxists. The ministers and entrepreneurs have small congregations and/or markets, and are openly sympathetic to nationalist causes. The politicians were from 12 wards. They

TABLE 23 ORGANIZATION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE HAROLD WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN

TASK FORCE

Date formed	November 7, 1982 (publically announced January 10, 1983)
Membership	95
Leading Figures	Robert Starks, Associate Professor Center for Inner City Studies Northeastern Illinois University Conrad Worrill, Associate Professor Center for Inner City Studies Northeastern Illinois University Lu Palmer, Adjunct Professor Urban Studies, Associated Colleges of the Midwest
% Black	100%
Purpose:	To help elect Harold Washington by mobilizing Black unity and using militant protect tactics

STEERING COMMITTEE

Date formed	December 13, 1982
Membership	62
Leading Figures	Bill Berry, Special Assistant to the President Johnson Products Company Warren Bacon, Manager of Community Relations Inland Steel Company Walter Clark, Vice President First Federal Saving and Loan
% Black	71%
Purpose:	To provide overall policy and planning, and to develop financial and political resources for the campaign

TRANSITION TEAM

Date formed	April, 1983
Membership	90
Leading Figures	Bill Berry, Special Assistant to the President Johnson Products company James O'Connor, President and Chairperson Commonwealth Edison Norman Ross, Senior Vice President 1st National Bank of Chicago Kenneth Glover, Vice President South Shore Bank
% Black	39.7%
Purpose:	To analyze and prepare recommendations for a new mayoral administration: city budget, administrative structure, policy, and key personnel appointments, etc.

were either independent officeholders or aspiring candidates with no mainstream or "Machine" (Regular Democratic Party) support. Hence, they were risking little by being in this "outside" leadership context. After being elected and consolidating a ward organization, one might expect this open affiliation with outsiders to decline. Many candidates stopped participating after the primary election--both the winners and losers.

The other city-wide organizations did as much as the Task Force, although they all worked together so closely, that a typical volunteer often was not clear what group they were *working under*. Everybody seemed just to know what they were *working for*: The election of Chicago's first Black mayor, Harold Washington. One organization was Chicago Black United Communities (CBUC), headed by Lu Palmer, and the other was PUSH, headed by Reverend Jesse Jackson. These two were headquartered in the First Congressional District represented by Harold Washington. The critical factor was that each organization had powerful personalities for leaders who had been frequently at odds, between each other, and with Washington. However, in this context, there was a contagious rapprochement spreading because the possibility of a Black mayor was something all of them wanted. The nationalists began to unite with Jesse Jackson. Lu Palmer and Jesse made up and Lu began to speak on the PUSH Saturday morning radio broadcasts. Reformers began working with the nationalists, etc. The historical moment created this militant Black unity of "outsiders," and this unity helped the moment have a magical quality people could believe in.

The development of "insider" leadership took place on two fronts. First, a Steering Committee was organized for broad policy planning, development of financial resources, and for establishing legitimacy with the multiple constituencies represented by its "blue ribbon" members who cut across racial, nationality, class, gender, and geographical lines. A second aspect, was the organization of a campaign staff, a campaign manager and office workers who would handle

policy implementation and coordinate the day to day activities of the campaign. This staff was an interesting combination of movement volunteers with utopian visions of political reform, operatives from machine-style political backgrounds along with reformers who wanted to move from the "outside" (community) toward the "inside" (City Hall administration, key board appointments, etc.).

The organization of formal campaign leadership began with close associates of Harold Washington being pulled together as staff, first Renault Robinson as the campaign manager, and then Al Raby. Initially the campaign lacked organizational coherence – no research, no media plan and projection. There was a breakdown in internal and external communication, weak office staff coordination and poor space (initially occupying offices of the AAPL in a far South Side Black community). But within a month after announcing his candidacy, Washington pulled together a "blue ribbon" Steering Committee and changed campaign managers. Al Raby was retained as campaign manager, and by January 7, 1983 he had developed the framework for running a professional campaign office in the heart of the downtown. The latter move provided readily available access to media outlets, transportation outlets, facilities, finance flows and city-wide volunteers. this move facilitated the staffing of district offices across the city.

There were two key groups on the Steering Committee. A civil rights network from the 1960s, and leading reformers from the struggles that led to the campaign from the 1970s and 80s. The Steering Committee was headed by Bill Berry who had gained prominence in the 1960s. Berry was the head of the Chicago Urban League (CUL) when it grew to be the largest chapter in the country. CUL benefitted its budget and gained mainstream legitimacy by Berry's rejection of Black militants and through his close working relationship to the major Chicago corporations. He was a key link between white mainstream leadership and the Black elites.

The chief research person, Harold Baron, worked for Bill Berry as the Urban League's director of research. Baron was a link of the campaign to progressive intellectuals and university faculty. Al Raby, the campaign manager, was the former head of the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO). During the 1960s, it was the largest such coalition in the USA. The CCCO maintained unity with diverse groups (e.g., the NAACP and SNCC). It sponsored Martin Luther King, moving his efforts into Chicago, and CCCO led the nation's largest school protests--the two boycotts Chicago Public Schools (October 1963 and February 1964). Warren Bacon, a Division Manager of Inland Steel, was on the School Board during the boycotts. And as a liberal, he opposed the dominant, reactionary interests on the Board who were under Daley's control. In this period Bacon worked closely with Berry. Bacon now serves on the Illinois Board of Higher Education.

Washington also selected the two leading Blacks in trade union leadership positions. They are part of the 1970s-1980s group of reformers: Charles Hayes, International Vice President of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union; and Addie Wyatt, Vice President of the Coalition of Labor Union Women. Others include: Nancy Jefferson, Executive Director of the Midwest Community Council; Artensa Randolph, Chair of the Advisor Council of the Chicago Housing Authority; Danny Davis, an independent City Council member; Juan Soliz, Latino independent candidate for City Council; and Jorge Morales, Latino minister and community activist.

Other members of the initial Steering Committee group included three representatives from the business community: Lerone Bennett, an internationally famous writer with Johnson Publishing Company; Ed Gardner, President of Soft Sheen Cosmetic Company; and Walter Clark, Vice President of First Federal Savings and Loan (second largest in Chicago). Clark also served as treasurer for the Steering Committee. Lastly, there were three progressive whites: Robert Mann,

lawyer, former state legislator; Robert Hallock, lawyer; and Rebecca Sive-Tomashefsky, Executive Director, Playboy Foundation. Also, a number of the leaders were bankers whose main role was to raise money.

The organization of the campaign was difficult precisely because the leadership had to deal with vastly different sets of expectations. The mainstream demand was that the future major and campaign organization be acceptable to all aspects of the Chicago community, especially whites and business interests. This was quite different from the Black demand that far-reaching reforms be advocated by aggressively pitting Black power advocacy against white racism and machine dominance of the Democratic Party. In general, this is the contrast between the *insider* rightward pull of mainstream institutional politics, and the *outsider* leftward pull of Black people mobilized into a protest movement. In this context, outsiders were at "the point of political production," fighting for votes, and status. However, on the inside, people were respected more for their social station in life. Status was fixed to rather stable occupational and political roles. This set the basis for the outsiders, because once their "production" of votes was no longer needed, they experienced a rapid decline in status.

After the primary victory, it was necessary to make definite decisions about planning a new Washington administration prepared to take over control of City Hall. This posed a new problem because running a large government bureaucracy and managing a diverse legislative body requires different skills than for mobilizing voters, especially when Black unity might win against a white racist vote, but would not work as the basis for running the entire city administration. Washington organized a Transition Team, with the same method and spirit used to facilitate succession of presidential administrations.

The overall Transition Team was composed of 300 people. Our concern here is only with the composition of leading bodies of the Transition Team and the leadership of the

various subcommittees, which numbers 90 people. The main division of the Transition Team was into a 25-member Financial Advisory Committee (The Fact Force) and a 65-member Transition Oversight Committee.

Table 24 summarizes the social character of each leadership group. On the insider-outsider axis, the Task Force and the Transition Team demonstrated opposite tendencies in the expected directions. The Transition Team had somewhat more an insider character, but quite significant was the outsider character of the Task Force (68.4%). Both the Steering Committee and the Transition Team were dominated by elites. About three-fourths of these organizations were business professional or ministerial elites. This diverged sharply from the predominantly outsider (community and labor) composition of the Task Force.

Table 24 SOCIAL CHARACTER OF LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HAROLD WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN

<i>Leadership Group</i>	<i>Task Force (N = 95)</i>	<i>Steering Committee (N = 62)</i>	<i>Transition Team (N = 90)</i>
Insiders	14.7%	11.3%	14.4%
Elites	16.9%	75.8%	74.4%
Outsiders	68.4%	12.9%	11.1%

Source: Official records and documents from each committee.

Further analysis of this data reveals a clear difference between the Steering Committee and the Transition Team leadership. Black ministers are over 1/5 of the elites on the Steering Committee, but none are in the Transition Team leadership. Black business and professional elites dominate the Steering Committee while white elites dominate the Transition Team.

The Task Forces is different in one additional way, namely, the reliance on the more independent small businesses and the academic professionals. These middle class positions allow for

Table 25 ELITES IN THE LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION OF THE HAROLD WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN

<i>Type Elites</i>	<i>Task Force (N = 16)</i>	<i>Steering Committee (N = 46)</i>	<i>Transition Team (N = 65)</i>
Black Ministers	43.7%	23.9%	0.0%
Black Business/ Professional	56.3%	60.9%	36.9%
White Elites (ALL)	0.0%	15.2%	63.1%

Source: official records and documents from each committee.

greater relative freedom, both on the job and in getting time away from the job. On the other hand, the Steering Committee was dominated by larger businesses and professionals in large bureaucratic agency settings that discipline the leaders within ideological and political limits defined by the political mainstream.

Overall, there is a great deal of significance to the percent Black of each leadership group: Task Force (100.0%); Steering Committee (71.0%) and Transition Team (39.7%). This pattern of declining Black composition rather accurately parallels the percent Black of the relevant reference group being served. The Task Force was for building unity in the Black community, so it was 100% Black, while the Steering Committee was for Washington's broad electoral support. His vote in the general election was 77% Black, while the Steering committee was 71.0% Black. Washington maintained a proportionate percent Black of all leadership groups in his campaign. This is also reflected in the composition of Blacks in the Transition Team leadership. Blacks comprised 39.7% of the leading positions which coincides with their percentage in the city population (39.8 in 1980).

The three groups are quite different in terms of the bureaucratic character of individual resources being organized. The Task Force was a loosely organized group mainly based on an individual's willingness to contribute

personal resources to a collective process. Similar to most social movement contexts, the participants select themselves and gain status in the movement to the extent that they live up to the expectations of membership. They lose status when they cease to function. The Transition Team members came from organized institutional contexts and, in a sense, they represented themselves as well as an organization. They derived their status as much from their position as from the performance in the role assigned. The Steering Committee was mixed in this regard. The top leadership of the Steering Committee consisted of institutional elites who were given formal public recognition, while the expanded committee structure (consisting of a number of citizens committees) allowed for a great deal of formal and informal cooptation. The informal cooptation on some subcommittees made them much more like the Task Force where status was a matter of performance: "What have you done lately?" is the question asked in these contexts.

The general inter-connection between these three leadership groups is based on overlapping membership:

Task Force: 48.4% outsiders (N = 95)

sent 5 members to Steering Committee,
and three are outsiders

Steering Committee: 75.8% elites (n = 62) of

which 60.9% are Black (N = 46)

professional/business people

sent 17 members to Transition Team

and 70.6% are elites of which 58.2% are
Black professionals/business people

Transition Team: (N = 90) 73.8 % are elites of

which 62.9% are white

Nancy Jefferson was the only person on all three leadership committees. She combines her position in community work

with memberships on the Chicago Police Board and the Board of First National Bank.

BLACK POWER AS STATE POWER

Black people have always had more access to the government than it has had to private business and civic institutions. This is the context for Black people fighting to gain access to government as the primary method for obtaining state power. Black power is a recent development in the fight for access to the government. The fight is no longer for proportionate representation, but leadership and control of the entire system. This is the general significance of serious Black candidates for offices of major, governor, and president.

However, the Chicago case of the fight for the first Black mayor demonstrates very clearly that while winning the office of chief executive is a critical turning point, the issue of power involves a more complex structure. We have identified a set of 5 aspects of the overall institution of government. Harold Washington was on a long march to win control of the (1) voters, (2) the mayors office, (3) the bureaucracy of city government, (4) the city council, and (5) the democratic party. This struggle took all five years Washington was mayor, and in the case of the party and bureaucracy it would have taken 15-20 years to consolidate.

This model should be contrasted with the general analysis of the issues and political movements that led to the campaign. These struggles were legitimate in their own right, and in each case might well have developed new leadership, a new mobilization of masses of people. Creative innovation is part of the radicalization of a mass protest, and leads to new ways to express mass discontent (especially ways in which the people at the bottom feel comfortable as opposed to middle class rhetoric). In this sense spontaneity is radically democratic and allows for a more truly open process. It is in this context that radical and revolutionary positions can contend with an against the mainstream positions and policy.

Table 26 5 FACES OF STATE POWER: THE CHICAGO ELECTORAL MODEL OF POLITICAL REFORM

Faces of State Power	Date	Critical Reform Actions
1. The Voter	1982	Community activists file lawsuit and win liberalization of voter registration procedures, so activists can become registrars and undertake registration at locations such as welfare offices, unemployment centers, and in public housing units. As of the 1982 general election, blacks surpassed whites in registration (86.7 to 78.3) and turnout (55.5 to 54.0).
2. The Mayor	April 1983	Harold Washington was elected mayor with 50.06% of the votes against one opponent. He got 98% of the black vote, 74% of the Latino vote and 12% of the white vote. In the primary, he got 36% of the total vote against 2 opponents, 79% of the black vote, 25% of the Latino vote, and 2% of the white vote.
3. The Bureaucracy	June 1983	Political patronage is eliminated Political patronage is eliminated by the Shakman decision, so only 400 or 40,000 jobs are directly controlled by Washington on a political basis, but new hiring policy begins to increase % of minority and women city employees.
4. The City Council	April 1986	Reapportionment of political boundaries leads to change and increase in black and Latino city council representation, from an anti-Washington council (29-21) to a pro-Washington council (25-25), with the mayor having the tie breaking vote.
	April 1987	Washington elected to 2nd term
5. The Party	June 1987	After Washington's re-election and consolidation of firm leadership in the council, his arch rival, E. Vrdolyak, is forced to resign as chairperson of the county Democratic Party, and he eventually becomes a Republican.

However, when a movement limits itself to electoral protest the forms of protest (aggregate mobilization as well as movement speech) are predetermined and become inherently limiting and reformist.

What we see in this conceptualization of the road to state power is a process that favors the middle class and people with a history of serving as political insiders. In the short run the electoral road is likely to remain a major frame of reference for the political struggle, and therefore middle class leadership will be critical to any process of change. Further, when the masses begin to rumble and burst out in spontaneous motion, the middle class will continue to contend for leadership for the movement. Only by grasping the lessons of historical struggles can this dynamic be understood and its logical conclusion be avoided and replaced by a new leadership, a more bold and fearless representation of the masses of people fighting for change.

The election of Harold Washington was a great victory for the working class and the masses of oppressed people even though it contained the dangers just mentioned. It was a victory of the masses that was betrayed by the leadership of the Black middle class. Harold was a fighter for political reforms, reforms that actually brought material gain to the poor and working people in virtually every community and ward in the city of Chicago. Further, he inspired people to organize in their communities to fight for change. This would probably not have lasted for much longer than the 5 years he was in, as even Washington set in motion inherently negative practices in the interest of law and order, a good climate for business, and being reelected.

What we can readily say is that Washington was probably a maverick, an unusual Black middle class politician committed to reform. Others set a different example.

1. Wilson Goode on May 13, 1985, ordered the bombing of a house, killing 11 Black people belonging to an organization called MOVE, rather than resolve the conflict

through negotiation utilizing organized forces within the Black community. Goode is the Black mayor of Philadelphia. Wilson Goode was supported for reelection by Jesse Jackson. Reynard Rochon was Goode's campaign manager, and is now in that same role for Eugene Sawyer. Ernest Barefield left Harold Washington's staff after he died to join Goode. Barefield has returned to Chicago as campaign manager for Tim Evans.

2. Joseph Clarke ordered the use of violence, including his carrying a baseball bat into the school, to force students to comply with his discipline rather than utilize the parents and leaders of the community. Clarke is the Black school superintendent of a New Jersey school system.
3. Vince Lane in late 1988 used police tactics to bring "law and order" to public housing by using police squads to seize buildings, forceable enter apartment without a search warrant, evict everyone not on an official lease, issue official ID cards to all residents, install a police check point to the building for the purpose of checking ID cards, and established a 12 midnight curfew at which time all guests would have to leave. Lane is the Black executive director of the Chicago Housing Authority.

There are many other examples, but the overall fact is that Black middle class leadership is being used to spearhead a militarization of social control over the Black ghetto poor. In other words, Black middle class leadership is two faced: one is friendly (the politicians who direct the protest movement toward the polls, especially the ones out of office or those being threatened by opposition), while the other is mean and rules with an iron fist (especially elected officials in the time of economic crisis and militant protest).

However, the masses of Black people are still out side of the political system, becoming more alienated every day. There is a growing tension between the dual leadership of the middle class and the lack of change for the masses of Black poor people. Mass spontaneous struggles will continue, out of

which new leadership will emerge. There has been a century of Black middle class leadership, and we have some idea of what to expect of them. The really exciting prospects come from the potential of the masses of Black people to throw up their own leadership who can learn the necessary political skills in order to guide the mass struggle past electoral reform towards more basic and far reaching ends.

Appendix

1980s / BLACK PEOPLE and POLITICS

University of Illinois - January 28-29, 1983

Conference Program

Friday Morning, January 28, 9am

Opening Statement Conference Convenors

Remarks Johnetta Jones, Eastern Illinois University

Panel: . **BLACK MAYORS: WHO GETS ELECTED?
WHERE? HOW AND WHAT DIFFERENCE DO
THEY MAKE?**

Chair: Douglas Gills

Panelists:

Milton Morris, Joint Center for Political Studies

John O'Laughlin, University of Illinois

Peter Eisinger, University Wisconsin-Madison

Sharon Watson, Smith College

Friday Afternoon, January 28, 2pm

Panel: **'THE BALLOT OR THE BULLET': MALCOLM X
RECONSIDERED**

Chair: Locksley Edmondson, Southern Illinois University

Panelists:

Lu Palmer, Chair, Chicago Black United Communities

Mercedes Maulette, Chair, Citizens for Self-Determination

Conrad Worrill, Chair, The Black United Front-Chicago

Bill Epton, Black Liberation Press, New York City

Friday Evening, January 28, 7pm

Panel: **WHAT HAVE BLACK MAYORS DONE?**

Chair: Carol Adams, Loyola University

Panelists

Atlanta: Mack Jones, Atlanta University

Detroit: Linda Williams, Howard University

Newark: Amiri Baraka, State University of

New York-Stony Brook

Washington, DC: Ronald Walters, Howard University

Saturday Morning, January 29, 9am

Panel: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BLACK POLITICS IN CHICAGO

Chair: Twiley Barker, University of Illinois

Panelists:

Charles Branham, University of Illinois

Harold Baron, Author

Milton Rakove, University of Illinois

Michael Preston, University of Illinois

Saturday Afternoon, January 29 1:30-3:15 Workshops

#1 OVERCOMING BLACK COMMUNITY DISUNITY

Chair: Sarah Miles Woods, Roosevelt University

Panelists:

George Clements, Holy Angels Church

Nancy Jefferson, Midwest Community Council

Nathaniel Clay, Journalist

Tim Black, Loop College

#2 BUILDING COALITIONS

Chair: Robert Starks, Northeastern Illinois University

Panelists:

Anderson Thompson, National Black Independent

Political Party Arturo Vasquez, Pilsen Housing and

Business Alliance Slim Coleman, Heart of Uptown

Coalition Bob Lucas, Kenwood-Oakland Community

Organization

#3 CRITICAL ISSUES: JOBS

Chair: John McClendon, University of Illinois

Panelists:

Roger Fox, Research Director, Chicago Urban League

Carl Turpin, Griever, United Steelworkers Local No. 1033

Berta Shelton, Bureau of Employment Security

Chuck Wooten, UAW Activist, Detroit

#4 CRITICAL ISSUES: HOUSING

Chair: Julia Lynne Walker, Peoples College

Panelists:

Waymon Winston, Milwaukee Housing Activists

James Payne, Chair, Kenwood-Oakland Community

Organization

Niana Hickman, Chicago Housing Tenants Association

3:30-5:15 Workshops

#5 WORKERS AND TRADE UNIONS

Chair: Charles Evans, Olive Harvey Community College

Panelists:

James Balanoff, Former District Director,
United Steelworkers District 31

Luis Perez, Electrical Union Activists

Bobby Joe Thompson, Vice Chair, Grievance Committee,
United Steel Workers Local No. 1010

#6 THE ROLE OF BLACK STUDIES

Chair: Kina McAfee, Student, Northwestern

Panelists:

David Johnson, Thornton Community College

Roger Oden, Governors State University

Carol Adams, Loyola University SUNDIATA

Cha Jua, Richland Community College

#7 CRITICAL ISSUES: EDUCATION

Chair: William Exum, Northwestern University

Panelists:

Kenneth Smith, Former President Chicago School Board

Harold Rogers, Black Faculty in Higher Education

#8 CRITICAL ISSUES: HEALTH CARE

Chair: Marvin Goodwin, Kennedy King College

Panelists:

Lea Rogers, Health Care Activist Quentin Young,

Physician James Townsel, University of Illinois

Saturday Evening, January 29, 7pm

Panel: BLACK POLITICS AND BLACK LIBERATION:
THE RELEVANCE OF LOCAL POLITICS

Chair: Ronald Bailey, Northwestern University Presenters

Mayor Richard Hatcher, Gary Indiana

Philip G. Smith, Political Editor, *Dollars and Sense Magazine*

Abdul Alkalimat, Peoples College

NOTES

1. The importance of this election can be easily seen in the newspaper coverage in Chicago and other parts of the world. The primary and general election coverage has been collected in two documentary volumes published by Peoples College Press (P.O. Box 2696, Chicago, Ill., 60680), *Black Power in Chicago, Volume 1, A Documentary Survey of the 1983 Mayoral Democratic Primary*; and *Volume 2, The General Election*. Some headlines from the European press are as follows: *Le Monde* in Paris, "Un Noir a ete elu pour la premiere fois maire de Chicago"; *Die Zeit* in Berlin, "Ein Schwarzer Kandidat Schlagt die Burgermeisterin aus dem Feld"; and *The Times* of London, "Black Vote Wins Chicago: Mayor Tries to Heal Racial Rift."

2. The general historical development of the U.S. capitalist city can be traced in the following: David Gordon, "Capitalist Development and the History of American Cities," in William Tabb and Larry Sawyers (eds.), *Marxism and the Metropolis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 25-63; Patrick O'Donnell, "Industrial Capitalism and the Rise of Modern American Cities," *Kapitalistate* 6 (Fall 1977), pp. 91-128.

3. Basic works on the history of Chicago include: Bessie Louise Pierce, *A History of Chicago, Volume 1, 1673-1848; Volume 2, 1848-1871; and Volume 3, 1871-1893* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957); Harold Mayer and Richard Wade, *Chicago: Growth of a Metropolis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909); Milo Quaife, *Checagou: From Indiana Wigwam to Modern City, 1673-1835* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933).

4. Thomas Meehan, "Jean Baptiste Point du Sable, the First Chicagoan," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 56, 3 (Autumn 1963), pp. 439-53; Milo Quaife (ed.), "Property of Jean Baptiste Point du Sable," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 15 (June 1928), pp. 89-92; Eugene Feldman, *Jean Baptiste Point du Sable* (Chicago: DuSable Museum of African American History, 1973).

5. James B. Lane, *City of the Century: A History of Gary, Indiana* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978); Edward Greer, *Big Steel: Black Politics and Corporate Power* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).

6. St. Claire Drake and Horace Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1945); Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922); Allan Spear, *Black Chicago: The Making of A Negro Ghetto 1890-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Dempsey Travis, *An Autobiography of Black Chicago* (Chicago: Urban Research Institute, 1981).

7. This rare mimeographed document is in the hands of the authors. We will be glad to send a photo copy to anyone interested for the cost of copying and postage.

8. Brian Berry et al., *Chicago: Transformations of an Urban System* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976).

9. Chicago Planning Commission, *Chicago 1992 Comprehensive Plan* (Chicago: City of Chicago, 1982).

10. Eighty-eight of the "Fortune 1,000" leading corporations are headquartered in the Chicago area. Six of the top 100 banks and insurance companies are located in Chicago; three major international transportation leaders are headquartered in Chicago, including United Airlines; three leading international industrial firms are based in Chicago, including Standard Oil of Indiana, Beatrice Foods, Inland Steel; two major diversified products companies, Esmark and IC Industries are based in Chicago. Three of the leading retail chain operations, Sears, Jewell Companies, and McDonald's, and one of the major utilities in the world, Commonwealth Edison, are based in Chicago. O'Hare International Airport is one of the most trafficked airports in the world. Chicago is a major electronic media outlet (NBC, *Chicago Tribune*, *Sun Times*). Further, 14 of the 100 largest multinational conglomerates in the U.S. are based in Chicago. The list of multinational corporations with direct investments in South Africa includes: First National Bank, Continental Bank, American Hospital Supply, Borg-Warner, Searle, International Harvester, Abbott Laboratories, and Motorola. Chicago has three major universities with over \$15 million in investments in major corporations doing business in South Africa and/or with direct investments in the exploitation of South African workers: Northwestern University, \$75 million; University of Chicago, \$50 million; and Illinois Institute of Technology, \$15 million. See *Fortune* 1982 and 1983 annual corporate surveys. *Forbes* (July 5, 1982); also Chicago Committee for a Free Africa, *Sell the Stock: The Divestiture Struggle at Northwestern University and Building the Anti-Imperialist Movement* (Chicago: Peoples College Press, 1978).

11. Donald S. Bradley, *The Historical Trends of the Political Elites in a Metropolitan Central City: The Chicago Mayors* (Working Paper No. 10, Center for Organizational Studies, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, May 1963); Donald S. Bradley and Mayer Zald, "From Commercial Elite to Political Administrator: The Recruitment of Mayors in Chicago," *The American Journal of Sociology* 71 (September 1965), pp. 153-67.

12. Bradley, op. cit.

13. Harold Gosnell, *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935, 1967); James Q. Wilson, *Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership* (Chicago: The Free Press, 1960); Charles Branham, "Black Chicago: Accommodationist Politics Before the Great Migration," in Peter Jones and Melvin Holli (eds.), *The Ethnic Frontier* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1977), pp. 212-62; Dianne Pinterhughes, "Interpretations of Racial and Ethnic Participation in American Politics: The Case of the Black, Italian, and Polish Communities in Chicago, 1910-1940" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1977).

14. Wilson, *op. cit.*

15. The general development of Black politics in Chicago is discussed in the forthcoming proceedings of a major conference of academics and activists held during the primary campaign: *Black Mayors in American Cities* (Chicago: Peoples College Press, forthcoming).

16. Michael Preston, "Black Politics in the Post-Daley Era," in Sam Gove and Louis Masotti (eds.), *After Daley: Chicago Politics in Transition* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), pp. 88-117; and Michael Preston, "Black Politics and Public Policy in Chicago: Self Interest Versus Constituent Representation," in M. Preston, L. Henderson, and P. Puryear (eds.), *The New Black Politics* (New York: Longman, 1982), pp. 159-86.

17. See the speech by that title delivered in Cleveland on April 3, 1964, reprinted in *Malcolm X Speaks* (New York: Merit Publishers, 1965), pp. 23-44. This is also the theme of panel presentations included in the proceedings, *Black Mayors in American Cities*, *op. cit.* Participants on this panel included Lu Palmer (Chicago Black United Communities), Mercedes Maulette (Citizens for Self-Determination), Conrad Worrill (Black United Front), Wylie Rogers (activist), and Locksley Edmondson (Cornell University).

18. Milton Rakove, *Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers: An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). Len O'Connor, *Clout: Mayor Daley and His City* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1975); Mike Royko, *Boss: Richard Daley of Chicago* (New York: New American Library, 1971).

19. Royko, *ibid.*

20. Scott Greer (ed.), *Ethnics, Machines, and the American Urban Future* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1981); Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). Thomas Guterbock, *Machine Politics in Transition: Party and Community in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

21. M. Preston, R. Lineberry, and K. Kemp, "Last of the Great Urban Machines, Last of the Great Urban Mayors: Chicago Politics, 1955-77," in Gove and Masotti, *After Daley*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-26; also official mayoral election returns, 1971 to 1983, Cook County Board of Election Commissioners (Chicago: City Hall, 1971-1983).

22. Rakove, *op. cit.*

23. For empirical data on local health needs, see Chicago Regional Hospital Study: *Annual Reports*, 1973, 1974, 1975 (Chicago: College of Urban Sciences, University of Illinois-Chicago Circle); for a historical background see Chicago Board of Health, *Chicago Health Statistics Survey: Health Data for the 75 Local Community Areas* (Chicago: Chicago Board of Health, WPA, 1939). For an assessment of inequalities in hospital facilities and professional personnel, see Pierre DeVise, "Misused

and Misplaced Hospitals and Doctors: A Locational Analysis of the Urban Health Care Crisis" (Washington, D.C.: Commission on College Geography, Resource Paper No. 22, Association of American Geographers, 1973).

Current health care conditions of Blacks in Chicago are documented in the proceedings from the Black Mayoral Politics Conference in *Black Mayors in American Cities*, op. cit. The most insightful accounts of the struggle to save Cook County Hospital, and the community unity and coalition-building dynamics around the issue, were provided by Lea Rogers and Quentin Young, health care activists and professionals directly involved in the work of the coalition. The most systematic documentation of the Cook County struggle in the public domain was printed in the pages of the *Chicago Defender*, April 1981 through September 1981. More general vital statistics on the health of the Chicago population are available through the Cook County Board of Health; its periodic reports can be found at the Municipal Reference Library at Chicago City Hall. For a view of health care issues in the primary, see "Health Care Urged as Key Primary Issue," *Chicago Tribune* (January 11, 1983). Also see "The State of Chicago's Health" by Harold Washington in *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, op. cit.

24. Paul Peterson, *School Politics Chicago Style* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Mary Herrick, *The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political History* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971); George Counts, *School and Society in Chicago* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1928).

The critical issues of public education in Chicago were documented and published in the proceedings of the Black Mayoral Politics Conference, in *Black Mayors in American Cities*, op. cit. Principal participants in the workshop, Rev. Kenneth Smith (former School Board president), George Schmidt (Substitutes United for Better Schools), and Harold Rodgers (Black Faculty in Higher Education), are highlighted in the proceedings. The current status of the Chicago public school system is well documented in the "Annual Reports of the Chicago Public Schools," Chicago Municipal Reference Library, Chicago City Hall; also see the various reports of the Citizens' Panel on the Public School Finances (1982). For a critical assessment of the recurrent financial crises within the school system from the perspective of the business community, see the publication of Chicago United, *Agenda for Public Education in Chicago*, June 1983. For selected articles in public schools as a campaign issue, see *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, op. cit.

25. Devereaux Bowly, Jr., *The Poorhouse: Subsidized Housing in Chicago, 1895-1976* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1978). The Chicago Housing Authority publishes bi-annually *CHA Facts*, as well as *Annual Reports*. The Cabrini-Green struggle is documented in the Chicago press of April-June 1981. The CHA Board struggle of April through

July 29, 1982 is also documented in the pages of the Chicago press. For a Black community perspective, see the *Chicago Defender*, April 1982 through July 25, 1982. For an insight into the organization of the struggle within CHA, see *Black Mayors in American Cities*, op. cit., on the Chicago Housing Tenants Organization; also available is a HUD publication, *Housing Crisis in Chicago* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), which features an article focused upon CHA housing and the role of the Chicago Tenants Organization. The CHA housing struggle is also documented in the "Campaign Build-up" section of *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, op. cit.

26. The best sources for information about the Allan Streeter campaign are the pages of the *Chicago Defender*, April through July 1, 1982 and the *All Chicago City News*, a bi-weekly newspaper that has documented key-issue areas in the struggle for local political and social reform. Also see "Campaign Build-up" section of *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, op. cit.

27. The *Chicago Reporter*, a monthly publication of the Community Renewal Society, annually reviews the status of Black business relations within the public sector. The Chicago Urban League's *Current Economic Conditions of Blacks in Chicago* (Chicago Urban League, 1977), is an available source. The Chicago Fest boycott of 1982 was prominently covered in the *Chicago Defender* in August of 1982. Also see the "Campaign Build-up" section of *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, op. cit., for selected articles focused on Chicago Fest and the Black community boycott. Another source of coverage was *All Chicago City News*, from August to September 1982. For an overall account of the press coverage in the primary, see *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, *ibid.*

28. Rodney Coates, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago, released findings of a study of the status of Blacks in municipal employment in the *Chicago Defender*, "Blacks Paid Less" (November 27, 1982). Coates's study is corroborated by previous *Chicago Reporter* investigations of minority employment and by the Chicago Urban League in 1977. It put a damper on Byrne's earlier claims that Black gains were made under her administration. See "Byrne Boasts of Black Gains," *Sun Times* (November 11, 1982).

29. The projected impacts of Reagan's domestic budget cuts were detailed in an assessment report published by the Legal Assistance Foundation: "The Reagan Budget Cuts: Impacts Upon the 'Truly Needy' in Chicago," edited by Doug Gills (1981). The origins, development, and activities of POWER are documented in the *All Chicago City News*, March 1982 through October 1982. POWER's role in the voter registration drive was documented in the Coalition Build-up Workshop of the Black Mayoral Politics Conference. See *Black Mayors in American Cities*, op. cit.

30. A major study of private housing in Chicago is Thomas L. Philpott's *The Slum and the Ghetto: Neighborhood Deterioration and Middle Class Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); also see Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council, *Housing Chicago and the Region* (Chicago: MHP, May 1981); and Chicago Urban League, *The Black Housing Market in Chicago* (Chicago: Research and Planning Department, May 1977).

31. Chicago Urban League, "Why Blacks Do Not Register and Vote" (Chicago: Research and Planning Department, 1981).

32. Ibid.

33. Official voter registration records are available from the Cook County Board of Election Commissioners (Chicago: City Hall, 1982, 1983).

34. Ibid.

35. It was widely projected that this high turnout in the November 2 general election represented the orchestration of a resurgence of the Cook County regular Democratic Party by chairman Ed Vrdolyak rather than an independent upsurge based in the Black community. See "Huge Voter Turnout Enhances (Washington) Mayoral Bid," *Chicago Defender* (November 4, 1982); see also the summary analysis articles of the effects of the gubernatorial turnout on the mayoral race in the *Sun Times* and *Chicago Tribune* (November 3-4, 1982).

36. The Byrne record in opposition to the issues of immediate concern to Blacks is documented in the local Black press, the *Chicago Defender* and the *Chicago Metro News*. Also, Lu Palmer, the noted Black journalist, has retained the commentaries from his radio program, "Lu's Notebook," in *Lu's Notebook* (Chicago: Lu Palmer Foundation, Summer-Fall 1982); see "Jane Byrne: Displaying a New Maturity," *Sun Times* (November 7, 1982).

37. Lu Palmer, *Lu's Notebook*, op. cit.

38. See "Byrne vs. Daley: How They Compare," and "A Capsule Look at the Daley Campaign," *Sun Times* (November 7, 1982). Also, the "Daley Biographical Sketch" prepared by the Daley campaign, reprinted in *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, op. cit.

39. During the third debate, Byrne noted that Daley should be careful in attacking her source of campaign funds because Daley "hadn't done so badly" himself. This was taken as a signal to the party faithful that Daley was mounting an implicit critique of patronage—a source of privilege and jobs—even among his supporters. Byrne implied that Daley could not be trusted to preside over this system, also because of his alignment with "open government liberals in his campaign."

40. See *Sun Times* (September 9-10, 1983). The El Rukns were especially active in the South Side on election weekend, and during the primary they worked through the Independent Grass Roots Youth Organization registering and mobilizing Black youth in wards where they had a strong presence (3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 20th wards). They received

some funds for these activities and for "poll working" during the primary election. Finally, they were seen frequently in attendance at meetings of the Task Force for Black Empowerment through December 1982. There they got names and phone numbers of people whom they called to intimidate during the latter stage of the primary.

41. See "Biographical Sketch" in *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, op. cit.; see also, press statement released by the Lawyers' Committee for Harold Washington, December 11, 1983, in authors' possession; and "Washington: 'My Life Is as Open as Anyone Else's,'" *Chicago Defender* (November 13, 1982).

42. *Crain's Chicago Business* is the leading news organ of fact and opinion of the business community, with a focus on the local and regional economy and public affairs affecting local and regional business. Weekly issues since 1976 are available. See "Washington Has Organization, Ability, Skills in Mayoral Bid" (December 24-31, 1982).

43. The factors were elaborated in a special conference newspaper circulated as a call to the Conference on Black Mayoral Politics, held at University of Illinois-Chicago Circle, January 28-29, 1983. The content of the *Black Mayoral Conference News* was developed by the Editorial Collective of Peoples College.

44. "Registration Totals," from Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.

45. *Ibid.*

46. A preliminary analysis of the correlation between racial distribution and vote for Harold Washington in the primary and general election has been undertaken by Ken Janda at Northwestern University. In the analysis of ward data, Janda found very high correlations (+.98) between percentage of Black ward population and percentage of vote for Harold Washington in both elections. The same analysis holds true (+.94) if the Latino vote is controlled. Janda found the most significant reversal was the dramatic shift in support for Washington among Latino wards in the general election. See K. Janda, "Notes on the Chicago Primary Vote," *Vox Pop* (APSA Newsletter Subfield Political Organizations/Parties) 2,1 (Winter 1983) and "More Notes on the 1983 Chicago Mayoral Election," *Vox Pop* 2,2 (Spring 1983). Also see Board of Election Commissioners, Official Canvas of the February 22, 1983 Primary Elections and various supplemental tallies, March 4, 1983.

47. Interview with Ken Glover, assistant campaign manager, held February 20, 1983. A similar proportion and total have been stated by various campaign officials (Al Raby, Bill Berry, Hope Mueller, et al.). However, the more definitive analysis remains. The data sources are the official campaign spending disclosure statements that candidates are required by law to file. See Committee to Elect Harold Washington Mayor of Chicago, Form D-2 Report of Campaign Contributions, or Annual Report of Campaign Contributions and

Expenditures (Chicago: Cook County Clerk, Nov. 10, 1982 to June 30, 1983).

48. *Black Mayoral Conference News*, op. cit.

49. See *Crain's Chicago Business*, "No Endorsement in Mayoral Primary" (February 14, 1983).

50. The authors have in their possession a listing of most organizations, individuals, and media endorsements for Harold Washington during the primary and the general elections. This material will be analyzed in detail in a future publication. The Black community leadership was virtually united in its support for Washington. However, Mike Scott with the Lawndale Peoples' Planning and Action Council supported Daley. Archie Hargreaves, former Shaw University president and leader of the West Side Organization, supported Jane Byrne, as did Oscar Brown, Jr., a well-known local Black artist.

51. The conclusions are based upon a recent study of the relations between ethnicity and religion and politics, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, "Chicago Elects a Black Mayor: An Historical Analysis of the 1983 Election," a research report edited by Paul Kleppner, Office for Social Science Research, Northern Illinois University, for the American Jewish Committee (Chicago: 55 East Jackson Blvd., Chicago, Ill. 60604, July 1983).

52. Official Canvas of the Primary Elections, Board of Election Commissioners, op. cit. Also Kleppner, op. cit.; *Chicago Reporter*, op. cit.

53. *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1, op. cit., Introduction. Each stage of the Washington campaign has not been fully elaborated in this analysis; however, the periodization scheme, first presented in *Black Power in Chicago*, provides a context for developing an analysis of the Washington campaign organization. This framework will be more fully articulated in subsequent publications, as products of research currently under way.

54. From *Black Mayoral Conference News*, op. cit.

55. Renault Robinson was appointed to the Chicago Housing Authority Board under Jane Byrne, becoming one of the most persistently vocal critics of CHA housing and management policy. Robinson had earlier earned popularity by leading the Afro-American Patrolmen's League, an organization of Black police officers organized in 1967 to fight against police brutality and misconduct against Blacks as well as against racial discrimination in employment, promotion, and assignment policies toward Blacks on the police force. The AAPL and Robinson were recently awarded a \$350,000 settlement of an anti-discrimination suit filed in 1971. Since the election of Washington, Robinson, an avid supporter of increased Black representation on policymaking boards, has been appointed the Commissioner of the Chicago Housing Authority.

56. Al Raby became well known as the Convener of the Chicago Coalition of Community Organizations (CCCO) between 1964 and 1967. Organized in 1961, "Triple-CO" was the first citywide coalition of civil rights groups and activists. CCCO mainly targeted discrimination against Blacks in the public schools and in housing. With Chicago SNCC and CORE as its support base, CCCO sustained a three-year boycott of the Chicago School Board, which was headed by Superintendent Ben Willis. CCCO under Raby has been credited with bringing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to Chicago in 1966 to dramatize the racist character of Northern cities. Raby was also a tenant union organizer and anti-Vietnam War activist in liberal Hyde Park. He began his political career as a delegate to the Illinois State Constitutional Convention, then served as an aide to Governor Walker through 1975. In 1976, he was appointed to the Peace Corps by President Carter and served as director of the Peace Corps mission to Ghana. After serving as campaign manager for Harold Washington (replacing Robinson), Raby ran unsuccessfully to fill the vacated seat of Washington in the First Congressional District. He placed a distant third behind Charles Hayes and Lu Palmer, Hayes's closest challenger. See Henry McCorty's "The Activist: Al Raby," *Chicago Tribune Magazine* (April 17, 1983).

57. The Task Force for Black Political Empowerment represented the consolidation of institutional/organizational leadership and the mobilization of Black community resources solidly behind Washington's campaign bid. The extensiveness of Washington's Black community support base refutes the view of Milton Rakove, a machine apologist, that the Black community still lacked sufficient resources and institutional support mechanisms to make a successful Black mayoralty bid possible. Rakove, a frequent contributor to the *Sun Times* and *Chicago Tribune*, is the author of *Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers*, and *We Don't Want Nobody Sent*, two impressionistic histories focused upon the Chicago machine during the Daley years (see Note 18).

58. Warren Bacon is a vice president and manager of Community Relations and Manpower Planning for Inland Steel Company, one of the leading steel-producing corporations in the United States. Bacon is also a board member of Seaway National Bank (a major Black bank located in Chicago), a member of the Illinois Board of Higher Education, and chairman of the Business Research Advisory Council to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. He holds a B.A. from Roosevelt University (1948) and a M.B.A. from the University of Chicago (1951). He serves on numerous civic boards, including the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council; the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities; the NAACP Legal Defense Fund; and Chicago United. Bacon served on the Chicago Board of Education from 1963 to 1973.

Edwin C. "Bill" Berry, a longtime civil rights influential and community leader, was the director of the Chicago Urban League at the height of the 1963-66 school boycott. He led forces to prevent hostile confrontations with the white power structure by militant Black community leaders. Berry is a leader in Chicago United, along with representatives of the leading business and corporate firms of Black, Latino, and white elites in Chicago. In addition to serving as chair of the Washington campaign steering committee, Berry became chair of the Washington Transition Committee in March following the primary victory.

59. See James Q. Wilson, *Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

60. See the press statement by PUSH regarding major contributions made by PUSH and Jesse Jackson to the Washington campaign. While PUSH claims to have made direct financial contributions to the campaign, PUSH does not show up in the financial disclosures as a direct contributor.

61. "Brzeczek Resigns, Washington: 'I Won't Have to Fire Him,'" *Chicago Defender* (April 6, 1983), p. 1.

62. See two articles by Marguerite Ross Barnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 32, 1 (1975), pp. 34-50; and "The Congressional Black Caucus: Illusions and Realities of Power," in Preston, et al. (eds.), *The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power* (New York: Longman, 1982), pp. 28-54.

63. Given the policy of reciprocity, since his election, Washington has spent considerable time on the road campaigning for local Black electoral bids across the country as part of the "payoff" to the national Black political elite, first and foremost, and to the Democratic Party in its electoral push for the 1984 presidential election.

64. Official Canvas of the Primary Elections, Board of Election Commissioners, op. cit.

65. This is partially explained by the concept of "cross pressures": a person belongs to two or more groups pulling in different directions. See Berelson, et al., *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

66. See *Crain's Chicago Business* (March 7-13, 1983), "Viewpoint," p. 10; and "The Ball's in Your Court, Washington Tells Business," pp. 1, 32. Also *Crain's Chicago Business* (March 14-20, 1983), "Four Cities with Black Mayors Show the Do's and Don'ts," p. 1.

67. See "National Demos to Byrne: 'Back Washington,'" *Sun Times* (March 23, 1983).

68. "Leaders Reaffirm Support," *Chicago Defender* (March 14, 1983), pp. 3-4.

69. For background on Ed Vrdolyak, see pamphlet "Stop Fast Eddie," available from TCB (Box 803351, Chicago, IL 60680).

70. Between May and August 1983, the *All Chicago City News* published a feature highlighting what the newspaper's editors termed "Cabalocrats," Republicans who had been masquerading as Democrats within the Democratic Party. Of course, the root term has its origins in the 1979 campaign, when Jane Byrne charged that these same party leaders were a "cabal of evil men." After being elected mayor, Byrne made her peace with the "cabal," who continued to lord over the local Democratic Party organization.

71. See *Black Power in Chicago*, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, op. cit.

72. The firm of Bailey, Deardourff, and Associates of New York was hired by the Epton Campaign. This firm had a long record of playing upon the most backward racial sentiments among whites. It was retained by Charles Robb in the 1980 race for governor in Virginia. Bailey, Deardourff has become the major Republican consulting firm. See also, "The Case Against Harold Washington," a 600-page documentary detailing Washington's brushes with the legal system and public irresponsibilities, compiled by Epton researchers. Materials are in possession of the authors.

73. See Edward R. Kantowicz, *Polish-American Politics in Chicago 1888-1940* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); John Allswang, *A House for All People: Ethnic Politics in Chicago, 1890-1936* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1971); Charles Emmons, "Economic and Political Leadership in Chicago Polonia" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1971), and Thaddeus Radzialowski, "The Competition for Jobs and Racial Stereotypes: Poles and Blacks in Chicago," *Polish American Studies* 33 (Autumn 1976), pp. 5-18.

74. In the possession of the authors is a set of records compiled by the Washington campaign on the legislative and public record of Bernard Epton. In addition, the reader should review the collection of policy papers generated by the Epton campaign and compare them with the "Washington Papers."

75. In Table 7, we presented election turnout data showing that 88% of the white electorate supported Byrne and Daley, while nearly 80% of the Black vote went to Washington. However, each campaign made attempts to recruit prominent community-respected leadership from across racial lines. On the other hand, during the general campaign period, Epton made little effort to recruit Blacks or Latinos to his campaign organization, and Washington, motivated by the reality of race as an issue in the campaign, redoubled his efforts to recruit prominent whites and Latinos into all levels of the campaign organization, including his Transition Team. See Tables 9 and 15; also Kleppner, op. cit.; Gove and Masotti, op. cit.

76. The authors have in their possession the campaign schedule of Harold Washington and the daily briefing notes and schedules

from February 1, 1983, through April 11, 1983; while in need of a much more thorough analysis, the preliminary analysis tends to confirm the claim that Washington campaigned in "all Chicago."

77. The Washington campaign issued a special paper on women's issues, as well as "street sheets" that targeted the concerns of women. The particular problems of Black women in Chicago must be assessed within the context of class exploitation, racism, and male supremacy. This has been highlighted by Peoples College in the 1979 *Black Liberation Month News* editorial, "The Triple Oppression of Black Women." A more historical treatment of Black women is found in the *Introduction to Afro-American Studies*, Vol. 2 (4th edition) (Chicago: Peoples College Press, 1978), chapter on "Black Women and the Family."

78. These data are drawn from the official April 1983 returns, available at the Cook County Board of Election Commissioners. The Kleppner study, *op. cit.*, represents the first published attempt to assess ethnicity as a factor in the election. Janda, *op. cit.*, attempts to focus upon the comparative role of nationality (Latino) in the primary and the general election returns.

79. A starting point for an understanding of the historical role of the Latino community in Chicago politics is Joanne Belenchia's "Latinos in Chicago Politics," in Gove and Masotti, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-45. See also John Walton and Luis Salces, "The Political Organization of Chicago's Latino Communities" (Evanston: Northwestern University Center for Urban Affairs, Red Cover Report, 1977).

80. From the 1983 Mayoral Inaugural Address of Harold Washington; the full text appears in the *Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago* (April 29, 1983, Chicago City Clerk's Office); *Sun Times* (April 29, 1983).

81. *Ibid.*; also see *Crain's Chicago Business* (March 7-13), "The Ball's in Your Court," *op. cit.*

82. See Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (1967). In this book, the strategy of Black power, stripped of its militant rhetoric, reveals an essentially reformist content. Black leaders would be willing to limit the aspirations and interests of Blacks to a proportionate share of the action rather than a radical redistribution of social wealth based upon egalitarian or socialist principles.

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
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Rod Bush, *The New Black Vote*



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